GIVE Conference- February 18, 2014
NYSP Academy, Albany NY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GIVE Conference- February 18, 2014
NYSP Academy, Albany NY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GIVE
Gun Involved Violence Elimination
Bidder's Conference
February 18, 2014

New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
80 South Swan Street
Albany, NY 12210
(518) 457-2667

Key Components of GIVE

Operation IMPACT Successes

- Promoted cooperative relationships between law enforcement agencies
- Advanced data-driven policing
- Enhanced information sharing
- 14 % overall crime reduction in IMPACT sites since inception. Most of this was property crime.

Same as IMPACT

- Same 17 counties
- Same partners
- Same funding
- Still competitive process – crime problem and quality of application/strategy

What is new with GIVE?

- Focus – shootings and homicides
- IMPACT murder up 14% 2013. NYC 20% drop shootings and murders.
- Crime Analysis Centers –
- Proven Strategies -

4 CORE COMPONENTS OF GIVE

1. **People** – Target "top offenders" responsible for most gun violence
2. **Places** –Target the key locations, or "hot spots", where most violence is occurring
3. **Alignment** –Align efforts and coordinate strategies with other local violence-prevention efforts
4. **Engagement** – Communicate and coordinate with key stakeholders and the community at large to ensure wide-ranging support

Jurisdiction Assessment

- Assess current shooting and homicide challenge
- Analyze underlying factors that contribute to the majority of shootings and homicides
- Identify existing resources used to combat gun crime

GIVE Strategy Development

- Utilize assessment, analysis, and resource evaluation to develop crime strategy
- Crime Analysis is crucial to the development and implementation of strategy

Evidence-Based Strategies

- Problem Oriented Policing
- Hot Spot Policing
- Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
- Focused Deterrence
- Street Workers
- Procedural Justice

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

- Do not necessarily have to start from scratch
- Technical Assistance and Training available from DCJS and national experts
- Encourage multi-faceted strategies

GIVE Monitoring

- Measure proposed strategies:
  - Implementation
  - Effectiveness
  - Outcome
- Not just crime data driven…

GIVE Network

- Cross-jurisdictional information sharing of successes and challenges
- Networking activities include:
  - Meetings
  - Conference calls
  - Webinars
  - Peer-to-peer learning



Problem Oriented Policing

John Klofas
Rochester Institute of Technology
Center for Public Safety Initiatives
John.klofas@rit.edu
585 475-2423

The **problem** **is the unit of work**, not a crime, a case or any individual incident.

POP Guides on violence (popcenter.org)

Youth violence
Violence around bars
Stalking and violence
Domestic Violence
Gun Violence in the workplace
Repeat Offenders
Gun Violence (Worcester, MA-)
High Point Violent Crime Task Force
Belmont NC Neighborhood violence reduction



The Crime Triangle

The SARA Process

- **Scanning**- identify reoccurring problems, develop broad goals
- **Analysis**- what is known there and elsewhere, narrow scope of problem, dev working hypothesis
- **Response**- brainstorm interventions, plan, implement
- **Assessment**- collect pre and post data, consider other strategies iteratively

The Analysis helps identify the problems. For Example:

- Disputes
- Locations, types,
- Gangs- or individual's in gangs- major offenders
- Bar closings
- Physical space
- Parking around bars
- Stores
- House parties
- Parolees/ probationers

TOOLS

- POP Guides (POPCenter.ORG)
- Partnerships
  - In CJ
  - Not in CJ
- Crime Analysis
- Research Partners
- Crime Incident Reviews

Issues to Address

1. Broad target analysis and definition (shootings)
2. GIVE Program structure- positions, responsibilities, project manager
3. Problem Specification Process-- working group, committee etc
4. Partners (who and how)
5. Links to other programs- ex street outreach programs
6. Discussion of other complimentary strategies
7. Analysis approach- what data, how use Analysis Center or other research resources
8. Implementation process – what resources, what will you measure?
9. Cycles/Iterations
10. Tracking, documentation and evaluation-

How Does POP Support…

- Hot Spot Policing
- Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CEPTED)
- Street Workers
- Focused Deterrence
- Procedural Justice

How does POP include…

- People Based Strategies
- Place Based Strategies
- Coordination with other local efforts (alignment)
- Engagement of stakeholders and community at large

Resources

- http://popcenter.org
- Boston Safe Street Teams https://www.crimesolutions.gov/programdetails.aspx?ID=280
- Crime Incident Reviews http://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/pdf/crime-incident-reviews-final.pdf
- Milwaukee Homicide Review Commission

http://city.milwaukee.gov/hrc#.Uv0gtfldV8E



Policing Hot Spots of Crime



Dr. Craig D. Uchida
Justice & Security Strategies
Visiting Fellow, BJA

GIVE Conference
Albany, NY
February 2014

Overview

- Background
- Rationale
- Evidence-Base Practices
- Implementation
- Example from Los Angeles
- Links to Other Strategies

Background

- Crime is not spread out evenly
- Crime occurs in clusters or in 'hot spots'
- Researchers found that some areas generate half of the crime in some cities
- Crime can be reduced by focusing resources on these areas.

Rationale

- Sherman, Gartin and Beurger (1995) found that gun crime was focused in specific areas in Kansas City
- Their experiment showed that crime reduction could occur by focusing directed patrol in specific areas.
- Similarly, Weisburd and Green (1995) focused on drug markets in Jersey City

Evidence-Based Practices

- 70% of large police departments across the country use crime mapping to identify crime hot spots (Police Foundation)
- 90% of agencies in a PERF survey (n=176) used hot spots policing on violent crime

Focused police interventions can produce significant crime prevention in high crime hot spots

Evidence-Based Practices

- National Research Council:

"…studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provided the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available."

(Skogan and Frydl, 2004)



Implementation



LAPD Southwest Division
May – Nov 12

- Use GIS to identify areas
- Focus on areas that are smaller than neighborhoods or communities
- For example, an 8 X 10 block area was used in the gun hot spot study
- Others recommend smaller areas or "micro-targets"
- Predictive policing models suggest 500 ft. by 500 ft. boxes

Implementation

- Use interventions that work:
  - Directed patrol
  - Crackdowns that are focused on small places
  - Traffic enforcement,
  - Problem solving methods
  - CPTED is linked here too (fix the environment)



Measure Outcomes

- Use official data – incidents of crime, calls for service, arrests
- Surveys of residents or businesses
- Systematic social observations (social or environmental factors – who, what, & where)
- Measure displacement or 'diffusion of benefits'
- Dosage – how much time is spent by police?

Findings

- Jersey City saw a reduction of 58% drug crimes at targeted drug hot spots
- Kansas City found 49% reduction in gun crime
- Diffusion of crime control benefits were more likely to occur than displacement

Specific example: Operation LASER

- Los Angeles' Strategic Extraction and Restoration Program (LASER)
- Created a Crime Intel Detail (CID)
- Focused on Chronic Locations and Chronic Offenders in Newton Division (1 of 21 LAPD areas)
- Newton = 150,000 people, 9 square miles, 44 gangs

Results

- Newton Division ended 2012 with an all-time low of 16 homicides –
  - A 56% decrease in homicides compared to 2011 and 59% decrease compared to 2010.
- Overall violent crime dropped 19% in Newton (from 2011 to 2012).
- Newton ranked number one in violent crime reduction in the entire LAPD for 2012

LASER: Location-based efforts

Where are the chronic locations? Used crime data (2006-2011), GIS, and analytics to answer questions





Gun-Related Crimes Newton Division 2011

Five Hotspot Corridors (in green); based on 2006-2011 data



Interventions: Locations

Weekly Missions in Hot Spot Corridors

Use Existing Resources:

- **Patrol Units (watches 2, 3 and 5)**
- **Bikes**
- **Foot Patrol**
- **Parole Compliance Unit (AB 109)**

Measures

- **Dosage = Extra minutes/month in hot spot corridors**
- **Crime Count by Deployment Period (DP) and by month**
  - **Gun-Related Crime (Part 1 and 2 incidents with a gun) since 2006**
  - **All Part 1 Crimes – Violent and Property since 2006**

TOTAL MINUTES IN NEWTON CORRIDORS BY DP, 2011-2012



Time Series

- From January 06 to June 2012
- Results indicate that Operation LASER had ***significant and tangible reductions in:***
- ***Gun-related crime (Part 1 and 2)***
- ***Homicides***
- ***Robberies***
- ***Violent Crime (Part 1)***

Time Series: Bottom Line

- Results **suggest that gun-related crime is falling nearly four (4) times faster** in Newton after LASER was implemented in Sept 2011
- Differences are statistically significant at the .10 level



Links to other Strategies

- Problem-Oriented Policing
  - Scanning
  - Analysis
  - Response
  - Assessment
- Chronic Offenders
  - Target specific persons within specific locations

Questions?

Los Angeles, California Smart Policing Initiative

Reducing Gun-Related Violence through Operation LASER

Smart Policing Initiative: Site Spotlight

October 2012

Smart Policing: Research Snapshot

The Los Angeles Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) sought to reduce gun-related violence in specific neighborhoods in the city of Los Angeles, through application of the SARA problem-solving model—Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment. As part of the scanning phase, the LAPD and its research partner examined gun-related crimes by Division and by Reporting District for 2011. In 2011, the Newton Division was ranked third in gun violence among the 21 Divisions.

The Los Angeles SPI team next sought to identify specific areas for intervention in the Newton Division, employing a geographic analysis of data on gun-related crimes, arrests, and calls for service over a six-year period (2006-2011). The location-based analysis resulted in the identification of five large hotspots.

Once the target areas were identified, the Los Angeles SPI team developed their intervention strategy, called Los Angeles' Strategic Extraction and Restoration Program (Operation LASER). Established in September 2011, Operation LASER's overall goal is to target with laser-like precision the violent repeat offenders and gang members who commit crimes in the target areas. LASER involves both location- and offender-based strategies, most notably the creation of a Crime Intelligence Detail (CID). CID's primary mission centers on the development of proactive, real-time intelligence briefs called *Chronic Offender Bulletins*. The bulletins assist officers in identifying crime trends and solving current investigations, and they give officers a tool for proactive police work.

The Los Angeles SPI team assessed the impact of Operation LASER using Interrupted Time-Series Analysis. In particular, the team analyzed monthly crime data for the Newton Division and 18 other divisions from January 2006–June 2012. Results show that Part I violent crimes, homicide, and robbery all decreased significantly in the Newton Division after Operation LASER began. After the program was implemented, Part I violent crimes in the Newton Division dropped by an average of 5.4 crimes per month, and homicides dropped by 22.6 percent per month. Importantly, the crime declines did not occur in the other LAPD divisions, which provide strong evidence that Operation LASER caused the declines in the Newton Division.

The Los Angeles SPI experience offers a number of lessons learned for both police managers and line officers. The initiative underscores the value of the SARA model as an evidence-based framework for crime control, and it highlights the central role of both crime analysis and technology in data-driven decision-making. The Los Angeles SPI invested heavily in the relationship between line officers and crime analysts, and the investment paid off in sizeable reductions in gun-related crime in the target areas. The initiative also demonstrates the importance of focusing intervention strategies on both people and places to achieve success in crime control and prevention.

This project was supported by Grant No. 2009-DG-BX-K021 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Los Angeles, California Smart Policing Initiative: Reducing Gun-Related Violence through Operation LASER

Craig D. Uchida, Marc Swatt, David Gamero, Jeanine Lopez, Erika Salazar, Elliott King, Rhonda Maxey, Nathan Ong, Douglas Wagner, and Michael D. White

Introduction

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and its research partner, Justice and Security Strategies, Inc. (JSS; led by Dr. Craig Uchida), sought to reduce gun-related violence and crime in specific neighborhoods in the Newton Division, one of 21 areas the LAPD serves. The Los Angeles Smart Policing Initiative (SPI) team selected this division because it has consistently ranked among the top three Divisions for the number of shootings and shooting victims over the last six years, and because there are more than 40 active gangs in the area. The Los Angeles SPI team sought to address gun violence in the Newton Division through a data-driven, evidence-based approach that incorporated both place- and offender-based strategies. The Los Angeles SPI team developed their strategy, called Los Angeles' Strategic Extraction and Restoration Program (Operation LASER), using the SARA problem-solving framework—Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment.

I. The Problem

Scanning

In 2011, 7,794 gun-related crimes occurred throughout the city of Los Angeles. Figure 1 (page 4) shows the top generators of gun violence across the city. The Newton Division, which has a population of about 150,000 and covers nine square miles, experienced the third highest number of gun crimes among the 21 LAPD divisions.

Additional analysis demonstrated that gun crimes were concentrated in a small number of locations. For example, of the 1,135 reporting districts in Los Angeles, about 6 percent accounted for 30 percent of the gun-related crimes in the city, and a number of these violent reporting districts were concentrated in and around the Newton Division. In addition to experiencing a disproportionate number of gun crimes, the SPI team also targeted the Newton Division because of the prevalence of gang activity in the Division. Gangs have been active in the area for over 40 years, beginning with the *Crips* and *Bloods* in the 1970s, and continuing with Hispanic gangs like *Primera Flats*, *38th Street*, *Playboys*, and others. In 2011, the LAPD documented 44 active gangs in the Newton Division. Finally, the SPI team selected the Newton Division because the area had been given little research attention in the past and because the recently promoted Captain was receptive to using data to drive decision-making.

Figure 1. Number of Gun-Related Crimes in Los Angeles by Division, 2011



Analysis

To identify specific areas for intervention, LAPD crime analysts in the Newton Division and in the Real-time Analysis and Critical Response Division (RACR), along with JSS, analyzed crime data to identify the top locations of gun violence in the Newton Division. Analysts examined the locations of crime incident and arrest data, as well as calls for police service, over a six-year period (from 2006 to 2011). Specifically, the SPI team focused on any Part I or Part II crime and arrest that involved a firearm, including drive-by shootings, shots fired, robberies, aggravated assaults, homicides, gang-related crime (with a firearm), drug offenses with a gun, and vandalism with a gun. For calls for service, the SPI team developed a rigorous protocol that flagged calls for crimes, as well as incident code descriptions that included 'shot' or 'gun' in the text fields.

The SPI team then used spatial analysis (in ESRI's ArcView) to create hotspot/density maps of the locations of gun crimes for each year. The six-year location-based analysis resulted in the identification of five large hotspots, shown in Figure 2 (the four narrow rectangular boxed areas, and the wider rectangular boxed area). From left to right, the first four hotspots are business corridors along major arteries in the Newton Division: Broadway, Main, Avalon, and Central Avenues. The fifth, larger hotspot is designated as a Community Law Enforcement and Recovery Program or "CLEAR" area. In 1995, the city of Los Angeles identified a total of nine CLEAR sites based on the level of gang activity, and, since that time, these areas have received additional community and law enforcement resources. Rather than break off a piece of the designated area, the SPI team decided to adopt the already-identified CLEAR boundary for the fifth project hotspot.

Figure 2. Gun-Related Crime Hotspots in Newton Division, 2011



II. The Response

Once the scanning and analysis phases were complete, the Los Angeles SPI team designed and implemented their response, called the Los Angeles' Strategic Extraction and Restoration Program, or Operation LASER. Operation LASER has five primary goals:

- Extract offenders from specific neighborhoods and areas.
- Restore peace to neighborhoods and communities.
- Remove the anonymity of gun offenders.
- Remove the anonymity of gang members.
- Reduce gun- and gang-related crime in the Newton Division.

Operation LASER is grounded in situational and environmental theories of crime. The basic premise is to target with laser-like precision the violent repeat offenders and gang members who commit crimes in the specific target areas. The program is analogous to laser surgery, where a trained medical doctor uses modern technology to remove tumors or improve eyesight. First, the area is carefully diagnosed: Who are the offenders, and where and when are they involved in criminal activity? Plans are then developed to remove offenders from an area with minimal invasiveness and minimal harm to the people and areas around them. Extraction of offenders takes place in a "non-invasive" manner (no task forces or saturation patrol activities), and the result produces less disruption in neighborhoods. Continuing with the medical analogy, by extracting offenders surgically, recovery time of the neighborhood is faster.

Offender- and Location-Based Strategies

Operation LASER, which includes both offender- and location-based strategies, was implemented in the five hotspot areas identified in the Newton Division. The centerpiece of the offender-based strategies involved the creation of a Crime Intelligence Detail (CID), composed originally of two sworn officers and one crime analyst (a third officer was added to the Detail in January 2012). CID's mission is to gather information from all available sources to produce proactive intelligence briefs called *Chronic Offender Bulletins*.[1] The CID unit gathers data daily from each patrol shift in the Newton Division, as well as from the Bicycle Unit, foot patrol, and Parole Compliance Unit (PCU) at Newton. CID also conducts daily reviews of all Field Identification Cards (FI), Citations, Release from Custody Forms (RFC), Crime Reports, and Arrest Reports from each of these entities, and then selects potential chronic offenders based on pre-determined criteria. Once CID has identified probable offenders, the Detail conducts more in-depth analyses of those individuals to confirm that they have been appropriately identified (e.g., review of each individual's criminal history, gang affiliation, previous detentions, and other factors).[2]

If an individual meets the criteria, CID prepares a *Chronic Offender Bulletin*. The bulletin contains pertinent information on each individual, such as description, physical idiosyncrasies (tattoos), gang affiliation, prior

[1] The Los Angeles City Attorney has approved the creation, use, and dissemination of the bulletins.

[2] The Palantir platform that LAPD uses allows law enforcement personnel to search multiple databases in one place. The program can map information, make associations among suspects and persons of interest, and aggregate data across Divisions, Bureaus, and the whole department. Palantir is described in greater detail in the last section of this Site Spotlight.

crimes committed, parole or probation status, and locations where the individual was stopped in or near the Newton Division. The bulletins are disseminated to all supervisors, officers, and detectives via an internal computer drive that only sworn personnel can use. Each *Chronic Offender Bulletin* is then placed into an online folder based on the location of where the individual was stopped (usually the Reporting District) in the Newton Division. The bulletins, which are updated every two months, are accessible through the officers' patrol car computers. The bulletins are intended to assist officers in identifying crime trends and solving current investigations, and to give officers a tool for proactive police work (e.g., a list of offenders to proactively seek out).

Initially, CID focused on individuals who committed robberies, weapons violations, burglaries, burglary from motor vehicles, and aggravated assaults related to gun and gang violence, though the primary focus soon turned to violent gun offenders. From July 2011 through June 2012, CID created 124 *Chronic Offender Bulletins.* Additionally, CID officers and the SPI research partner established consistent and uniform criteria to rank-order chronic offenders. The scheme assigns additional points based on known risk factors:

- 5 points if the individual is a gang member;
- 5 points if the individual is on Parole or Probation;
- 5 points if the individual had any prior arrests with a handgun;
- 5 points if the individual had any violent crimes on his rap sheet; and
- 1 point for every quality police contact in the last two years (2009-2011).

The worst offender had 31 points, and the top ten all had more than 25 points. These top ten chronic offenders became the primary targets for patrol and special units, who employed traditional enhanced surveillance, as well as License Plate Readers, in probable offender locations. By August 2012, 87 of the 124 identified chronic offenders (70 percent) had been arrested at least once.

The Los Angeles SPI team also conducts location-based strategies in each of the five identified hotspots. These include:

- Directed patrols—Patrol officers are given "missions" to work the areas, watching for
- criminal activity at specific times and in specific locations;
- Bike officer and foot patrol missions in the hotspot corridors; and
- Use of closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras.

All officers were asked to record the additional time they spent in the five hotspots as a result of Operation LASER. The SPI team examined officers' reports to calculate SPI project time across four-week periods (LAPD calls these "deployment periods"), from September 2011 through August 2012. During this time, officers spent an additional 8,900 to 18,000 minutes per deployment period in the five hotspots (an average of 13,326 extra minutes per period). Put another way, the hotspot corridors received 55.5 extra man hours per week, or about 8 hours per day.

Figure 3A. Results for Total Part I Violent Crimes and Gun Crimes in the Newton Division

Figure 3A. Observed v Predicted Crime for Newton



III. Assessment: Measuring Operation LASER's Impact

The LAPD SPI team sought to measure the impact of Operation LASER using a strong quasi-experimental, Interrupted Times Series design. The Interrupted Time Series design assesses whether the interventions in the Newton Division had an effect on crime while controlling for the previously existing trends. The SPI team examined monthly crime incident data for the Newton Division and 18 other divisions, from January 2006 to June 2012. Specifically, the analysis focused on Total Part I Crime, Part I Violent Crime, Part I Property Crime, Part I Gun-Related Crime (any Part I crime where a firearm was indicated as a weapon), and individual crimes of Homicide, Robbery, Burglary, and Motor Vehicle Theft.[3] The results from the analysis of Newton Division are presented visually in the figures below. In each graph, the solid grey line represents the observed crimes for each category for the Newton Division from January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2012. The dotted line represents the predicted crime from the various models for each crime type. The dashed vertical line, labeled "Intervention," is a reference line for the start date of Operation LASER that occurred on September 2011 (month 69).

Figure 3A shows the results for Total Part I Violent Crimes and Gun Crimes. For Total Part I Violent Crime, there is a pronounced downward trend after the intervention that is statistically significant, and it suggests that the Newton Division experienced 5.393 fewer Part I Violent

[3] The Foothill and North Hollywood Divisions were excluded from consideration due to the fact that these divisions are currently implementing strategies from Predictive Policing and because these efforts started around the same time as Operation LASER. For more information on the Interrupted Time Series methodology, as well as the analysis and modeling techniques, see Uchida, C.D. & Swatt, M.L. (2012). "Smart Policing in Los Angeles: Preliminary Results." Washington, DC: Justice and Security Strategies.

crimes per month after Operation LASER was implemented. The change in the slope of Gun-Related Part I crimes is less pronounced and did not reach statistical significance, though this finding may be tied to the limited number of post-intervention observations (e.g., number of months since LASER started). If the downward trend continues through the end of 2012, it will likely reach statistical significance.

Figure 3B. Results for Homicide and Robbery in the Newton Division



Figure 3B shows the results for Homicide and Robbery, and for both types of crimes, a statistically significant decrease follows the intervention.[4] For Homicide, this translates into an additional 22.59 percent per month decrease after Operation LASER began. For Robbery, this translates into an additional decrease of 0.218 robberies per month after Operation LASER began. The SPI team also tested whether the findings in the Newton Division were unique or part of larger crime trends in Los Angeles. Similar models were run for 18 other divisions, and the findings from the Newton Division were not observed in those other areas.[5] This suggests that the findings in the Newton

[4] Note that there is a general downward trend for all of the crimes shown in Figures 3A and 3B. As stated earlier, one of the advantages of Interrupted Time Series Analysis is that it accounts for trends prior to an intervention and assesses whether an intervention "accelerated" the trend. This is what occurred in the Newton Division; Operation LASER led to accelerated declines in Part I Violent Crimes, Homicides, and Robbery. Although not show here, the authors also ran models for Total Part I Crime, Total Part I Property Crime, Burglary and Motor Vehicle Theft. The findings were not significant, which is likely explained by the fact that Operation LASER did not focus on property crimes.

[5] The analysis of other Divisions did identify four trends that were consistent with the reductions in the Newton Division. Each of these findings was explored in detail and was determined to be a statistical artifact. For more detail on this analysis, see Uchida, C.D. & Swatt, M.L. (2012). "Smart Policing in Los Angeles: Preliminary Results." Washington, DC: *Justice and Security Strategies*.

Division are distinctive, and provides strong evidence that Operation LASER caused the crime reductions in Newton.

IV. Lessons Learned

For the Police Manager

The SARA model provides an evidence-based foundation for crime control: There is a large and growing body of evidence highlighting the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing and of the SARA model in addressing a host of crime and disorder-related problems.[6] The SARA model's phases – Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment – are straightforward and logical: first, identify a problem; then, determine the cause of the problem. Once the scope, nature, and causes of the problem are understood, develop a comprehensive response to target the underlying conditions (or causes) of the problem. Last, evaluate the response to make sure that it had the intended effect on the problem. In Los Angeles, the SPI team identified gun-related violence in the Newton Division as a problem, and through crime analysis, determined that the problem was tied to chronic offenders in specific hot spot locations. The SPI team developed strategies that were both offender- and location-based, and targeted those individuals and places with "laser-like" precision. With assistance from their research partner, the Los Angeles SPI team used a rigorous quasi-experimental methodology to document significant reductions in Part I violent crime, homicide and robbery in the target areas (with promising results for gun crime as well). Results from the Los Angeles SPI demonstrate that the SARA model is an effective strategy for controlling and preventing crime.

Crime analysis is the key to data-driven decision making: The analysis phase of the SARA model has traditionally been given short-shrift by police, who often do not have the time or resources for in-depth analysis. However, responses that do not properly target the causes of a problem can provide, at best, only a temporary solution. Crime analysis provides an in-depth understanding of a problem, and it provides answers to important questions, such as: *Why is this a problem now? What is causing this problem? Why has this problem persisted for so long at this location? What (and who) needs to be targeted to effectively address this problem?* Crime analysis provides the necessary guidance and direction for effective responses to these questions. In Los Angeles, the SPI team harnessed the resources and expertise of the newly formed CID, which used real-time, daily analysis of all available data to effectively identify offenders and locations that were intimately tied to the violence and gun crime in the Newton Division. CID effectively became the "eyes and ears" of the Newton Division, and provided patrol officers, detectives, and supervisors with a road map for targeting the places and people most responsible for crime problems in the area. The LAPD's upfront investment of resources and staff in CID paid off in the long-term, as illustrated by Operation LASER's impact on violent crime, homicide and robbery in the Newton Division.

Technology can improve efficiency and effectiveness: Technology has been central to the LAPD's ability to improve efficiency and

[6] See Weisburd, D. & Eck, J.E. (2004). "What police can do to reduce crime, disorder, and fear?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 593, 42-65.

effectiveness. A new platform called Palantir enables crime analysts, officers, and detectives to search LAPD's data in a single place and discover associations and connections between internal and external sources. Data sources include crime incidents, arrests, field interviews, calls for service, license plate readers, vehicle recovery, and citizen tips, allowing crime analysts and detectives to find suspects, vehicles, and locations quickly and easily.[7] When Operation LASER first began, it took the CID unit about an hour to generate a bulletin; using Palantir, the process now takes three to five minutes. Additionally, Palantir allows officers to search for license plates when they may only have three numbers or letters, and it creates visual work-ups of criminal networks and marks crime incidents on maps. This technology has been central to the success of the Los Angeles SPI.[8]

For the Line Officer

Focus on both people and places: Research has consistently shown that crime is not only tied to people, it is tied to places. For example, results from the Boston SPI indicate that many of the violent street corners and segments in the city have been crime hot spots for decades. That is, the most violent streets and corners in 1980 are still the most violent streets and corners more than 30 years later. The people living and spending time on those streets have certainly changed, but violence has persisted at those locations because of the relationship between crime and place. In fact, many of the prevailing theories of crime and crime prevention now focus on the interplay between people and places (e.g., Broken Windows, Routine Activities).

Results from the Los Angeles SPI also highlight the importance of targeting places. For the veteran line officer, the idea that certain street corners, bars, apartment complexes, and convenience stores are persistently violent is no surprise. However, line officers traditionally focus on the people at those locations, rather than the locations themselves. Place-based strategies that increase guardianship of places reduce opportunities for crime and increase the risk of apprehension for criminals, both of which are effective tools in the line officer's toolbox. Examples of place-based strategies include working with property and business owners to manage their properties more effectively, using technology to increase surveillance (CCTV and license plate readers), and adhering to the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). In short, effective crime control and prevention is grounded in targeting both people and places.

Rely on your crime analyst: The 21st century law enforcement agency is data-driven, strategic, and proactive. Though line officers are increasingly expected to engage in systematic problem-solving, including problem analysis, they often lack the time, resources, and analytic skills to comprehensively examine complex problems. This is the core of the crime analyst's role, however. Line officers should develop a

[7] Currently, Palantir is undergoing beta testing and refinements in the Newton Division.

[8] LAPD also makes use of predictive policing tools to guide deployment of officers into areas where they are needed the most. Using a mathematical algorithm developed at University of California, Los Angeles, LAPD has been testing the premise that property crimes (e.g., burglary and burglaries from motor vehicles) can be predicted at specific locations at specific times. Five divisions are currently testing the predictive policing model.

positive working relationship with their agency's crime analysis unit. This working relationship should be defined by open communication, responsiveness, and constructive feedback. Unfortunately, this is often not the case. In some agencies, crime analysts work out of headquarters and are isolated from line officers. In other agencies, crime analysts are civilians who are under-valued by sworn personnel. In addition, some crime analysts are overburdened with administrative tasks tied to weekly meetings and the demands of police leadership (e.g., CompStat), and they struggle to balance those demands with requests from line officers.

In Los Angeles, the SPI team invested heavily in the relationship between line officers and crime analysts. The newly formed CID has become an invaluable resource to line officers in the Newton Division. CID produces real-time intelligence that directly guides the work of line officers. Moreover, the CID unit is able to respond to requests from officers about specific offenders and locations. In effect, the Los Angeles SPI has produced a seamless integration of crime analysis into the day-to-day activities of line officers. In simple terms, the crime analyst plays a crucial role in the 21st century police department. The closer the relationship between the crime analyst and the line officers, the more likely that those line officers will engage in data-driven decision-making, ultimately leading to more effective crime prevention and control.

About The Authors

Craig D Uchida is President of Justice & Security Strategies, Inc (JSS). Dr. Uchida received his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from the University at Albany. His research interests include predictive policing, community policing, gang violence, and mortgage fraud.

Marc Swatt is a Senior Research Associate and Statistician with JSS. Dr. Swatt received his Ph.D. from the University of Nebraska Omaha.

Dave Gamero, Jeanine Lopez, Erika Salazar, and Elliott King are police officers with the LAPD.

Rhonda Maxey, Nathan Ong, and Douglas Wagner (Ph.D.) are Crime Intelligence Analysts with the LAPD.

Michael D. White is an Associate Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State University, and is Associate Director of ASU's Center for Violence Prevention and Community Safety. He is also a Subject Matter Expert for BJA's *Smart Policing Initiative*. He received his Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Temple University in 1999. Prior to entering academia, Dr. White worked as a deputy sheriff in Pennsylvania. Dr. White's primary research interests involve the police, including use of force, training, and misconduct. His recent work has been published in *Justice Quarterly, Criminology and Public Policy, Crime and Delinquency, and Criminal Justice and Behavior*.

8 References

Barr, R., & Pease, K. (1990). Crime placement, displacement, and deflection. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), *Crime and justice: A review of research* (vol. 12, pp. 277-318) Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berk, R., Smyth, G., & Sherman, L. (1988). When random assignment fails: Some lessons from the Minneapolis spouse abuse experiment. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 4, 209-23.

Bittner, E. (1970). *The functions of the police in modern society*. New York: Aronson.

Bowers, K., Johnson, S., Guerette, R., Summers, L., & Poynton, S. (2011). *Spatial displacement and diffusion of benefits among geographically focused policing initiatives.* Campbell Systematic Reviews DOI: 10.4073/csr.2011.3.

Braga, A. (1997). *Solving violent crime problems: An evaluation of the Jersey City police department's pilot program to control violent places.* Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International.

Braga, A. (2001). The effects of hot spots policing on crime. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578, 104 – 25.

Braga, A. (2005). Hot spots policing and crime prevention: A systematic review of randomized controlled trials. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 1, 317 – 342.

Braga, A. (2007). *The effects of hot spots policing on crime*. Campbell Systematic Reviews DOI:10.4073/csr.2007.1

Braga, A. (2008). *Problem-oriented policing and crime prevention.* 2nd ed. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.

Braga, A., & Bond, B. (2009). Community perceptions of police crime prevention efforts: Using interviews in small areas to evaluate crime reduction strategies. In J. Knutsson & N. Tilley (Eds.), *Evaluating crime reduction* (pp. 85 - 120). Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press.

Braga, A., & Weisburd, D. (2010). *Policing problem places: Crime hot spots and effective prevention.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Braga, A., & Weisburd, D. (2006). Problem-oriented policing: The disconnect between principles and practice. In D. Weisburd & A. Braga (Eds.), *Police*

innovation: Contrasting perspectives (pp. 133 – 154). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Brantingham, P., & Brantingham, P. (Eds). (1991). *Environmental criminology*. 2nd ed.Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Buerger, M. (Ed). (1992). *The crime prevention casebook: Securing high crime locations.* Washington, DC: Crime Control Institute.

Buerger, M. (1993). *Convincing the recalcitrant: An examination of the Minneapolis RECAP experiment.* Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International.

Campbell, D.T., & Boruch, R. (1975). Making the case for randomized assignment to treatment by considering the alternatives: Six ways in which quasi-experimental evaluations in compensatory education tend to underestimate effects. In C. Bennett & A. Lumsdaine (Eds.), *Evaluation and experiment: Some critical issues in assessing social programs* (pp. 195 – 296). New York: Academic Press.

Campbell, D.T., & Stanley, J. (1966). *Experimental and quasi-experimental designs for research*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Clarke, R.V., & Felson, M. (Eds.) (1993). *Routine activity and rational choice. Advances in criminological theory* (vol. 5). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.

Clarke, R.V., & Harris, P. (1992). Auto theft and its prevention. In M. Tonry (Ed.), *Crime and justice: A review of research* (vol. 16, pp. 1-54). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Clarke, R.V., & Weisburd, D. (1994). Diffusion of crime control benefits: Observations on the reverse of displacement. *Crime Prevention Studies* 2, 165-84.

Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*. 2nd ed. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Cohen, L., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review* 44, 588-605.

Cook, T. & Campbell, D.T. (1979). *Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Cordner, G., & Biebel, E. (2005). Problem-oriented policing in practice. *Criminology and Public Policy* 4, 155 – 180.

Cornish, D., & Clarke, R.V. (1987). Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory. *Criminology* 25, 933-947.

Duval, S., & Tweedie, R. (2000). A nonparametric “trim and fill” method of accounting for publication bias in meta-analysis. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 95, 89-98.

Eck, J. (1997). Preventing crime at places. In University of Maryland, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Eds.), *Preventing crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising* (pp. 7-1 – 7-62). Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

Eck, J. (2002). Preventing crime at places. In L. Sherman, D. Farrington, B.Welsh, & D. L. MacKenzie (Eds.), *Evidence-based crime prevention* (pp. 241-294). New York: Routledge.

Eck, J. (2006). Science, values, and problem-oriented policing: Why problem-oriented policing? In D. Weisburd & A. Braga (Eds.), *Police innovation: Contrasting perspectives* (pp. 117 – 132). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Eck, J., & Maguire, E. (2000). Have changes in policing reduced violent crime? An assessment of the evidence. In A. Blumstein & J. Wallman (Eds.), *The crime drop in America* (pp. 207 – 265). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Eck, J., & Weisburd, D. (1995). Crime places in crime theory. In J. Eck & D. Weisburd (Eds.), *Crime and place* (pp. 1-34). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.

Farrington, D. (2006). Methodological quality and the evaluation of anti-crime programs.*Journal of Experimental Criminology* 2, 329-327.

Farrington, D., Gill, M., Waples, S., & Argomaniz, J. (2007). The effects of closed-circuit television on crime: Meta-analysis of an English national quasi-experimental multi-site evaluation. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 3, 21 – 38.

Farrington, D., & Petrosino, A. (2001). The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578, 35-49.

Goldkamp, J., & Vilcica, E. (2008). Targeted enforcement and adverse system side effects: The generation of fugitives in Philadelphia. *Criminology* 46, 371 – 410.

Goldstein, H. (1990). *Problem-oriented policing*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Green, L. (1996). *Policing places with drug problems*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Greene, J. A. (1999). Zero tolerance: A case study of police practices and policies in New York City. *Crime and Delinquency* 45, 171-81.

Hawley, A. (1944). Ecology and human ecology. *Social Forces* 23, 398-405.

Hawley, A. (1950). *Human ecology: A theory of urban structure*. New York: Ronald Press.

Hunter, R., & Jeffrey, C.R. (1992). Preventing convenience store robbery through environmental design. In R. Clarke (Ed.), *Situational crime prevention:*

Successful case studies (pp. 194-204). Albany, New York: Harrow and Heston.

Kelling, G., Pate, A., Dickman, D., & Brown, C. (1974). *The Kansas City preventive patrol experiment: A technical report.* Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

Lipsey, M., & Wilson, D.B. (2001). *Practical meta-analysis*. Applied social research methods series (vol. 49). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Lösel, F., & Köferl, P. (1989). Evaluation research on correctional treatment in West Germany: A meta-analysis. In H. Wegener, F. Lösel, & J. Haisch (Eds.), *Criminal behavior and the justice system* (pp. 334-355). New York: Springer.

Mazerolle, L., Soole, D., & Rombouts, S. (2007). *Street level drug law enforcement: A meta-analytic review*. Campbell Systematic Reviews, DOI: 10.4073/csr.2007.2.

Pease, K. (1991). The Kirkholt project: Preventing burglary on a British public housing estate. *Security Journal* 2, 73-77.

Perry, A., & Johnson, M. (2008). Applying the consolidated standards of reporting trials (CONSORT) to studies of mental health provision for juvenile offenders: A research note. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 4, 165-185.

Perry, A., Weisburd, D., & Hewitt, C. (2010). Are criminologists reporting experiments in ways that allow us to assess them? *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 6, 245 – 263.

Pierce, G., Spaar, S., & Briggs, L. 1988. *The character of police work: Strategic and tactical implications.* Boston, MA: Center for Applied Social Research, Northeastern University.

Police Executive Research Forum (2008). *Violent crime in America: What we know about hot spots enforcement.* Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Reppetto, T. (1976). Crime prevention and the displacement phenomenon. *Crime & Delinquency* 22, 166-77.

Rosenthal, R. (1994). Parametric measures of effect size. In H. Cooper & L. Hedges (Eds.), *The handbook of research synthesis* (pp. 231-244). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Rothstein, H.R. (2008). Publication bias as a threat to the validity of meta-analytic results. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 4, 61-81.

Shaw, C., & McKay, H. (1942). *Juvenile delinquency and urban areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shaw, J. (1995). Community policing against guns: Public opinion of the Kansas City gun experiment. *Justice Quarterly* 12, 695-710.

Sherman, L. (1990). Police crackdowns: Initial and residual deterrence. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), *Crime and justice: A review of research* (vol. 12, pp. 1-48). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sherman, L. (1997). Policing for crime prevention. In University of Maryland, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Eds.), *Preventing crime: What works, what doesn't, what's promising* (pp. 8-1 – 8-58). Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

Sherman, L. (2002). Fair and effective policing. In J.Q. Wilson & J. Petersilia (Eds.), *Crime: Public policies for crime control* (pp. 383-412). Oakland, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

Sherman, L., Gartin, P., & Buerger, M. (1989). Hot spots of predatory crime: Routine activities and the criminology of place. *Criminology* 27, 27-56.

Skogan, W., & Frydl, K. (Eds.) (2004). *Fairness and effectiveness in policing: The evidence.* Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Taylor, R., & Gottfredson, S. (1986). Environment design, crime, and prevention: An examination of community dynamics. In A.J. Reiss & M. Tonry (Eds.), *Communities and crime* (pp. 387 – 416). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tyler, T. (2000). Social justice: Outcomes and procedures. *International Journal of Psychology* 35, 117-125.

Tyler, T. (2001). Public trust and confidence in legal authorities: What do majority and minority groups members want from the law and legal institutions? *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 19, 215-235.

Weisburd, D. (1997). *Reorienting crime prevention research and policy: From causes of criminality to the context of crime.* Research report. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Weisburd, D., & Braga, A. (2003). Hot spots policing. In H. Kury & J. Obergfell-Fuchs (Eds.), *Crime prevention: New approaches* (pp. 337-354). Mainz, Germany: Weisser Ring.

Weisburd, D., & Eck, J. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, and fear? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593, 42-65.

Weisburd, D., & Green, L. (1994). Defining the street level drug market. In D. MacKenzie and C. Uchida (Eds.), *Drugs and crime: Evaluating public policy initiatives* (pp. 61-76). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Weisburd, D., & Green, L. (1995b). Measuring immediate spatial displacement: Methodological issues and problems. In J. Eck & D. Weisburd (Eds.), *Crime and place* (pp. 349-361). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.

Weisburd, D., Lum, C., & Perosino, A. (2001). Does research design affect study outcomes in criminal justice? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578, 50 -70.

Weisburd D., Telep, C., Hinkle, J., & Eck, J. (2008). *The effects of problem-oriented policing on crime and disorder*. Campbell Systematic Reviews, DOI: 10.4073/csr.2008.14.

Weisburd, D., Maher, L., & Sherman, L. (1992). Contrasting crime general and crime specific theory: The case of hot spots of crime. *Advances in Criminological Theory* (vol. 4, pp. 45-69). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.

Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S., McNally, A.M., Greenspan, R., & Willis, J. (2003). Reforming to preserve: Compstat and strategic problem solving in American policing. *Criminology and Public Policy* 2, 421 – 456.

Welsh, B., Peel, M., Farrington, D., Elffers, H., & Braga, A. (2011). Research design influence on study outcomes in crime and justice: A partial replication with public area surveillance." *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 7, 183-198.

Werthman, C., & Piliavin, I. (1967). Gang members and the police. In D. Bordua (Ed.), *The police: Six sociological essays* (pp. 56-98). New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Wilkinson, L., & Task Force on Statistical Inference. (1999). Statistical methods in psychology journals: guidelines and expectations. *American Psychologist* 54, 594 – 604.

Wilson, D.B. (2001). Meta-analytic methods for criminology. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578, 71-89.

Wilson, D. B. (2009). Missing a critical piece of the pie: Simple document search strategies inadequate for systematic reviews. *Journal of Experimental Criminology* 5, 249 – 440.

National Network For Safe Communities
Saving Lives, Saving Communities

GROUP VIOLENCE INTERVENTION
AN INTRODUCTION

Center for Crime Prevention and Control | John Jay College of Criminal Justice | 524 West 59th Street Suite 600, New York, NY 10019

National Network for Safe Communities

These strategies are carefully designed to

- Reduce serious violence
- Shut down overt drug markets
- Reduce arrests and incarceration
- Strengthen disadvantaged communities
- Operate largely within existing resources

2

Results

A recent **Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review** of the strategies, and others related to them, concluded that there is now "strong empirical evidence" for their crime prevention effectiveness.

Group Violence Intervention

63%
reduction in youth homicide
Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire

42%
reduction in gun homicide
Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper

37%
reduction in homicide
Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods

44%
reduction in gun assaults
Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods

34%
reduction in homicide
Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership

41%
reduction in gang member-involved homicide
Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence

3

Results

Recent implementation (2013 outcomes)

- Chicago: 18 percent reduction in homicide, to the lowest level since 1965
- New Orleans: nearly 20 percent reduction, lowest level since 1971
- Baton Rouge: nearly 20 percent reduction
- South Philadelphia: 50 percent reduction
- Oakland: 29 percent reduction, single largest in 40 years
- Stockton, CA: 55 percent reduction, single largest ever

4

The best of these city operations combine:

- Focused deterrence and strategic law enforcement
- Procedural justice and work on police legitimacy
- Street outreach
- Attention to individual "impact players" as well as groups

5

Connection between violence & groups

The most important finding here is simple: there is a profound and so far invariant connection between serious violence, and highly active criminal groups.



Representation in population

Representation in homicides

6

Street group members face extremely high risk

national homicide: 4 in 100,000

homicides for core gang network: 1,500-3,000 in 100,000

for those close to victims of homicide and shooting, the risk increases by up to 900%

7

Examples from our sites

Boston 1996 [2,3]

Specifically targeting homicide victimization of individuals 21 years of age and under

Total population:
556,189

Group Member Involved (GMI):
61 identified groups
Approx. 1,500 individuals



2. Kennedy, D., A. Braga and A. Piehl. "The (Un)Known Universe: Mapping Gangs and Gang Violence in Boston." In *Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention*, edited by D. Weisburd and J.T. McEwen, 219-262. New York: Criminal Justice Press, 1997.
3. Kennedy, D., A. Braga and A. Piehl. "Developing and Implementing Operation Ceasefire." In *Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire*, 5-53. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice, 2001.

8

Examples from our sites

Cincinnati 2007 [4]

Total population:
333,321

GMI:
800-1,000 identified



4. Engel, R. S., Baker, S. G., Tilyer, M. S., Eck, J., & Dunham, M. S. (2008). *Implementation of the Cincinnati initiative to reduce violence (CIRV): Year 1 report.* Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute.

9

Examples from our sites

Los Angeles

Very different setting:
More active, historically embedded gang culture
Different, but essentially parallel dynamics

In one police district with a singularly intergenerational Hispanic gang scene…



10

Criminal Histories of Cincinnati Group Members

Characteristics of Street Group Members (Updated March 2008, n=748)

	Mean	1 or more	5 or more	10 or more
1. Misdemeanor arrest charges	14.40%	89.7%	72.3%	56.8%
2. Misdemeanor charge convictions	10.13	86.2%	66.0%	42.1%
3. Felony arrest charges	7.43	84.4%	59.4%	32.3%
4. Felony charge convictions	2.96	74.5%	27.1%	3.0%
5. Delinquent arrest charges	12.73	81.5%	68.3%	52.7%
6. Delinquent charge adjudications	8.51	80.3%	60.6%	37.8%
7. Approach w/ caution (0=no, 1=yes)	71%			
8. Violent arrest (0=no, 1=yes)	91%			
9. Drug arrest (0=no, 1=yes)	91%			

Source: Cincinnati Policing Institute

11

Why groups matter

Group dynamics drive the action

- Peer pressure and "pluralistic ignorance"
- Vendettas, boy-girl issues, respect

Street code – not money – drives the action

- Disrespect requires violence
- We're street soldiers and the community approves of what we're doing
- We're not afraid of death or prison
- The cops are against us: it's personal

12

CIRV network analysis of sets



Source: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute

Chicago 6th district conflict network



Source: Andrew Papachristos

Mass incarceration destroys families and communities

- Nearly 3 million children have a parent in prison
- One in nine black children has a parent in prison
- 4% of children without incarcerated fathers get expelled from school
- About 25% with incarcerated fathers get expelled
- One in eight black men can't vote
- Permanent impact on school, marriage, employment, earnings
- Concentrated in poor black neighborhoods

15

Framework

Direct, sustained engagement with core offenders by a partnership standing and acting together:

- Community leaders
- Social service providers
- Law enforcement
- Street outreach workers

Explicit focus on homicide and serious violence

Core elements:

- Moral engagement
- Offer of help
- Swift, certain, legitimate consequences

An approach, not a program

16

1 Focused law enforcement

- Group accountability for group violence by any legal means:
  - "Pulling levers"
- "First group/worst group" promise
  - First homicide after call-in
  - Most violent group
  - After each call-in, if no group wants to be first or worst, it all stops.
- Formal notice of legal exposure
- Formal notice of law enforcement intent

17

Deterrence not enforcement

- We want compliance, not arrests and sentences
- Actual enforcement is (mostly) a sign of failure
- When something drastic is about to happen, it's in everyone's interest to avoid it
- Goal: make consequences so clear and certain that nobody wants them
- Keep offenders and communities safe
- Provide "honorable exit"

18

2 Moral engagement with offenders

Offenders can and will choose, should be treated as responsible human beings

Challenge the street code

There's right, there's wrong: no gray area

Activates agency: offender is now in control

Treats offender with respect: procedural justice

Enhances law enforcement legitimacy

Mobilizes community partners

19

Community moral voice:

Clear, direct community stand from respected local figures, parents, ministers, mothers, activists:

- "We need you alive and out of prison."
- "You're better than this."
- "We hate the violence."

Offenders and ex-offenders:

- "Who helped your mother last time you were locked up?
- "How long before one of your boys sleeps with your girlfriend?"
- "Who thinks it's okay for little kids to get killed?"

20

Addressing norms and narratives

In order for law enforcement and community truly to work together, they must address mutual and toxic misunderstandings

- Law enforcement is not solving the problem, is doing harm, is playing into terrible stereotypes
- Community is not taking responsibility, is not setting standards, is playing into terrible stereotypes

21

Addressing norms and narratives

Strong, practical emphasis on

- Resetting relationships between police and alienated communities
- "Reconciliation and truth-telling"
- Enhancing police legitimacy
- Strengthening community action

22

3 Help as a moral and practical obligation

"We are here to keep you alive and out of prison."
"You have been targeted – to be saved."
Address trauma
Protect from enemies
Offer "big small stuff" – crucial real-time needs
Save havens
New relationships and "sponsors"
New ideas to replace "street code"
Links to traditional social services – education, work, etc.
Street outreach an important way to do all this

23

GVI preparation and application

Problem analysis
- Group audit
- Incident review

Working Group
Project manager
Getting to the first call-in
After the first call-in

24

Problem analysis

A quantitative and qualitative problem analysis collects and summarizes intelligence on street groups, impact players and other group members, and their connection to violence.

Provides crucial information to guide the adaptation of the strategy to local group and street dynamics.

25

CIRV network analysis of sets



Source: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute

26

SNA social network analysis

A mathematical method that identifies the structures of street groups through connections contained within the records of police department arrest, field stop, and other similar data.

27

SNA social network analysis

Black Souls social network



Before: Two distinct groups of individuals



After: Identified additional key players within the organization

- Individuals identified as Black Souls by CPD officers
- Individuals who appear to have a strong connection in the network

Source: Andrew V. Papachristos

28

Action on demonstration enforcement group

Which is the most violent group in the city?

Use existing case, or instigate new one.

Use as example in first call-in.

29

Identify and organize Social service providers and community moral voices

Who can provide help?

- Get commitments, arrange priority treatment, ensure casework and outreach, one-stop shopping.

Who can speak to community norms?

- Mothers of murdered children, ex-offenders, elders, faith leaders

30

Working Group and project manager

Working Group consists of key actors from law enforcement agencies, service providers, community moral voices, and outreach workers.

Project Manager works with Working Group and other partners to keep operation on track

31

The Call-in

The Call-in is direct communication with group members on probation or parole as a way of delivering the GVI message to all groups in a city at once. *It is not about the people in the room*.

Identify groups, identify probationers and parolees, deliver notices to appear, rehearse and hold call-in.

32

The Call-in Message

- The violence has to stop, end of story.
- None of us like what has been going on; we all want to change.
- It's wrong, it hurts, you're better than this, you don't like it, we don't want to live like this any more.
- Your community and loved ones need it to stop.
- You are hugely important and valuable.
- The ideas you are living by are wrong.
- We will do everything we can to help you.
- When you walk out of here, we will pay law enforcement attention to the next group that kills someone, and to the most violent group in the city.

33

Keep promises and repeat

Those who ask for help get it

Law enforcement works on "worst group" and "next group"

Repeat call-in regularly or as needed

- Assume every ninety days for first year or so
- "These guys didn't listen and here's what we did."
- "These guys asked for help and they got it."

Track, assess, adjust

34

Custom notifications

A method for communities, law enforcement and service providers to talk directly to street group members, letting them know that they are important and valued members of the community, that the GVI partners want to keep them alive and out of prison, that support & outreach are available, and giving them individualized information about their legal risk.

Can be done by law enforcement alone, community partners alone, LE with community, and by outreach workers.

Can include, or be directed to, "influentials."

35

Custom notifications


THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER

CINCINNATI.COM

PROTECT YOUR VOTE

Extra voting to cost county at least $406 for each hour

MAKE IT COUNT

Feds want all Freddie and Fannie profits

Get to know the real Paul Ryan

SAVING AVONDALE

Homicides in Avondale this year:

ZERO

Something has happened to stem the deaths. But what?

2011: 11 | 2010: 7 | 2009: 10

Moral Voice effort speaks to criminals, convinces them to lay down guns

36

GVI best matched with attention to individual gun offenders

"Chicago PSN"

37

National Network For Safe Communities
Saving Lives, Saving Communities

Current major sites



Chicago, IL
New York, NY
Philadelphia, PA
New Orleans, LA
Newark, NJ
Detroit, MI
Oakland, CA
Los Angeles, CA
Peoria, IL
South Bend, IN

38


National Network
For Safe Communities
Saving Lives, Saving Communities
nnscommunities.org
39

Crime Prevention Research Review

No. 6

Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime

Anthony A. Braga
Rutgers University and Harvard University

David L. Weisburd
George Mason University and Hebrew University Law School

COPS
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

C2
THE CAMPBELL COLLABORATION

Suggested citation:

Braga, Anthony A., and David L. Weisburg. 2012. *Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies to Prevent Crime*. No. 6 of Crime Prevention Research Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group (www.campbellcollaboration.org/ccjg) is an international network of researchers that prepares, updates, and rapidly disseminates systematic reviews of high-quality research conducted worldwide on effective methods to reduce crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.

August 2012
ISBN: 978-1-932582-59-8

Contents

> Focused deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas… while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law enforcement tools.

Introduction

Introduction

Deterrence theory posits that crimes can be prevented when the offender perceives that the costs of committing the crime outweigh the benefits (Gibbs 1975; Zimring and Hawkins 1973). Most discussions of the deterrence mechanism distinguish between general and special deterrence (Cook 1980). General deterrence is the idea that the general population is dissuaded from committing crime when it sees that punishment necessarily follows the commission of a crime. Special deterrence involves punishment administered to criminals with the intent to discourage them from committing crimes in the future. Much of the literature evaluating deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of those crimes (Apel and Nagin 2011; Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978).

In recent years, scholars have begun to argue that police interventions provide an effective approach for gaining both special and general deterrence against crime. A series of rigorous program evaluations have shown that the police can be effective in preventing crime (Braga 2001; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004) and that such crime prevention benefits are not offset by displacement of crime to areas near police interventions (Braga 2001; Weisburd et al. 2006). Durlauf and Nagin (2011) have drawn from this literature to argue that "[i]ncreasing the visibility of the police by hiring more officers and by allocating existing officers in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension consistently seem to have substantial marginal deterrent effects" (14). Indeed, they conclude that crime prevention in the United States would be improved by "shifting resources from imprisonment to policing" (ibid, 9–10).

A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the growing evidence of the effectiveness of police deterrence strategies is the focused deterrence framework, often referred to as pulling levers policing[1] (Kennedy 1997, 2008). Pioneered in Boston as a problem-oriented policing project to halt serious gang violence during the 1990s (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996), the focused deterrence framework has been applied in many U.S. cities through federally sponsored violence prevention programs, such as the Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative and Project Safe Neighborhoods (Dalton 2002).

[1] This paper briefly reviews the research on the crime control effectiveness of pulling levers focused deterrence programs. Readers interested in a more detailed assessment of the crime prevention value of pulling levers focused deterrence programs should acquire the full report (Braga and Weisburd 2012) available on the Campbell Crime and Justice Group web page (www.campbellcollaboration.org).

Focused deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by offenders, while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law enforcement tools to do so, such as communicating incentives and disincentives directly to targeted offenders (Kennedy 1997, 2008). The focused deterrence approach is also consistent with recent theorizing about police innovation, which suggests that approaches that seek both to create more focus in the application of crime prevention programs and to expand the tools of policing are likely to be the most successful (Weisburd and Eck 2004).

> Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often framed as problem-oriented exercises.

Identifying Evaluations of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

Identifying Evaluations of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

We examined the effectiveness of pulling levers focused deterrence programs by reviewing all available academic studies evaluating pulling levers strategies. To be eligible for this review, programs had to fit within the basic pulling levers focused deterrence framework described by Kennedy, which included (2006, 156–157):

- Selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or street drug dealing
- Pulling together an interagency enforcement group, typically including police, probation, parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes federal enforcement agencies
- Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the field experience of front-line police officers, to identify key offenders—and groups of offenders, such as street gangs and drug crews—and the context of their behavior
- Framing a special enforcement operation directed at those offenders and groups and designed to substantially influence that context, for example, by using any and all legal tools (or levers) to sanction groups whose members commit serious violence
- Matching those enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct services and the moral voices of affected communities to those same offenders and groups
- Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let them know that they are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as shootings) will get special attention, when that has happened to particular offenders and groups, and what they can do to avoid enforcement action: e.g., offenders are invited or directed (if they are on probation or parole) to attend face-to-face meetings (i.e., forums, notifications or call-ins) with law enforcement officials, service providers, and community figures

We used this basic framework to assist in determining whether particular programs engaged the focused deterrence approach. However, certain programs that were determined to be eligible for this review did not necessarily follow the specific pulling levers steps identified by Kennedy (2006). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often framed as problem-oriented exercises where specific recurring crime problems are analyzed and responses are highly customized to local conditions and operational capacities. As such, we fully anticipated a variety of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies to be identified by our systematic review. Identified studies were further screened to ensure that rigorous evaluation designs, such as randomized experiments and quasi-experiments, were used.[2]

We paid particular attention to studies that measured crime displacement effects and diffusion of crime control benefit effects. For instance, Kennedy (2009) described a place-based application of pulling levers focused on a disorderly drug market operating in High Point, North Carolina. Crime prevention strategies focused on specific locations have been criticized as resulting in displacement (see Reppetto 1976). More recently, academics have observed that crime prevention programs sometimes result in the complete opposite of displacement—that crime control benefits can be greater than expected and "spill over" into places beyond the target areas (Clarke and Weisburd 1994).

Our review was not restricted to a specific time period. Eligible studies included published as well as unpublished works: e.g., journal articles, theses/dissertations, reports, books, book chapters, and conference papers. (For further details of the systematic search methodology, see Braga and Weisburd 2012.)

[2] These evaluation designs permit the clearest assessments of "cause and effect" in determining whether hot spots policing programs prevent crime. These designs examine pre- and post-program measurements of crime outcomes in targeted locations relative to "control" locations. The control groups in the identified hot spots evaluations received routine levels of traditional police enforcement tactics.

We reviewed a total of 2,473 article summaries for any suggestion of an evaluation of a pulling levers focused deterrence program. Of the 2,473 summaries, we selected 93 for closer review. We acquired and carefully assessed the full-text reports, journal articles, and books for these evaluations to determine whether pulling levers interventions were involved and whether the studies used rigorous evaluation designs. Using these methods, 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations were identified and included in this review:

1. Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2001)
2. Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles, California (Tita et al. 2003)
3. Indianapolis (Indiana) Violence Reduction Partnership (McGarrell et al. 2006)
4. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007)
5. Operation Peacekeeper in Stockton, California (Braga 2008)
6. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008)
7. Drug Market Intervention in Nashville, Tennessee (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009)
8. Drug Market Intervention in Rockford, Illinois (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2010)
9. Cincinnati (Ohio) Initiative to Reduce Violence (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010)
10. Operation CeaseFire in Newark, New Jersey (Boyle et al. 2010)

> The deterrence message was…a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response from law enforcement.

Characteristics of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

Characteristics of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

The 10 selected studies (see page 10) examined pulling levers focused deterrence interventions that were implemented in small, medium, and large U.S. cities (see Appendix A on page 30). Six studies (Boston, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Lowell, and Stockton) evaluated the crime reduction effects of pulling levers strategies on serious violence generated by street gangs or criminally active street groups. Two studies (Nashville and Rockford) evaluated strategies focused on reducing crime driven by street-level drug markets; these types of programs are generally called "Drug Market Intervention" (DMI) pulling levers focused deterrence strategies. Two studies (Newark and Chicago) evaluated crime reduction strategies that focused on individuals.

The pulling levers focused deterrence strategies designed to reduce violence by gangs and criminally active street groups generally replicate the Operation Ceasefire process developed in Boston during the 1990s (Braga et al. 2001). Briefly, the Boston Operation Ceasefire program was designed to prevent violence by reaching out directly to gangs, explicitly saying that violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by "pulling every lever" legally available when violence occurred (Kennedy 1997). The chronic involvement of gang members in a wide variety of offenses made them, and the gangs they formed, vulnerable to a coordinated criminal justice response. As such, the authorities could:

- Disrupt street drug activity
- Focus police attention on low-level street crimes, such as trespassing and public drinking
- Serve outstanding warrants
- Cultivate confidential informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities
- Deliver strict probation and parole enforcement
- Seize drug proceeds and other assets
- Ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention
- Request (and enforce) stronger bail terms
- Bring potentially severe federal investigative and prosecutorial attention to gang-related drug and gun activity

Simultaneously, youth workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community groups offered gang members services and other kinds of help.

The Boston Ceasefire working group, consisting of criminal justice, social service, and community-based partners, also delivered an explicit message that violence was unacceptable to the community and that "street" justifications for violence were mistaken. The Boston Ceasefire working group delivered this message in formal meetings (i.e., forums or call-ins) with gang members, through individual police and probation contacts with gang members, in meetings with inmates at secure juvenile facilities in the city, and through gang outreach workers. The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response from law enforcement. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, then the normal workings of the police, the prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters. But if gang members hurt people, the Boston Ceasefire working group concentrated its enforcement actions on those gangs.

DMI strategies seek to shut down overt drug markets entirely (Kennedy 2009). Enforcement powers are used strategically and sparingly, employing arrest and prosecution only against violent offenders and when nonviolent offenders have resisted all efforts to desist and receive help. Through the use of "banked" cases,[3] the strategy makes the promise of law enforcement sanctions against dealers direct and credible, so that dealers have no doubt concerning the consequences of offending and have good reason to change their behavior.

The strategy also brings powerful informal social control to bear on dealers from immediate family and community figures. It organizes and focuses services, help, and support on dealers so that those who are willing have what they need to change their lives. Each operation also includes a maintenance strategy.

The two crime reduction strategies that focused on individuals deviated from the classic pulling levers focused deterrence approach developed in Boston and defined by Kennedy (2006). However, after a careful review of program elements, we determined that the necessary components of an eligible study were present.

[3] A "banked" case refers to a potential prosecution for narcotics sales. The prosecution is supported by audio and video evidence usually obtained through a controlled buy that is held at an inactive status unless the subject of the prosecution continues dealing, at which point an arrest warrant is issued and prosecution proceeds.

Boyle et al. (2010) described Newark's Operation CeaseFire strategy as focused on preventing gun violence by criminally active individuals; this hybrid of the Boston Ceasefire pulling levers model (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 1996) and the Chicago CeaseFire public health approach uses trained street outreach staff, public education campaigns, and community mobilization to prevent shootings (Skogan et al. 2008).

The Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) study evaluated the violence reduction effects of a strategy comprised of four key interventions (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007):

1. Increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns
2. Lengthy sentences associated with federal prosecutions
3. Supply-side firearm policing activities
4. Social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through offender notification meetings

“…these programs generated significant crime control benefits.”

Effects of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs on Crime

Effects of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs on Crime

Nine of the 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations concluded that these programs generated significant crime control benefits (see Appendix B on page 31).[4] A meta-analysis of these pulling levers strategies also found that these programs generated an overall statistically significant reduction in crime outcome measures (see Braga and Weisburd 2012).[5] Although Boyle et al. (2010) reported a small but positive reduction in gunshot wound incidents from Newark's Operation CeaseFire, this evaluation was the only one to not report any discernible crime prevention benefits generated by the violence reduction strategy.[6]

Evaluations of pulling levers strategies targeting gangs and criminally active groups reported large, statistically significant reductions in violent crime. These results included a 63 percent reduction in youth homicides in Boston (Braga et al. 2001), a 44 percent reduction in gun assault incidents in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al. 2008), a 42 percent reduction in gun homicides in Stockton, California (Braga 2008), a 35 percent reduction in homicides of criminally active group members in Cincinnati (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010), a 34 percent reduction in total homicides in Indianapolis (McGarrell et al. 2006), and noteworthy short-term reductions in violent crime in Los Angeles (Tita et al. 2003).

[4] During our search for eligible studies, several scholars suggested that the systematic review include the Hawaii Opportunity with Probation Enforcement (HOPE) randomized controlled trial (Hawken and Kleiman 2009). HOPE was a community supervision program aimed at substance-abusing probationers. The program relied on a mandate to abstain from illicit drugs, backed by swift and certain sanctions for drug test failures, and preceded by a clear and direct warning. While this program represented a departure from our selection criteria, we agree that the deterrence mechanisms in HOPE are similar to those engaged by the 10 pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations included in this report. Similar to the findings of the other programs, HOPE generated impressive crime control benefits. Only 21 percent of HOPE probationers experienced new arrests as compared to 47 percent of control probationers.

[5] Meta-analysis is a technique used to investigate overall program effects associated with a selected set of studies (see Lipsey and Wilson 2001).

[6] Although the reason why the Newark program failed to generate larger impacts on gun violence is unclear, growing evaluation evidence suggests the CeaseFire Chicago community-driven violence reduction approach—with its premium on gang violence mediation and negotiation work by "violence interrupters"—may not produce the desired violence prevention benefits (see Papachristos 2011).

The two DMI evaluations also reported statistically significant crime reductions. The DMI generated a 55 percent reduction in illegal drug possession incidents in Nashville (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009) and a 22 percent reduction in non-violent offenses in Rockford (Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell 2010). While Newark's strategy did not generate statistically significant crime control gains when high-rate offenders were targeted, the Chicago PSN intervention—the other program focused on individuals—was associated with a 37 percent reduction in homicide (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

Two of the three studies that measured possible crime displacement and diffusion effects reported noteworthy diffusion of crime control benefits associated with the focused deterrence intervention. Consistent with the absence of a treatment effect, the Newark evaluation did not report any statistically significant crime displacement or diffusion effects (Boyle et al. 2010). The Nashville evaluation reported statistically significant reductions in drug offenses and total calls for service in the non-treated area immediately adjoining the targeted drug market area (Corsaro and McGarrell 2009). The Los Angeles evaluation found statistically significant reductions in violent crime in areas surrounding the targeted census block groups as well as noteworthy reductions in violent offending by non-treated gangs that were "socially tied" to treatment gangs (Tita et al. 2003).

> …jurisdictions…should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing portfolio of prevention and control interventions.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The available scientific evidence on the crime reduction value of focused deterrence strategies has been characterized as "promising" but "descriptive rather than evaluative" (Skogan and Frydl 2004: 241) and as "limited" but "still evolving" (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie 2005: 10) by the U.S. National Research Council's Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices and its Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms, respectively.

However, our systematic review identified 10 evaluations of focused deterrence strategies; nine of these evaluations were completed after the National Research Council reports were published. A better-developed base of scientific evidence now exists to assess whether crime prevention impacts are associated with this approach.

The basic findings of our review are very positive. Nine out of 10 eligible studies reported strong and statistically significant crime reductions associated with the approach. The findings of eligible focused deterrence evaluations fit well within existing research suggesting that deterrence-based strategies, if applied correctly, can reduce crime (Apel and Nagin 2011).

The focused deterrence approach seems to have the desirable characteristic of altering offenders' perceptions of sanction risk. Our findings are also supported by the growing body of scientific evidence that suggests police departments, and their partners, can be effective in controlling specific crime problems when they engage in a variety of partnerships and tailor an array of tactics to address underlying criminogenic conditions and dynamics (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd and Eck 2004). Indeed, our study suggests that Durlauf and Nagin (2011) are correct in their conclusion that both imprisonment and crime can be reduced through the noteworthy marginal deterrent effects generated by allocating police officers, and their criminal justice partners, in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension.

While the results of this review support deterrence principles, other complementary crime control mechanisms are at work in the focused deterrence strategies described here that need to be highlighted and better understood. In Durlauf and Nagin's (2011) article, the focus is on the possibilities for increasing perceived risk and deterrence by increasing police presence.

Although Durlauf and Nagin's conclusion is warranted by the data and represents an important component of the causal mechanisms that have increased the effectiveness of focused deterrence strategies, we believe it misses an important part of the story.

In the focused deterrence approach, the emphasis is on not only increasing the risk of offending but also decreasing opportunity structures for violence, deflecting offenders away from crime, increasing the collective efficacy of communities, and increasing the legitimacy of police actions. We suspect that the large effects we observe come precisely from the multi-faceted ways in which this program influences criminals.

A number of scholars have focused on the mechanism of discouragement when discussing the crime prevention benefits of interventions (see Clarke and Weisburd 1994). Discouragement emphasizes reducing the opportunities for crime and increasing alternative opportunity structures for offenders. In this context, situational crime prevention techniques are often implemented as part of the core pulling levers work in focused deterrence strategies (Braga and Kennedy 2012). For instance, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence used civil forfeiture techniques to close down a highly problematic bar that generated recurring serious violence (Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer 2010). Extending guardianship, assisting natural surveillance, strengthening formal surveillance, reducing the anonymity of offenders, and utilizing place managers can greatly enhance the range and quality of the varying enforcement and regulatory levers that can be pulled on offending groups and key actors in criminal networks (see Welsh and Farrington 2009).

The focused deterrence approach also seeks to redirect offenders away from violent crime through the provision of social services and opportunities. In all the gang/group interventions reviewed here, gang members were offered job training, employment assistance, substance abuse treatment, housing assistance, and a variety of other services and opportunities.

Aspects of the "broken windows" theory may also be relevant for understanding how and why focused deterrence programs reduce crime (Wilson and Kelling 1982). The theory argues that intensive police efforts to reduce social and physical disorder can reverse the breakdown of community social controls that accompany untended and unrestrained violations of social order. Thus, crime is reduced in part because of police efforts and in part because of community members' increased vigilance. Kleiman and Smith (1990) describe the potential benefits of an intensive police effort to reduce drug crime and disorder, noting "a dramatic police effort may call forth increased neighborhood efforts at self-protection against drug dealing activity; given police resources, such self-defense may be essential to long-run control of drug dealing" (88).

Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) emphasize the capacity of a community to realize common values and regulate behavior within it through cohesive relationships and mutual trust among residents. The authors argue that the key factor determining whether crime will flourish is the sense of a community's collective efficacy. A community with strong collective efficacy is characterized by high capacities for collective action for the public good. Focused deterrence enhances collective efficacy in communities by emphasizing the importance of engaging and enlisting community members in the strategies developed. The DMI strategy, for example, draws upon collective efficacy principles by engaging family, friends, and other influential community members in addressing the criminal behaviors of local drug dealers (Kennedy 2009).

Finally, the focused deterrence approach takes advantage of recent theorizing regarding procedural justice and legitimacy. Policing's effectiveness is dependent on public perceptions of the legitimacy of police actions (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Tyler 1990, 2004). Legitimacy is the public belief that the community has a responsibility and obligation to voluntarily accept and defer to the decisions made by authorities (Tyler 1990, 2004). Recent studies suggest that when procedural justice approaches are used by the police, citizens will not only evaluate the legitimacy of the police more highly but also be more likely to obey the law in the future (see Paternoster et al. 1997). Advocates of focused deterrence strategies argue that targeted offenders should be treated with respect and dignity (Kennedy 2008, 2011), reflecting procedural justice principles. The Chicago PSN strategy, for example, sought to increase the likelihood that the offenders would "buy in" and voluntarily comply with the pro-social, anti-violence norms being advocated by criminal justice, social service, and community representatives interacting with offenders in ways that enhance procedural justice in their communication sessions (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2007).

In closing, focused deterrence strategies are a recent addition to the existing scholarly literature on crime control and prevention strategies. While the evaluation evidence needs to be strengthened and the theoretical underpinnings of the approach need further refinement, jurisdictions suffering from gang violence, overt drug markets, and repeat offender problems should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing portfolio of prevention and control interventions. The existing evidence suggests that these new approaches to crime prevention and control generate noteworthy reductions in crime.

Bibliography

Bibliography

Apel, Robert, and Daniel Nagin. 2011. "General Deterrence: A Review of Recent Evidence." In *Crime and Public Policy,* eds. James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia. New York: Oxford University Press.

Blumstein, Alfred, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, eds. 1978. *Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates*. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.

Boyle, Douglas J., Jennifer L. Lanterman, Joseph E. Pascarella, and Chia-Cherng Cheng. 2010. *The Impact of Newark's Operation Ceasefire on Trauma Center Gunshot Wound Admissions*. Newark, NJ: University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, Violence Institute of New Jersey.

Braga, Anthony A. 2001. "The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 578: 104–25.

_____. 2008. "Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies and the Prevention of Gun Homicide." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 36: 332–343.

Braga, Anthony A., and David M. Kennedy. 2012. "Linking Situational Crime Prevention and Focused Deterrence Strategies." In *The Reasoning Criminologist: Essays in Honour of Ronald V. Clarke*, eds Graham Farrell and Nick Tilley. London: Taylor and Francis.

Braga, Anthony A., David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring, and Anne M. Piehl. 2001. "Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 38: 195–225.

Braga, Anthony A., Glenn L. Pierce, Jack McDevitt, Brenda J. Bond, and Shea Cronin. 2008. "The Strategic Prevention of Gun Violence Among Gang-Involved Offenders." *Justice Quarterly* 25: 132–162.

Braga, Anthony A., and David L. Weisburd. 2012. *The Effects of "Pulling Levers" Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime*. Campbell Systematic Reviews 2012:6. DOI: 10.4073/csr.2012.6

Clarke, Ronald V., and David Weisburd. 1994. "Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse of Displacement." *Crime Prevention Studies* 2: 165–84.

Cook, Philip J. 1980. "Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade." In *Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research*, Vol. 2, eds. Norval Morris and Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Corsaro, Nicholas, Rod Brunson, and Edmund McGarrell. 2010. "Problem-Oriented Policing and Open-Air Drug Markets: Examining the Rockford Pulling Levers Strategy." *Crime & Delinquency* (forthcoming).

Corsaro, Nicholas, and Edmund McGarrell. 2009. *An Evaluation of the Nashville Drug Market Initiative (DMI) Pulling Levers Strategy*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, School of Criminal Justice.

Dalton, Erin. 2002. "Targeted Crime Reduction Efforts in Ten Communities: Lessons for the Project Safe Neighborhoods Initiative." *U.S. Attorney's Bulletin* 50: 16–25.

Durlauf, Steven, and Daniel Nagin. 2011. "Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?" *Criminology & Public Policy* 10: 13–54.

Engel, Robin S., Nicholas Corsaro, and Marie Skubak Tillyer. 2010. *Evaluation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV)*. Cincinnati, OH: University of Cincinnati Policing Institute.

Gibbs, Jack P. 1975. *Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence*. New York: Elsevier.

Hawken, Angela, and Mark A. R. Kleiman. 2009. *Managing Drug Involved Probationers with Swift and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii's HOPE*. Final report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

Kennedy, David M. 1997. "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention." *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31: 449–484.

_____. 2006. "Old Wine in New Bottles: Policing and the Lessons of Pulling Levers." In *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, eds. David L. Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2008. *Deterrence and Crime Prevention: Reconsidering the Prospect of Sanction*. London: Routledge Press.

_____. 2009. "Drugs, Race, and Common Ground: Reflections on the High Point Intervention." *National Institute of Justice Journal* 262: 12–17.

_____. 2011. *Don't Shoot.* New York, Bloomsbury

Kennedy, David M., Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga. 1996. "Youth Violence in Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, and a Use-Reduction Strategy." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59: 147–196.

Kleiman, Mark A. R., and Kerry D. Smith. 1990. "State and Local Drug Enforcement: In Search of a Strategy." In *Drugs and Crime, Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, Vol. 13, eds. Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lipsey, Mark W., and David B. Wilson. 2001. *Practical Meta-Analysis*. Vol. 40 of Applied Social Research Methods Series. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

McGarrell, Edward, Steven Chermak, Jeremy Wilson, and Nicholas Corsaro. 2006. "Reducing Homicide through a 'Lever-Pulling' Strategy." *Justice Quarterly* 23: 214–229.

Papachristos, Andrew. 2011. "Too Big to Fail: The Science and Politics of Violence Prevention." *Criminology & Public Policy* 10: 1053–1061.

Papachristos, Andrew V., Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan. 2007. "Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago." *Journal of Empirical Legal Studies* 4: 223–272.

Paternoster, Raymond, Robert Brame, Ronet Bachman, and Lawrence Sherman. 1997. "Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault." *Law & Society Review* 31: 163–204.

Reppetto, Thomas. 1976. "Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon." *Crime & Delinquency* 22: 166–77.

Sampson, Robert, Stephen Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime." *Science* 277: 918–924.

Skogan, Wesley, and Kathleen Frydl, eds. 2004. *Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence*. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Skogan, Wesley, Susan Hartnett, Natalie Bump, and Jill DuBois. 2008. *Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Institute for Policy Research.

Tita, George, K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Clifford Grammich, Allan Abrahamse, and Peter Greenwood. 2003. *Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an Intervention in East Los Angeles*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Tyler, Tom R. 1990. *Why People Obey the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Compliance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

_____. 2004. "Enhancing Police Legitimacy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593: 84–99.

Weisburd, David, and John Eck. 2004. "What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593: 42–65.

Weisburd, David, Laura Wyckoff, Justin Ready, John Eck, Joshua Hinkle, and Francis Gajewski. 2006. Does Crime Just Move Around the Corner? A Controlled Study of Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits. *Criminology* 44: 549–592.

Wellford, Charles F., John V. Pepper, and Carol V. Petrie, eds. 2005. *Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review*. Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Welsh, Brandon C., and David P. Farrington. 2009. *Making Public Places Safer: Surveillance and Crime Prevention*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wilson, James Q., and George L. Kelling. 1982. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." *Atlantic Monthly* March: 29–38.

Zimring, Franklin, and Gordon Hawkins. 1973. Deterrence: *The Legal Threat in Crime Control*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Appendix

Appendix A: Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Programs

Study	Program Type
Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire Braga et al. (2001)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
Los Angeles (CA) Operation Ceasefire Tita et al. (2003)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership McGarrell et al. (2006)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007)	Gun violence reduction strategy comprised of four interventions: (1) increased federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) lengthy sentences associated with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing activities, and (4) social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through offender notification meetings
Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper Braga (2008)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods Braga et al. (2008)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by street gangs
Rockford (IL) Drug Market Intervention Corsaro and McGarrell (2009)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street-level drug market
Nashville (TN) Drug Market Intervention Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2010)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing crime driven by a street-level drug market
Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer (2010)	Pulling levers strategy focused on reducing serious violence by criminally active street groups
Newark (NJ) Operation CeaseFire Boyle et al. (2010)	Violence reduction strategy targeting individual gang members, described as a "hybrid" between the Boston CeaseFire pulling levers strategy and the Chicago CeaseFire street-worker program

Appendix B: Results of Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Evaluations

Study	Crime Outcomes	Displacement / Diffusion
Boston (MA) Operation Ceasefire Braga et al. (2001)	Large reductions in youth homicide incidents, gun assault incidents, and shots-fired calls for service	Not measured
Los Angeles (CA) Operation Ceasefire Tita et al. (2003)	Short-term reductions in violent crime reported while intervention was in place	Diffusion of crime control benefits reported
Indianapolis (IN) Violence Reduction Partnership McGarrell et al. (2006)	Large reduction in total homicide incidents	Not measured
Chicago (IL) Project Safe Neighborhoods Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007)	Large reduction in total homicide incidents; reductions in gun homicide and aggravated assaults	Not measured
Stockton (CA) Operation Peacekeeper Braga (2008)	Large reduction in gun homicide incidents	Not measured
Lowell (MA) Project Safe Neighborhoods Braga et al. (2008)	Large reduction in gun assault incidents	Not measured
Rockford (IL) Drug Market Intervention Corsaro and McGarrell (2009)	Reduction in non-violent offenses	Not measured

Study	Crime Outcomes	Displacement / Diffusion
Nashville (TN) Drug Market Intervention Corsaro, Brunson, and McGarrell (2010)	Reductions in illegal drug possession offenses, illegal drug equipment offenses, and property crime offenses	Diffusion of crime control benefits reported
Cincinnati (OH) Initiative to Reduce Violence Engel, Corsaro, and Tillyer (2010)	Large reduction in group member-involved homicides	Not measured
Newark (NJ) ***Operation CeaseFire*** Boyle et al. (2010)	No noteworthy effects on gunshot wound incidents reported	No displacement or diffusion effects reported

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
145 N Street, N.E.
Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS programs,
call the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770.

Visit COPS Online at **www.cops.usdoj.gov**.

August 2012
e041218459
ISBN: 978-1-932582-59-8

The New York Times

January 10, 2010

Prisoners of Parole

By JEFFREY ROSEN

IN 2004, STEVEN ALM, a state trial judge in Hawaii, was frustrated with the cases on his docket. Nearly half of the people appearing before him were convicted offenders with drug problems who had been sentenced to probation rather than prison and then repeatedly violated the terms of that probation by missing appointments or testing positive for drugs. Whether out of neglect or leniency, probation officers would tend to overlook a probationer's first 5 or 10 violations, giving the offender the impression that he could ignore the rules. But eventually, the officers would get fed up and recommend that Alm revoke probation and send the offender to jail to serve out his sentence. That struck Alm as too harsh, but the alternative — winking at probation violations — struck him as too soft. "I thought, This is crazy, this is a crazy way to change people's behavior," he told me recently.

So Alm decided to try something different. He reasoned that if the offenders knew that a probation violation would lead immediately to some certain punishment, they might shape up. "I thought, What did I do when my son was young?" he recalled. "If he misbehaved, I talked to him and warned him, and if he disregarded the warning, I gave him some kind of consequence right away." Working with U.S. marshals and local police, Alm arranged for a new procedure: if offenders tested positive for drugs or missed an appointment, they would be arrested within hours and most would have a hearing within 72 hours. Those who were found to have violated probation would be quickly sentenced to a short jail term proportionate to the severity of the violation — typically a few days.

Alm mentioned his plan to the public defender, who suggested that it was only fair to warn probationers that the rules were going to be strictly enforced for the first time. Alm agreed, and on Oct. 1, 2004, he held a hearing for 18 sex offenders, followed by another one for 16 drug offenders. Brandishing a laminated "Wanted" poster, he told them: "I can guarantee that everyone in this courtroom wants you to succeed on probation, but you have not been cutting it. From now on, you're going to follow all the rules of probation, and if you don't, you're going to be arrested on the spot and spend some time in jail right away." He called the program HOPE, for Hawaii's Opportunity Probation With Enforcement, and prepared himself for a flood of violation hearings.

But they never materialized. There were only three hearings in the first week, two in the second week and none in the third. The HOPE program was so successful that it inspired scholars to evaluate its methods. Within a six-month period, the rate of positive drug tests fell by 93 percent for HOPE probationers, compared with a fall of 14 percent for probationers in a comparison group.

Alm had stumbled onto an effective strategy for keeping people out of prison, one that puts a fresh twist on some venerable ideas about deterrence. Classical deterrence theory has long held that the threat of a mild

punishment imposed reliably and immediately has a much greater deterrent effect than the threat of a severe punishment that is delayed and uncertain. Recent work in behavioral economics has helped to explain this phenomenon: people are more sensitive to the immediate than the slightly deferred future and focus more on how likely an outcome is than how bad it is. In the course of implementing HOPE, Alm discovered another reason why the strategy works: people are most likely to obey the law when they're subject to punishments they perceive as legitimate, fair and consistent, rather than arbitrary and capricious. "When the system isn't consistent and predictable, when people are punished randomly, they think, My probation officer doesn't like me, or, Someone's prejudiced against me," Alm told me, "rather than seeing that everyone who breaks a rule is treated equally, in precisely the same way."

Judge Alm's story is an example of a new approach to keeping people out of prison that is being championed by some of the most innovative scholars studying deterrence today. At its core, the approach focuses on establishing the legitimacy of the criminal-justice system in the eyes of those who have run afoul of it or are likely to. Promising less crime and less punishment, this approach includes elements that should appeal to liberals (it doesn't rely on draconian prison sentences) and to conservatives (it stresses individual choice and moral accountability). But at a time when the size of the U.S. prison population is increasingly seen as unsustainable for both budgetary and moral reasons — the United States represents 5 percent of the world's population and nearly 25 percent of the world's prison population — the fact that this approach seems to work may be its biggest draw.

The HOPE program, if widely adopted as a model for probation and parole reform, could make a surprisingly large contribution to reducing the prison population. In many states, the majority of prison admissions come not from arrests for new crimes, as you might think, but from probation and parole violations. Nationwide, roughly two-thirds of parolees fail to complete parole successfully. Todd Clear, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, estimates that by eliminating imprisonment across the nation for technical parole violations, reducing the length of parole supervision and ratcheting back prison sentences to their 1988 levels, the United States could reduce its prison population by 50 percent.

Some in government are beginning to take notice. In November, invoking the HOPE program as a model, the Democratic congressman Adam Schiff of California and his Republican colleague Ted Poe of Texas introduced legislation in the House that would create federal grants for states to experiment with courts that deliver swift, predictable and moderate punishment for those who violate probation.

There also appears to be a national audience for a broader conversation about new ways to shrink the prison population. Last year, a three-judge panel in California ordered the overcrowded state prison system — the largest in the country, with more than 170,000 prisoners at its peak — to reduce the inmate population by tens of thousands of prisoners within two years in order to comply with constitutional standards for medical and mental health care. Facing a tightening budget crisis in September, California legislators added to the pressure by demanding a reduction in the prison budget of $1.2 billion. In the U.S. Senate, Jim Webb of Virginia is leading a crusade for prison reform, insisting that fewer jail terms for nonviolent offenders can make America safer and more humane, while also saving money. And in the Obama administration, Attorney General Eric Holder is questioning the value of relentlessly expanding prisons. In July, he declared that "high rates of incarceration have tremendous social costs" and

"diminishing marginal returns."

The most effective way to shrink the prison population, of course, is not just to reform probation and parole but also to deter groups of potential lawbreakers from committing crimes in the first place. If, in addition to bringing down the numbers of probation and parole revocations, police officers and judges could also address the core problems of drug arrests and street violence, the United States might even be said to have solved its notorious prison problem. Is such an ambitious goal possible? While it might sound too good to be true, the HOPE-style thinking about deterrence offers a promising road map for addressing all these challenges.

ALTHOUGH HE ACTED on his own, Judge Alm did not design the HOPE program without inspiration. In the mid-1990s, when he was a U.S. attorney in Hawaii, Alm heard a presentation by David M. Kennedy, who is considered the patron saint of the new thinking about deterrence. Kennedy, who now teaches at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, spoke about Operation Ceasefire, a program he was designing to reduce youth violence in Boston. Along with his colleagues Anne M. Piehl and Anthony Braga, Kennedy worked with the head of the Youth Violence Strike Force, a division of the Boston Police Department. The police officer explained that while conventional deterrence hadn't worked, he had begun to persuade gangs to behave by issuing a credible threat: namely, that when a gang attracted attention with notorious acts of violence, the entire gang — all of whose members likely had outstanding warrants or probation, parole or traffic violations — would be rounded up.

Kennedy recalls this today as a breakthrough moment in his thinking. Ever since the days of Cesare Beccaria, the 18th-century philosopher and death-penalty opponent, classical deterrence theorists had focused on credibly threatening individuals; Kennedy's first innovation was to focus on increasing the legitimacy of law enforcement in the eyes of groups. "The legitimacy element has risen in my mind from being an important element of the strategy to the most important element," Kennedy told me. Convinced that the best way to increase legitimacy was to enlist what he calls the "community's moral voice," Kennedy set out to deter the most dangerous young gang members by persuading their friends and neighbors to pressure them into obeying the law.

In May 1996, Kennedy, Piehl and Braga helped to design the first of what came to be known as "call-in" sessions, intended to put gangs on notice that they would face swift and certain punishments. Working with Kennedy, probation and parole officers ordered gang members to attend face-to-face meetings with the police. The gang members were given three warnings. First, they were told that if anyone in their group killed someone, the entire group would suffer consequences. Second, the gang members were told that if they want to escape from street life, they could get help and job training from social service agencies and churches. And finally, they heard from members of their community that violence was wrong and it had to stop. The results of the forums were striking and immediate. Within two years, youth violence in Boston fell by two-thirds and city homicide rates by about half.

Why was Operation Ceasefire so effective? One reason was that the warning hearings gave the gang members a sense of what to expect. Increasingly draconian sentences don't always reduce crime, and sometimes increase it. (After increasing in the 1980s, crime fell by 25 percent in the 1990s, but states that put more people in jail had a smaller decline than states that imprisoned fewer.) In part, this is because

many people actually don't know the punishments they face.

In addition to offering knowledge, Operation Ceasefire provided certainty. The small numbers of gang members singled out meant they could trust that the police would be able to follow through on their threats. "If you can get people to behave by threatening them credibly, you'll need less actual punishment than if you let them run wild and punish only occasionally," says Mark A. R. Kleiman, author of the new book "When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment." Kleiman, whom Alm consulted soon after initiating the HOPE program, became interested in swift, certain and moderate punishment when he was a colleague of Kennedy's years before. Lastly, Operation Ceasefire gave gang members an incentive to obey the law by promising that they would get positive reinforcement from their families and neighbors for changing their behavior.

In all of this, Kennedy's insights were supported by a variety of recent research suggesting that people are more likely to obey the law when they view law enforcement as fair and legitimate. Tom Tyler, a psychology professor at New York University, has found that compliance with court orders is highest for offenders who perceive that they have experienced a fair process. And in a recent book, "American Homicide," the Ohio State University historian Randolph Roth argues that throughout American history, the homicide rate has decreased when people trust that the government is stable and unbiased and believe in the legitimacy of the officials who run it. Similarly, the legal scholar Paul Butler argues in his new book, "Let's Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice," that widespread incarceration in the 1980s and '90s undermined the legitimacy of law enforcement in the eyes of the affected communities by converting a prison term into something heroic rather than stigmatic.

After Operation Ceasefire, Kennedy turned his attention from gangs to open-air drug markets. He set out to change how the criminal-justice system was viewed from the perspective of the offenders and their communities — and how the offenders and their communities were viewed by the police. As Kennedy told me, "I saw law enforcement believing plausible but untrue things about the communities they police" — namely, that the communities were corrupt and didn't care about the violence that was destroying them — "and the communities believing untrue things about the police" — namely, that the cops were part of a racist conspiracy to lock up black offenders while overlooking white ones.

To correct what he calls a "corrosive and tragic mistake," Kennedy came up with the idea of a kind of truth-and-reconciliation commission in which offenders would talk to the police accompanied by the people they trusted the most: their mothers. In 2003, working with James Fealy, the police chief in High Point, N.C., Kennedy arranged some preliminary meetings. Although Fealy had been shocked to learn that the community thought he and his officers were almost as bad as the drug dealers, Fealy, in turn, surprised community members by declaring that no one in law enforcement thought the drug war could be won.

These meetings prepared the groundwork for the strategy that followed. After identifying 16 active drug dealers, Fealy arrested four and then prepared warrants for the other 12 that could be signed whenever the police chose. He then called in the other dealers, nine of whom arrived accompanied by their mothers and other "influentials" like grandmothers, and delivered the following message to them as a group: "You could be in jail tonight. We don't want to do that, we want to help you succeed, but you are out of the drug business." The mothers and grandmothers, seemingly impressed by the decision not to arrest, cheered on

the police. In subsequent meetings, the “influentials” shouted down naysayers, including a conspiracymonger who accused the C.I.A. of having created the crack epidemic to oppress black people. The drug market in the area dried up.

IN ADDITION TO influencing Judge Alm’s probation reform, Kennedy’s efforts to rethink deterrence have also inspired one of the most powerful recent models for national parole reform, which comes from Tracey Meares, a law professor at Yale. (Unlike probation, which involves a sentence instead of prison, parole involves supervision after part of the prison sentence has been served.) In 2002, Meares, who was then a law professor at the University of Chicago, was asked by the U.S. attorney in Chicago, Patrick Fitzgerald, to analyze how best to address crime in the city. She concluded that they should begin on the West Side, in West Garfield Park and the surrounding area, where rates of murder and gun violence were more than four times the city average. Fitzgerald suggested that they might implement a version of Project Exile, a controversial program in Virginia that sought to deter gun violence by threatening federal prosecutions — and a five-year mandatory minimum sentence — for repeat offenders convicted of illegal gun possession. But Project Exile had experienced only mixed success: federal prosecutors could prosecute only a small proportion of the gun cases submitted by the Richmond police. The threat of a severe sentence was, in effect, something of a bluff.

Meares told Fitzgerald that threats of zero tolerance wouldn’t work because they simply weren’t credible. Instead, Meares argued that law-enforcement officials should concentrate on specific groups of wrongdoers in ways they could accept as both reasonable and fair. Using Operation Ceasefire in Boston as a model, Meares identified everyone who had committed violent or gun-related crimes and had been released from prison and recently assigned to parole. She gathered them in random groups of no more than 20 for call-in sessions in what Meares calls “places of civic importance” — park buildings, local schools and libraries — where they sat at the same table as the police in order to create an egalitarian, nonconfrontational atmosphere. They then heard a version of Kennedy’s three-part presentation. The results of the program were drastic: there was a 37 percent drop in the average monthly homicide rate — the largest drop of any neighborhood in the city. Violent crime in Chicago today is at a 30 year low. “All these strategies are a way of signaling to groups of people that government agents view them with dignity, neutrality and trust, which is the best way of convincing them that the government has the right to hold them accountable for their behavior,” Meares told me.

From Kennedy and Kleiman to Alm and Meares, the judges and scholars developing new deterrence strategies are changing the way we think about parole, probation, gang violence and drug markets. But the strategies also present a rare opportunity to persuade the nation’s policymakers that the most urgent case for prison reform is not only economic but also moral and practical. Yes, it’s an outrage that the United States locks up citizens for so long with such uncertain effect; but it’s also self-defeating, because long sentences give rise to a crisis of legitimacy that can lead to more crime, not less.

A crisis of legitimacy may sound like a huge, perhaps intractable problem, but the tantalizing promise of the new deterrence thinking is that the crisis can actually be solved, practical step by practical step. The relative simplicity of the solutions, it turns out, is at the core of their radical potential.

Jeffrey Rosen, a law professor at George Washington University, is a frequent contributor to the

magazine. He is at work on a book about Louis Brandeis.

January 23, 2014
HUFF POST POLITICS

The Story Behind the Nation's Falling Body Count

Posted: 01/21/2014 9:39 am

Richard Williams Photography via Getty Images

The numbers are in: 2013 puts America on track for its lowest murder rate in nearly 40 years. But there's an important point the year-end media round-ups are missing: there is a method to the growing lack of madness in America's cities. Most of the cities making headlines -- Chicago, down 18 percent, to the lowest level since 1965; New Orleans, down almost 20 percent, to the lowest level since 1971; Baton Rouge, down over 20 percent; Philadelphia, down a quarter, to the lowest level since 1967; New York, down 20 percent, to an absolute historical record low; Oakland, down 29 percent, the single largest reduction in 40 years; Stockton, down 55 percent, the single largest reduction ever -- are using the same basic method to stop the killing. There is something that can be done about the urban homicide that has plagued the nation for generations, these cities are doing it, and it is working.

Violent crime has been declining across the U.S. for some time, but there is still tremendous work to do. It is nothing less than a national shame that communities across America, especially poor black communities, live with unconscionable levels of violence, incarceration, and tensions with the police (for much of the time the national homicide rate has been going down, the gun homicide rate for younger black men has been going *up*). Traditional enforcement in these neighborhoods has been not only ineffective but often broad, blunt, and intrusive: high levels of street stops, drug arrests, "trespassing" and other pretext misdemeanor arrests, warrant service, and the like have left many angry at and distrustful of authorities. But the cities where violence really declined in 2013 are approaching the problem narrowly and strategically; working to *not* arrest and incarcerate; and consciously engaging with communities in ways that they can embrace as fair and that help them reset their own public safety standards.

Indeed, focus is one of the important things these cities have in common. A growing body of criminological evidence shows that serious violence (and much other crime) is concentrated among remarkably small numbers of "hot" people and places. We now know that homicide and gun violence are overwhelmingly concentrated among serious offenders operating in groups: gangs, drug crews, and the like representing under half of one percent of a city's population commit half to three-quarters of all murders. We also know some reliable predictors of risk: individuals who have a history of violence or a close connection with prior victims are far more likely to be involved in violence themselves. Hot groups and people are *so* hot that when their offending is statistically abstracted, their neighborhoods cease to be dangerous. Their communities aren't dangerous; *they* are.

Hot places are likewise very few and account for a startling proportion of a community's crime. Research on hot spots shows violence to be concentrated in "micro" places, rather than in "dangerous neighborhoods," as the popular idea goes. Blocks, corners, and buildings representing just five or six percent of an entire city will drive half of its serious crime.

The good news is that these concentrations create high-payoff opportunities to intervene. The cities that recognize this fact are creating community-based interventions with a laser-like focus on the people and places driving violence.

In Chicago, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Philadelphia, Oakland, and Stockton -- all cities where homicide, not homicide reduction, has made headlines for years -- a community, social service, and law enforcement partnership identifies group members with extensive criminal histories and engages them in meetings -- "call-ins" -- to demand an end to violence, explain the legal risks they face, and offer them help. Chicago has added "custom notifications" and is using new social network analysis techniques to identify the hottest and most vulnerable people and give them individualized messages about their vulnerability, the help available to them, and their legal risks. Not only has violence dropped dramatically, the Chicago Police Department made 7,000 *fewer* arrests last year. In Los Angeles, where homicide is down to 255 city-wide, a pilot version of the approach in the San Fernando Valley's Mission Area has reduced violence even further: shooting victims are down almost half over last year.

Similar hot-people interventions are consistently effective. In New York City, NYPD has launched Operation Crew Cut, aimed at street crews and their dynamics. Closely monitoring crews, focusing enforcement on the most violent, and intervening when

violence is imminent appears to have cut youth homicide in the city by half while resulting in only 400 or so arrests -- at the same time that, at year's end, the city's controversial street stops were down a full 80 percent. The NYPD's Juvenile Robbery Intervention Program, or JRIP, operating along similar lines, has cut robbery recidivism equally dramatically. A gun-offender call-in initiative pioneered in Chicago over ten years ago by now-Yale Law School Professor Tracey Meares has shown remarkable impact and is being replicated in five sites across New York State, and expanded to juveniles in New York City. High Point, North Carolina has even extended the approach to the most dangerous domestic violence offenders, with very promising early returns.

The approach can transform what are often broken relationships between police and historically troubled, oppressed, and deeply angry minority communities. By making it clear that law enforcement can tell the difference between the very few even potentially violent and everybody else, and leading with intervention rather than arrest and incarceration, law enforcement wins the trust of communities and strengthens their ability to act on their own behalf and police themselves.

This is not simply an aspiration; more and more, it is a proven approach.

In Los Angeles, for example, the Watts Gang Task Force has set up a real-time working partnership between the LAPD, community figures and ex-gang members to gather street intelligence and intervene to head off trouble before anybody gets either hurt or arrested. Ex-offenders committed to their communities are working closely with the Philadelphia and Mission Area law enforcement teams, and elsewhere across the country. Community actors -- elders on the block, pastors, the moral voices that remain strong and authentic in the most troubled of neighborhoods -- help make the Chicago-style "custom notifications" and say to young men and their mothers, we care about you, we need you alive and out of prison, the violence has to stop. These and similar efforts are not about "community relations." They are concrete, pragmatic working partnerships between police and communities. Evidence shows that they reduce violence, but they also have the important effect of increasing police *legitimacy,* the belief that authorities are acting with respect and in communities' best interests. "The statistical information reflects a positive trend," says Todd Chamberlain, commanding officer in the LAPD's Mission Area. "However, what's not reflected, yet just as important, are the incredible partnerships that have grown out of implementation of the program." We now know that where legitimacy goes up, crime goes down: if police are seen as allies, rather than an occupying army, and street offenders hear "put your guns down" rather than "stop snitching," the spiral of decline we have been used to for so long becomes a virtuous cycle.

The new law enforcement thinkers are even taking on the past harms and toxic racial legacies that poison relationships between police and especially African-American communities. Chicago's Superintendent Garry McCarthy is a model of this new honesty. "I understand the historical divide between police and communities of color," he said shortly after taking over the Chicago Police Department. "The most visible arm of government is a police force, and the institutionalized governmental programs that promoted racist policies that were enforced by police departments in this country are part of the African American history in this country. And we have to recognize it because recognition is the first step towards finding a cure towards what is ailing us. Over the years we've actually done a lot of things wrong and I'm willing to admit that. A lot of police executives are defensive. We've done a lot wrong." Remarkably, this transformative honesty about the America's racial history and its implications for legitimacy has become all but, if not, mainstream amongst criminal justice's leadership. "It's time to declare, once and for all, that we must do better - as a country and as a people," Attorney General Eric Holder told the International Association of Chiefs of Police this fall. "For the safety of our men and women on the front lines -- and in the name of winning the respect and cooperation of America's minority communities -- it is incumbent upon law enforcement leaders to help bridge this divide. And we can start by recognizing that compliance with the law begins not with the fear of arrest or even of incarceration - but with respect for the institutions that guide our democracy."

It's true, of course, that not every city with homicide declines in 2013 is doing this work (and this is not all the successful ones are doing; the Philadelphia Police Department, for example, is seeing powerful impact from a parallel hot-places strategy). But where cities are using these approaches, the results are consistently tremendously promising. And they are growing and spreading: Detroit, Denver, and Kansas City have begun to use them; Baltimore will launch this year; the state of Connecticut is supporting them in New Haven, Bridgeport, and Hartford; smaller cities like Peoria, Chattanooga, and South Bend have begun or are beginning. They are taking on squarely the core public safety issue for American cities, and in many ways for the American democratic experiment: how to police both effectively and with legitimacy, and how to protect communities without sending whole generations of young men to prison.

Homicide may be down nationally, but until we reach the corners of America that still suffer from daily violence, and where getting stopped, arrested, and locked up are a normal part of a young man's life, we are doing them an injustice. The efforts of these cities, using these methods, represent a major advance -- a workable way forward. They foster a focus on preventing violence and incarceration among the people most likely to be touched by both; help police do their jobs in a way that does not harm, and in fact strengthens, the communities they serve; and support communities in reclaiming their voice about the way they want to live.

David M. Kennedy is a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, and co-chair of the National Network for Safe Communities, which supports cities in the work described in this article. His most recent book is Don't Shoot: One Man, A Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in Inner-City America.

Procedural Justice, Police Legitimacy and Violence Reduction

Tracey Meares
Yale Law School

A paradox regarding policing in America

- In recent decades the objective quality of American policing has improved.
  (*Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing*, 2004, National Academy of Science).
  - Greater ability to fight crime
  - Decline in unlawful shootings of civilians
  - Etc.
- There is a lot we can feel good about in American policing.

The legitimacy of the police

- Public support for the police – "police legitimacy" - has not increased at a similar rate.
  - This is especially true among minorities.

Police legitimacy

- The core idea is that it is important for the public to view the police as entitled to exercise the authority to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems in their communities.
- Legitimacy reflects three related issues:
  - Trust and confidence in the police
  - The willingness to defer to police authority.
  - Viewing police actions as morally correct and appropriate.
- Often indexed as trust and confidence in the police

Percentage of Americans expressing confidence in the police has been similar over the last 30 years. (Gallup poll/USDOJ)



Percent expressing "a great deal/quite a lot" of confidence in police officers



Legitimacy matters

- During police-citizen interactions.
  - Increases deference. Leads to voluntary decision acceptance of police directives that is maintained over time
  - Lowers resistance and hostility.

In everyday life

- Promotes voluntary compliance with law.
- Encourages cooperation with the police.
  - Report crime and criminals.
  - Work with the police to secure communities.
- Less likely to engage in extra-legal violence; collective actions such as riots.

The legitimacy of the police

- We need to ask: “What shapes police legitimacy in the eyes of the public if not the objective quality of police behavior?”

Distinct perspective

- Dominant policing models.
  - What is lawful. Focus on whether officers are obeying the law.
  - What is effective. Are the police controlling crime, catching criminals?
- Neither of these issues is found to be central to public trust and confidence in the police.

Understanding Legitimacy

Lawfulness is . . .

Understanding Legitimacy

Lawfulness is . . .

Legal Constraints

1. Laws and Ordinances
   - Activate behavior
2. Rules, Regulations and SOPs
   - Activate and limit conduct
3. Court Rulings and Decisions
   - Constitutional protections provide legal limits

Understanding Legitimacy

- Lawfulness is . . .
- Legitimacy is . . .



What shapes police legitimacy when people deal with the police?

- The primary issue shaping people's views about legitimacy when dealing with the police is whether the police are exercising their authority in fair ways - procedural justice.
- Procedural justice is more important than the outcome of those experiences.

Defined in terms of four issues

- Quality of decision making.
  - Voice.
  - Neutrality.
- Quality of treatment
  - Respect for people and their rights.
  - Trustworthiness.

Voice

- The opportunity to state one's case; tell one's side of the story.
- When policies are being created: participation.
- When policies are being implemented: chances for input.

Neutrality

- Evidence of neutral decision-making: lack of biased decision; consistent and rule based decision making. Evaluations on the merits and in accord with the rules typically applied.
- Being neutral is not the same as being seen as neutral.
- Transparency and accountability allow people to see that decision making has been neutral.
  - Explaining reasons for police policies/actions. Why are people being stropped; why has a person has been stopped.

Quality of treatment – respect people/rights

- Receiving interpersonal treatment that is respectful and dignified. This includes respect as a person and respect for one's rights.
- Respect involves both treating people with dignity and showing sensitivity to their status as members of the community.

Trust in integrity of officers

- Trying to do what is right.
- Communicating that you are concerned about the people involved (benevolence).
- Acknowledge the importance of the issues to the people involved. Consider people's arguments.
- Account for decisions showing responsiveness to concerns. Concerns have been listened to and taken into account.

Understanding Legitimacy

- Lawfulness is . . .
- Legitimacy is . . .



How can we influence police legitimacy in the community?

- To address the legitimacy of the police and of policing practices we need to think about policing in a new way.
- We need to focus on how police policies can be improved through procedural justice

First focus on personal experiences

- We should treat every encounter that the public has with the police, the courts, and the law as a "teachable moment" that builds or undermines legitimacy.
- We should consider what individuals react to when they have these encounters.

Studies suggest that judgments about policing practices shape public behavior

Does the public believe that the police exercise their authority in fair ways (procedural justice)? → Does the public accept the legitimacy of police authority? →

-Defer to police decisions.

-Generally accept and obey the law

-Cooperate with the police to fight crime.

Research studies support the role of procedural justice.

- Study of California street stops
  - Conducted in Oakland and Los Angeles
  - Assessed why people voluntarily defer to police officers and judges
  - 1656 interviews of people who had recent personal experiences with the police.

Measures used in this study

- Evaluations of experience
  - Outcome.
    - Outcome favorability (The decision favored me.)
    - Outcome fairness (I received the outcome I deserved.)
  - Procedural justice.
    - The decisions were made in fair ways.
    - I was treated in fair ways.
- Reaction to experience
  - Voluntary deference
    - I willingly accepted the decisions made.

Willingness to accept decisions by race



What does this mean in terms of the likelihood of voluntarily deferring to police decisions during a street stop?



Broader goals.

- Gain public cooperation.
- Build the community.

Helping the police.

- Help police identify crime, criminals.
- Help by testifying if needed.
- Defer to police in managing disputes and conflicts.
  - No private violence.
  - No riots.

General views about police legitimacy matter.



31

Summary

- The way members of the public perceive the police and evaluate police behavior and policing practices shapes their views and behaviors.
  - These effects are very robust.
- The key issue is procedural justice and, in particular, how people are treated by the police.
  - Procedural justice creates and maintains legitimacy.
  - This is true for both Whites and minority group members.

2/19/2014 32

Key points.

- You can treat people fairly and still enforce the law.
  - Panel study of people pre and post stops by the police in which they receive a negative outcome (Tyler & Fagan, 2008).

Officer safety.

- Policing is a dangerous job and officers are naturally concerned about their safety.
  - The assumption is that encounters with the public are dangerous and the police will be safer if they project force and dominate people and situations.
- Research does not support this. Research suggests that procedural justice lowers the rate of escalation and injury to officers as well as civilians.
- When the police react to perceived threat by displaying force it leads to escalation of conflict.
  - Of course, force is always needed in some situations or with some people. But, it should be a last resort ("the reluctant warrior")
- "First secure the situation, then sell the stop".

Police concerns.

- Officer safety.
- Control of crime.

Increasing Legitimacy

Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago

1. **Increased Federal Gun Prosecutions**
   - Deterrence
2. **Increased Federal Prison Sentences**
   - Incapacitation
3. **Increased Firearms Policing**
   - Supply-side strategies
4. **Offender Notification Meetings**
   - Deterrence
   - Normative change

PSN Interventions

1. **Increased Federal Gun Prosecutions**
   - Deterrence
2. **Increased Federal Prison Sentences**
   - Incapacitation
3. **Increased Firearms Policing**
   - Supply-side strategies
4. **Offender Notification Meetings**
   - Deterrence
   - Normative change

Legitimacy Efforts

PSN Efforts

One Hour Meetings with "Active Gun Offenders"

- Recently released to parole/probation
- Prior gun/violent offense
- Live in target community
- Possible gang membership

"Stick and Carrot" Approach . . . With a lot of *legitimacy*

Offender Notification Forums

- Three sets of presentations followed by one-on-one time with offenders:
  1. Law Enforcement Message – "You're a Target"
  2. Ex-Offender Message – "You can do it"
  3. Community Message – "Here's how you do it"

Implementation

Urban League-Style Seating in a Place of "Civic Importance"

"You're only going to be targeted if you pick up a gun, so you have a choice right? So, if you get angry, pick up a shoe and beat someone with it because you probably won't kill them and you won't have to worry about us . . . It's when you pick up a gun that you have a problem"

A Police Commander's Message

"We don't want to see you again, because, if we do, it'll either be on a piece of paper as someone who picked up a gun, or as a victim. Go out and be producers. Don't destroy the community anymore."

A State's Attorney's Message

"There's a saying, 'Change is a choice, but accountability is a guarantee.' They [pointing to police] are sitting here and telling you they [are] coming after you. Gonna hold you accountable. Now, I don't mean no disrespect, but if you ain't listening, you got to be a fool . . I changed. It was a choice, a real hard one. But I did it. . . .Once you change your life around, you'll have a whole world of new respect for yourself and others."

An Ex-Offender's Message

How do we know it works?

A Review of the Research

Quasi-experimental design

Analyze:

- Neighborhood Crime Rates
- Individual Recidivism

Original Survey – The Chicago Gun Project

- N = 150 active gun offenders in PSN districts
- Focus on legitimacy and networks

Research Design

Change in Monthly Homicide Rates by Assignment Groups



Summary of PSN "Treatment" Effects on Quarterly Neighborhood Homicide Rates

Percentage decrease in Log(Homicide Rate) associated with a one-unit increase in PSN "treatment"



***N.B.: Random Effects Poisson Regression*

“Survival” on the Streets – Recidivism Rates of Forum Attendees



Gang Member ‘Survival’ Estimates



"People Should Obey the Law Even if it Goes against what they think is right"



Pearson Chi-Squared = 3.717 , p = 0.054

"Most Police Treat People with Respect"



Pearson Chi-Squared = 113.32 , p = 0.0000

Summary of Survey Findings

- "Criminals" obey the law for the same reasons as "normal" people
- Legitimacy and respect matter, even for offenders.
  - Respect for authority → more likely to believe law is legitimate
  - Less likely to carry a gun

Thank You

Questions?

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Volume 92 Summer 2009 Number 4

BARROCK LECTURE ON CRIMINAL LAW

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
FEBRUARY 19, 2009

THE LEGITIMACY OF POLICE AMONG YOUNG AFRICAN-AMERICAN MEN

TRACEY MEARES*

Introduction by Dean Joseph D. Kearney

It is a privilege for me to introduce the George and Margaret Barrock Lecture. Permit me to begin by saying a few words about the individuals in whose memory this lecture stands. While I would do this in any event, it is especially appropriate to do so this year, for this is the inaugural Barrock Lecture.

George Barrock was a Marquette lawyer, from our class of 1931. George's parents were from Lebanon, coming over to the United States on a cattle boat. Like so many immigrants, they both modeled a strong work ethic and stressed to their children the importance of education.

Upon George's graduation from law school, he started his own firm in his native Milwaukee. He was primarily a family-law lawyer, although he is said to have always tried to help his client reconcile with his or her spouse rather than divorce, if possible. In all events, George Barrock was fortunate in his own marriage: his wife, Margaret, was not only his partner for life but also worked with him at the firm, on administrative matters. A bequest to support an occasional distinguished lecture in George and Margaret Barrock's memory was provided by their daughter, Mary Bonfield.

This is *that lecture, which we have determined to associate with the area of criminal law. While this was not George Barrock's specialty, it is consistent not only with his daughter's bequest (to be sure) but with his own practice, which served individual citizens with their everyday legal problems. Moreover, criminal law is an*

* Walton Hale Hamilton Professor, Yale Law School. This lecture was edited for publication.

historic strength of Marquette University Law School, certainly insofar as our teaching and our graduates' practices are concerned. I am thus very pleased that this lecture series will occur in the area of criminal law.

And how fortunate we are that Tracey Meares, the Walton Hale Hamilton Professor at Yale Law School, has accepted the invitation, which Associate Dean Michael O'Hear extended on our behalf, to join us to deliver this inaugural Barrock Lecture. Professor Meares is among the nation's most innovative and influential criminal law scholars. Her work focuses on the immensely difficult and important problem of high crime rates in poor, urban, minority neighborhoods. Professor Meares's writings on this topic exemplify the very best of interdisciplinary legal scholarship, bringing to bear a deep understanding of sociological theory in an effort to help develop constructive, practical proposals for improving both legal doctrine and police practices.

In particular, Professor Meares has called for a more flexible approach to constitutional rights that would give local communities more power to address their own crime problems, and she has called for police to develop different ways of engaging with the communities they serve. Her work thus defies categorization based on the simplistic, partisan labels that mark much of the public discourse on criminal procedure, such as "pro-defendant" or "pro-police." Indeed, it does nothing less than invite us to rethink our positions about crime and policing in the inner-city and to be open to innovative crime-control strategies that move beyond traditional deterrence-based approaches.

Please join me in welcoming, to Marquette University Law School and Milwaukee, Professor Tracey Meares.

Thank you, Dean Kearney, for your very generous introduction, and thank you, Professor O'Hear, for the Law School's invitation. I am so pleased to see all of you here. It is a pleasure to come to a city where there is such a diverse crowd interested in this very important issue. I am especially honored to be the first person asked to give the George and Margaret Barrock Lecture.

Let me begin with Bill Bratton, chief of the Los Angeles Police Department: he believes that police are the solution to the problem of race in America. Admittedly, this is a bit of an overstatement, but not much. In an interview with *Playboy* magazine in 2008, Bratton stated, "If we don't solve the race issue, we'll never solve the other issues. The police have traditionally been the flash point for so many of America's racial problems."[1]

Many, if not most, of you would agree with the last part of Chief Bratton's statement. However, I'd like to engage with his first sentence: "If we don't solve the race issue, we'll never solve the other issues."[2] The "we" Bratton

1. Joe Domanick, *Saving Los Angeles*, PLAYBOY, Feb. 2008, at 71, 72.
2. *Id.*

was referring to in his statement is the police, and I'm quite sure that Bratton believes that policing agencies ought to set themselves to this task. I think he also believes that policing agencies have a good shot at making headway.

The question for this lecture is whether he is correct. Or, incorrect. Or, simply out there. In this inaugural George and Margaret Barrock Lecture, I plan to explore the answers to this question.

Here is a sketch of my argument: I shall begin with a description of the group at the heart of the matter—young, poorly educated, urban-dwelling African-American men. I will describe their entanglement in the various criminal justice systems of this nation, and I will discuss their prospects for succeeding in life along dimensions that most people would commonly agree constitute success. At the end of this section, I will suggest that the prevalence and intensity of criminal justice involvement among this group are relevant to—indeed, the very reasons why—Chief Bratton's assertion might, paradoxically, make some sense.

Next, I shall outline a vision of the kind of policing necessary to achieve Bratton's goal. I believe that the form of policing that has the potential to solve the "race issue" emphasizes process rather than outcomes and moral engagement as opposed to notions of criminal deterrence. The most important aspect of this type of policing is the notion of legitimacy—a term about which I shall try to explicate in some detail below.

Finally, I will say a little bit about both the prospects of policing to take this new path as well as the likelihood that the target group will accept it. Increasingly, there are promising signs that make me hopeful about the prospects for change. It is my hope that you will also be hopeful at this lecture's end.

So we begin.

When Chief Bratton points to solving the "race issue," I think he means to emphasize the specific as opposed to the general. It is not news to say that police agencies across this country have had more difficulty in achieving high levels of trust and positive engagement with African-Americans as a group no matter their age, gender, or socioeconomic status, as compared to other racial groups. Survey evidence is crystal clear regarding the gap between the levels of confidence that minority group members and whites have in police and the courts,[3] and research notably shows that the more negative opinions of people of color are durable without regard to group members' specific experiences with legal authorities.[4] This point about specific experiences is, of course, a

3. *See* Richard R.W. Brooks & Haekyung Jeon-Slaughter, *Race, Income, and Perceptions of the U.S. Court System*, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 249, 251 & n.7 (2001) (collecting cases).

4. Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, *Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct*, 51 SOC.

critical one, because contact with police is not randomly distributed. Men have more contact with police than women.[5] The young have more contact with police than the old.[6] The poor have more contact with police than the rich,[7] and so on. But, whatever issue police have with African-Americans as a group, that issue is much more acute among the subgroup at risk of the most contact with police. No one is surprised to learn that black men have long faced a higher arrest probability than white men. What people might find surprising is the scale of that differential.

Recent research indicates that the likelihood of police contact (broadening the "contact" category to include stops) for African-American men in urban centers is much higher than for other groups.[8] For example, Jeffrey Fagan and his colleagues have estimated that the probability of being stopped by police for African-American men ages eighteen to nineteen residing in New York City in 2006 was between 78% and 80%.[9] For youth a bit older, between eighteen and twenty-four, the probability ranged from 50% to 70%.[10] The corresponding probabilities for Hispanic males and non-Hispanic white males for the same time period were 35% and 45% and 10% and 13% respectively.[11] And in Los Angeles, my colleague Ian Ayres has found that per 10,000 residents per year, the black stop rate is 3,400 stops higher than the white stop rate.[12]

The disproportionate involvement of African-American men in the criminal justice system just starts with police, but it doesn't end there. Anyone familiar with the Sentencing Project's Reports has heard the following numbers: In 1994, almost one in three black men between the ages

PROBS. 305, 307–08, 316–20 (2004); *see also* Wesley G. Skogan, *Assymetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police*, 16 POLICING & SOC'Y 99, 101 (2006).

5. *See* FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 tbl.8 (2008), *available at* http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/arrests/index.html.

6. *See id.* at tbl.38.

7. *See generally, e.g.*, Douglas A. Smith, *The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior*, 8 CRIME & JUST. 313 (1986) (explaining that police often have a more visible presence in poor neighborhoods than wealthier ones).

8. Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies & Valerie West, *Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City*, *in* RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING (Michael White & Steven Rice eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 25, on file with author).

9. *Id.* (manuscript at 25–26, 39 tbl.14.4a).

10. *Id.* (manuscript at 25–26, 39 tbl.14.4b).

11. *See id.* (manuscript at 25–26, 39 tbl.14.4c & tbl.14.4d). The estimate varies depending on assumptions about the number of persons stopped more than once, and the total number of stops that are repeat stops.

12. Ian Ayres, *Racial Profiling in L.A.: The Numbers Don't Lie*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A27.

of twenty and twenty-nine was under correctional supervision (prison, jail, probation, or parole), up from fewer than one in four in 1990.[13] The African-American rate is more than four times that of similarly aged white men.[14] Drilling down, the numbers become even more shocking. Bruce Western, a sociologist at Harvard University, has calculated the likelihood that men from different demographic groups would go to prison by age thirty-five. Focusing on men without a high school degree, Western demonstrates that one in nine white men born between 1965 and 1969 would go to prison by age thirty-five.[15] That's not a small number, and it is a definite marker of the trend toward expanding the scope of imprisonment in the United States. Still, the number is significantly less than the rate black male high school dropouts in the same cohort faced at the end of the 1990s. A black male high school dropout born between 1965 and 1969 had nearly a 60% chance of going to prison by the end of the last decade.[16]

This means that for certain men—black men without a high school degree—imprisonment is *modal* in statistical terms. In everyday language, it is *normal*. For these men, going to prison is an ordinary life experience along one's life course trajectory, just like graduation, marriage, a first job, or having children is for everybody else.[17]

Note my emphasis on "certain men." Western claims that the racial disparity of imprisonment hasn't changed over the last thirty years. What has changed is the profound increase in imprisonment among a certain group of black men—those without a high school education.[18] It should go without saying that if imprisonment is modal among this group, then so contact with the police must be.

Chief Bratton's statement—or challenge, if you will—is relevant to these dismal figures. At base, Bratton argues that the police have a unique opportunity to make a difference in the lives of the young men I've just spoken about, and I think he is right. Police officers are members of the government agency with which poorly educated, young African-American men as a group of people are likely to have the most contact outside of public school officials.[19] It is true that police officers provide young African-

13. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3 (1995).

14. *Id.*

15. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 26 (2006).

16. *Id.*

17. *Id.* at 28.

18. Interview by Elizabeth Henderson with Bruce Western (Dec. 5, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?articleId=12277).

19. Recall that by definition we are talking about people who are disengaged from schools.

American men with many (perhaps too many) opportunities to shape negative opinions of law enforcement. However, this observation leads to the prospect of its opposite. Police officers as state officials have more opportunities than most state agents to make a positive difference.

It is easy to criticize this point by relying on the many instances in which police have not gotten it right and have made situations worse. Examples are legion, and the fact that they can be referenced by name underscores the point.[20] I am heartened, however, by the research highlighted in a recent paper by my colleagues and coauthors, Tom Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan.[21] Tyler and Fagan's research contradicts that of other prominent police researchers such as Wesley Skogan, who claims that negative experiences that folks have with the police hurt public evaluations of police a great deal, while positive experiences do little to improve them.[22] There is nothing surprising about Skogan's first conclusion; rather, it is the second that the Tyler and Fagan work undermines.

Tyler and Fagan demonstrate, through a very clever research design that allows them to determine causal connections between the experiences that people have with the police and their later judgments of police legitimacy, that positive experiences do indeed lead to positive evaluations of police legitimacy at a later date.[23] Importantly, their findings hold even when the relevant experience the respondent had with the police led to a negative outcome.[24]

It might seem strange, or even bizarre, to say that one could have both a positive experience and a negative outcome, but there is a psychological theory that helps to make the point more clear. That theory is centered on the notion of legitimacy, and to explain what it means, it is useful to ask the following question: Why do people obey the law?

Many people believe that people obey the law because they fear the consequences of failing to do so. The theory is simple and lies in deterrence theory. Deterrence theorists believe that people rationally maximize their utility and shape their behavior in response to incentives and penalties in the criminal code.[25] If the cost of breaking the law becomes high enough because

20. Consider Rodney King, Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo, and Sean Bell.

21. Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, *Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in their Communities?*, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).

22. Wesley G. Skogan, *Assymetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police*, 16 POLICING & SOC'Y 99, 100 (2008).

23. Tyler & Fagan, *supra* note 21, at 255–56.

24. *Id.* at 256.

25. *See* WESTERN, *supra* note 15, at 177–79.

sentences are long, or because the likelihood of getting caught increases, then, the theory goes, people will choose to obey rather than break the law.[26]

Social psychologists have offered a different view—one that will likely resonate with people. Social psychologists point to normative bases for compliance rather than instrumental ones, and they have connected voluntary compliance with the law to the fact that individuals believe that the law is "just" or that the authority enforcing the law has the right to do so.[27] These factors are considered normative; individuals respond to them differently from the way they respond to rewards and punishments.[28] In contrast to the individual who complies with the law because she is responding to externally imposed punishments, the individual who complies for normative reasons does so because she feels an *internal* obligation.[29] It is "[t]he suggestion that citizens will voluntarily act against their self-interest [that] is the key to the social value of normative influences."[30]

Compliance that flows from one's belief that a law is just is different from compliance that follows a belief that authorities have the right to dictate proper behavior, even though both of these categories for compliance are normative.[31] Psychologist Tom Tyler refers to reasons for compliance situated within the former category as morality-based, and he calls the latter category of reasons for compliance legitimacy-based.[32] Although research suggests morality to be the more powerful of the normative reasons for compliance,[33] I focus here on legitimacy for three reasons. First, legitimacy, an amalgamation of perceptions that individuals hold regarding the law and authorities that enforce it, is in the government's control in contrast to the development of personal morality.[34] Second, there are legal constraints on what may be the most effective methods for government to utilize in shaping personal morality of citizens.[35] Third, and perhaps most important, legitimacy

26. *See id.*

27. *See, e.g.*, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (1990).

28. *Id.* at 24.

29. *Id.*

30. *Id.*

31. *See id.* at 4.

32. *See id.*

33. *See id.* at 57–64 (showing that regression analyses indicate that among deterrence, peer disapproval, personal morality, and legitimacy, personal morality is most strongly correlated with compliance).

34. This is not to say that governmental authorities have no influence over the development of an individual's morality, and schools are an obvious location of government-based influence on the development of childhood and adolescent morality.

35. For example, one potentially very effective state inculcation of morality (that also happens to favor the state) could be the codification of *Romans* 13:1–2, which states:

is a more stable basis for voluntary compliance than is personal morality—at least from the government's perspective. While greater legitimacy translates into more compliance whether or not compliance is in the personal interest of an individual, one's personal moral schedule may or may not be in line with authoritative dictates.[36]

The next logical question is to ask what it means to say that people will comply because they believe an authority has the right to dictate to them proper behavior. This is the essence of legitimacy. Social psychologists have helpfully tied together an explanation of governmental legitimacy to thought processes that people undertake when evaluating official behavior and actions.[37] For example, Allan Lind and Tom Tyler argue that processes that lead up to an outcome are important indicators to individuals about how the authority in question views the group to which the evaluator perceives herself belonging.[38] Procedures that all parties regard as fair facilitate positive relations among group members and preserve the fabric of society even in the face of conflicts of interest that exist in any group whose members have different preference structures and different beliefs concerning how the group should manage its affairs.[39] Putting this point another way, procedures might be considered more "trait-like"[40] than outcomes, which are variable, or which may be extremely indeterminate in a particular case. While it may not be obvious how a particular case should come out, it is almost always clear how parties should proceed and be treated in that particular case.

> Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.

This move would obviously contradict the strictures against state establishment of religion found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

36. *See* TYLER, *supra* note 27, at 4 (using the example of the war in Vietnam and explaining that those who believed in the legitimacy of government fought in the war regardless of their beliefs in favor of or against the conflict, while others who did not believe in the morality of the war illegally dodged the draft).

37. *See* E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 230–41 (1988) (developing the group value model to explain instances in which people confer legitimacy even when outcomes do not accrue to their benefit).

38. *See id.*

39. *See id.*

40. *See* Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, *Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust*, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 390, 404 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1995).

Lind and Tyler call this approach the group value model of procedural justice,[41] and the approach is a central aspect of their view of legitimacy-based compliance. They also offer views regarding how people connect their treatment by government officials to assessments of social value. Individuals focus on three factors: standing, neutrality, and trust.[42] By *standing*, researchers are referring to indications that the authority recognizes an individual's status and membership in a valued group, such as polite treatment and treatment that accords dignity and respect, such as concern for rights.[43] *Neutrality* refers to indications to the perceiver that she is not being made to feel less worthy than others because an authority's bias, discrimination, or incompetence.[44] And *trust* refers to the extent to which a perceiver believes that the authority in question will act fairly and benevolently in the future.[45] Of course, individuals making assessments do not disaggregate them in terms of these factors; rather, they come to conclusions regarding authorities by considering information that is *relevant* to these factors.

Importantly—indeed, critically—for our purposes, the empirical evidence is quite persuasive: These legitimacy factors matter more toward compliance than instrumental factors, such as sanctions imposed by authorities on individuals who fail to follow the law or private rules.[46] For example, in a study designed to test compliance directly, Tyler used regression analyses to test the relative impact on the compliance of respondents of legitimacy, public deterrence, peer disapproval, and personal morality.[47] He found that the regression estimate for legitimacy on compliance was about five times greater than the estimate for deterrence.[48] Other studies exploring the relationship between legitimacy and behavior related to compliance, such as acceptance of arbitration awards[49] and decision acceptance and rule following in business settings,[50] have found that legitimacy has a profound impact on behavior.

41. *See* LIND & TYLER, *supra* note 37, at 230–41.

42. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, *A Relational Model of Authority in Groups*, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 158–59 (1992).

43. *See id*. at 153 (collecting studies); *see also* Tom R. Tyler, *What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used By Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures*, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 129 (1988) (discussing the importance of recognition of citizen's rights).

44. Tyler & Lind, *supra* note 42, at 157.

45. *See* Tom R. Tyler, *Trust and Democratic Governance*, *in* TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 269, 269–70 (Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).

46. TYLER, *supra* note 27, at 4.

47. *Id.* at 59 tbl.5.1.

48. Specifically, the regression estimates are .11** for legitimacy and .02 (not significant) for deterrence. *Id.* Both of these estimates of reliability were adjusted. To put these estimates in perspective, note that the estimates for the impact of age and sex on compliance are .24*** and .26***, respectively. *Id.*

49. *See generally* ROBERT J. MACCOUN, E. ALLAN LIND, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DAVID L.

It is also important (and critical) to see that the research does *not* imply that instrumental means of producing compliance have no effect. In each of the studies cited here, deterrence or outcome-based judgments influenced compliance or related behavior in some way. Still, the work suggests that legitimacy is typically more important to compliance than instrumental reasons. It should be clear, then, that a legitimacy-based law enforcement policy necessarily will make relevant those who are typically considered law breakers, as well as those who are not. A legitimacy-based program of law enforcement will focus more on persuasion than it will focus on punishment. And to achieve persuasion, authorities will have to pay attention to the creation of the necessary social capital that engenders trust relationships between governors and the governed. Such trust cannot be created simply by emphasizing rewards and punishments, for those strategies assume that all individuals care about is the "bottom line"—an assumption that is contrary to the theory of procedural justice and much empirical evidence. In fact, an assumption that compliance is typically created only by threats of coercion backed up with punishment is fundamentally inconsistent with trust, for such a stance assumes that individuals cannot be counted to defer. This approach emphasizes a space rather than a bond between the state and its citizens.

I would like to point to two examples of law enforcement policy to motivate this theory. The first example is more of a re-entry strategy than it is a policing approach, but it is still instructive. The second example is more squarely policing, but it, too, involves multiple agencies. Notably, both strategies feature what I have called moral engagement as opposed to notions of criminal deterrence. And, both heavily implicate governmental legitimacy.

Chicago has recently experienced a steep drop in homicide and other violent crime since 1999. Indeed, if one examines the highest crime communities on the city's high-poverty west side, one would observe a 37% drop in the quarterly homicide rate between 1999 and 2006.[51] While

BRYANT & PATRICIA A. EBENER, ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988) (finding that the probability of litigants in cases involving auto claims in New Jersey courts accepting arbitrators' awards correlated with legitimacy and outcome favorability); E. Allan Lind, Carol T. Kulik, Maureen Ambrose & Maria deVera Park, *Outcome and Process Concerns in Organizational Dispute Resolution* (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9109, 1991) (finding that the decisions of parties to accept or reject arbitration awards were strongly related to procedural justice (legitimacy) judgments and that outcome favorability judgments operated only through procedural justice judgments).

50. *See generally* P. Christopher Earley & E. Allan Lind, *Procedural Justice and Participation in Task Selection: The Role of Control in Mediating Justice Judgments*, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1148 (1987) (examining the influence of the fairness of task assignment procedures on individual's acceptance of assignments and finding acceptance influenced by procedural justice measures).

51. *See* Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, *Attention Felons:*

researchers are beginning to examine several competing and complementary factors responsible for the drop in Chicago's murder rate, one influential program, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), may be a major contributing factor.

PSN is a billion-dollar federal program designed to promote innovative gun-crime reduction strategies throughout the nation.[52] In Chicago, PSN has meant the formation of a multiagency task force that includes members from law enforcement and local community agencies.[53] Since May 2002, the PSN task force has met on a monthly basis to devise gun violence reduction strategies for targeted police districts with high rates of gun violence.[54] PSN Chicago utilizes several coordinated strategies that rely on traditional law enforcement as well as recent developments in the realms of restorative and procedural justice.[55] This essay focuses on one strategy—Offender Notification Forums (Forums).

The PSN team also believed, consistent with theories of legitimacy detailed above, that the key to changing patterns of gun crime lies in altering the normative beliefs of gun users themselves.[56] Keeping these principles in mind and considering other successful programs implemented in Boston,[57] the PSN team crafted its most innovative strategy, the Forums.[58] Offenders in the target neighborhood with a history of gun violence and gang participation who were recently assigned to parole or probation are requested to attend a Forum hosted by the PSN team.[59] The Forums are hour-long, round-table style meetings in which approximately twenty offenders sit around a table with representatives from state and local law enforcement, community

Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMP. L. STUD. 223, 254 (2007). Much of the material following this note is taken from this article.

52. *Id.* at 225.

53. "Participating members include representatives from the Chicago Police Department, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, the Illinois Department of Correction, the Cook County Department of Probation, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois, the City of Chicago Corporation Counsel, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy, the Chicago Crime Commission, and more than 12 community-based organizations." *Id.* at 229.

54. *Id.*

55. *Id.* at 230–31. Other Chicago PSN strategies include: multiagency case review, specialized federal and local gun enforcement teams, school based gun-violence education programs, media outreach efforts, and officer training programs. For a review of these and other PSN initiatives, see *id.* at 231–33.

56. *See id*. at 237.

57. *See* Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring & Anne Morrison Piehl, *Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire*, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195, 198, 220 (2000).

58. Papachristos, Meares & Fagan, *supra* note 51, at 231.

59. *Id.*

representatives, and various service providers.[60] Informal conversations with attendees after the conclusion of meetings often last an additional hour and lead to more intimate follow-up and service provision.[61] The meetings take place in a location of civic importance (such as a local park, library, or school) and are designed to be egalitarian in nature, meaning that offenders sit at the same table as all other Forum participants, rather than as passive audience members.[62]

The content of the meeting is designed to stress to offenders the *consequences*, should they choose to pick up a gun, as well as the *choices* they have to make to ensure that they do not reoffend.[63] The meeting is divided into three different segments.[64] First, law enforcement agencies openly discuss the targeted PSN enforcement efforts, giving examples of cases that have occurred *within* the offenders' neighborhoods.[65] Many times, the Forum attendees are familiar with the defendants.[66] The point of the first segment is to explain in very specific terms the consequences of gun offending for both the individual and his neighborhood.[67] The second segment of the Forum entails a presentation by an ex-offender who has successfully stayed away from a life of offending for several years.[68] The ex-offender talks about how he has been able to stay away from a life of crime using poignant examples from his own experiences.[69] The speaker's message stresses the seriousness of the current levels of violence in the community, the problems of intraracial violence, the truth about gang life (including its meager financial rewards to most of its gang members), the troubles offenders face when looking for work, and the seriousness of the PSN enforcement efforts.[70] The final segment of the Forum stresses the choices offenders can make to avoid reoffending.[71] This entails a series of conversations with service providers, community agencies, and employers from the offenders' own neighborhoods.[72] "Programs include substance abuse assistance, temporary shelter, job training, mentorship and union training, education and GED

60. *Id.* at 231–32.
61. *Id.* at 232.
62. *Id.* at 237.
63. *Id.* at 231–32.
64. *Id.* at 231.
65. *Id.* at 231–32.
66. *Id.* at 232.
67. *See id.* at 231–32.
68. *Id.* at 232.
69. *Id.*
70. *Id.*
71. *Id.*
72. *Id.*

courses, and behavior counseling."[73] Often several local employers attend and instruct attendees on the necessary steps to gain employment with their firms.[74]

We used a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the impact of PSN strategies on neighborhood-level crime rates and individual rates of reoffending.[75] PSN appears to have been remarkably effective in reducing neighborhood crime rates. There were dramatic reductions in homicide in the PSN districts as compared to control areas and the city as a whole. More specifically, there was an approximately 37% decrease in monthly homicide rate after the start of the program as compared to the preceding three years.[76] Furthermore, that decrease is significantly larger than the city as a whole—in fact, if one considers the PSN areas separately from the city, nearly all of the decline in the city's homicide can be associated with the drop in the PSN areas.[77]

Neighborhood-level analysis also demonstrates the relative impact of the various PSN enforcement and community efforts. Increased federal prosecutions and the number of guns recovered by the gun teams were correlated with declining neighborhood-level homicide rates—namely, more federal prosecutions and getting more guns off of the street are associated with a small portion of the observed drop in homicides in the PSN neighborhoods.[78]

The PSN program with the greatest effect on declining neighborhood level homicide was the Offender Notification Forums.[79] In short, the greater the proportion of offenders who attend the Forums, the greater the decline in neighborhood levels of homicide.

Analyses of recidivism rates give further support of the efficacy of the PSN Forums. To summarize, individuals who attended a PSN Forum were almost 30% less likely to return to prison as compared to similar individuals in the same neighborhood who did not attend a forum.[80] Individuals in the PSN treatment group tended to desist from criminal involvement and to "survive" on the street longer periods of time as compared to individuals in

73. *Id.*

74. *Id.*

75. *Id*. at 224.

76. *Id*. at 254.

77. *Id*. at 255.

78. *Id*. at 257–59.

79. *Id*.

80. *See* Jeffrey Fagan, Andrew Papachristos, Danielle Wallace & Tracey Meares, Desistance and Legitimacy: Effect Heterogeneity in a Field Experiment on High Risk Groups (Nov. 2008) (unpublished research, on file with author).

the control group.[81] By the third year after release from prison, approximately half of all non-PSN group members have re-offended and been incarcerated, as compared to about 25% of the PSN treatment group.[82] Furthermore, the program appears to diminish levels of recividism and reincarceration among gang *and* non-gang members, and appears to be particularly effective for first-time offenders, those individuals who have been convicted of only a single prior offense.[83]

There is a second notable strategy that some might consider more relevant to legitimacy in policing than the PSN example that I just offered. The strategy is colloquially referred to as the "High Point Model," after High Point, North Carolina, where it was implemented. The High Point Model gained some fame after it was highlighted in a *Wall Street Journal* piece penned by journalist Mark Schoofs.[84] The process worked this way: police officers investigated dealers and other personnel central to the operation of an open-air drug market in the West End neighborhood of High Point.[85] A critical aspect of this investigation was police videotape of the drug market in action and the relevant personnel.[86] After putting together complete cases on twelve people involved in the market, High Point police called them into the station and promised them that they would not be arrested—at least that night.[87] There, nine of the twelve[88] invited faced family members, social workers, community members, and clergy members, who confronted them about their activities and implored them to stop dealing drugs and engaging in violence.[89] After this first session, the nine traveled to another room where a multiagency law enforcement group was waiting for them.[90] The law enforcement officials were clear. The men had a choice. They could either stop dealing, or they could go to jail.[91] To the extent that the message did not immediately sink in, the men were presented with the complete case against them, including videotape.[92]

81. *See id.*

82. *See id.*

83. *See id.*

84. Mark Schoofs, *New Intervention: Novel Police Tactic Puts Drug Markets Out of Business*, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2006, at A1.

85. *Id.*

86. *Id.*

87. *Id.*

88. *Id.* Only nine of the twelve invited showed up at the station.

89. *Id.*

90. *Id.*

91. *Id.*

92. *Id.*

According to High Point officials and associated researchers, the open-air drug market in the West End neighborhood closed that day and has not yet reopened.[93] Violence is down substantially. People in the neighborhood report feeling much more positive about their community and, importantly, more positive about their relationships with police.[94] This last point should bring to mind the theories of legitimacy that I explored earlier in this lecture. It is the engagement by police officers with relevant community members and offenders in a way that accords both groups dignity that is one key to legitimacy and one feature of both the PSN program in Chicago and the High Point Model that I've just described.

There are differences, to be sure, between High Point and Chicago PSN, but both share a number of critical features. Each site implemented a process that emphasizes direct moral engagement of offenders by a group of law enforcement agents, community service providers, and, critically, members of the community—often street workers or former offenders (sometimes one and the same)—who discuss the importance of turning away from activities that harm communities, such as violence and drug selling.

At each location, the sessions are not designed to scare the participants straight, nor are they preachy. Instead, they are intended to promote the individual agency of offenders to make good choices rather than bad ones by stressing to participants the profound need of the community for safety and security, the eagerness of the partners to help offenders change their lives, and the consequences should they choose to engage in gun crime or drug dealing. And, at each location legitimacy is critical. Whether in Chicago or High Point, Cincinnati, or the host of other cities that have seen this approach succeed,[95] those who lead this new wave of law enforcement and community safety projects take them seriously. They understand that attempting to sustain neighborhood safety through a continuing commitment to carpet-bombing and locking up the next generation of young African-American men is doomed to failure. They understand that, despite an often crippling alienation between law enforcement and communities, police, community members, and offenders alike want the streets to be safe, residents to succeed, and for jail and prison to be a rare last resort. They are discovering—in practice, not just in theory—that a normative commitment to compliance is a

93. David Kennedy, *Drugs, Race and Common Ground: Reflections on the High Point Intervention*, NAT'L INST. JUST. J., Mar. 2009, at 12, 18.

94. *Id.*

95. David Kennedy and Jeremy Travis have counted seventy-five cities. *See* Jeremy Travis, Keynote Address at the Marquette University Law School Public Service Conference: Building Communities with Justice: Overcoming the Tyranny of the Funnel 7 (Feb. 20, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/web_images/Marquette_Law_School.pdf).

sustainable and realistic approach to bringing crime down. When it does not work, law enforcement is still there, but it is used far less often and is seen as legitimate by the affected community.

It is this last point that makes me hopeful about the third issue I am scheduled to address in this lecture: the potential for young African-American men, many of whom are involved in the criminal justice system, to accept the new path of policing. I do not want to be Pollyannaish about this issue. The challenges are severe, and the stakes are high. What we can see is that policing agencies *are* changing practices and methods that reflect the theories I have discussed here. Indeed, Milwaukee's Chief Ed Flynn is a leading member of this new vanguard. The other thing we can see is that these new strategies are leading to lower crime rates, just as the theory would suggest. My own research demonstrates that offenders are just as likely as nonoffenders to believe in the legitimacy of law—a finding that might surprise some.[96] However, those same offenders still remain deeply skeptical of police.[97]

I suspect it is a matter of time. The reality may be that we shall never convince those who offend to fully trust the police, but we will be much better off in a world in which the demographic group that is the most likely to be entangled in the system does not automatically presume that the police behave antagonistically toward them. And, moreover, the existence of social networks among groups means that African-Americans as a group also will be better off. This is so because crime is likely to be lower in communities that are committed to this approach, but also because crime reduction is not the only goal of these new approaches. Helping communities help themselves get things done for the long term is a critical larger objective. Legitimacy in law enforcement is not just a nascent strategy. It is a movement. It is movement with the potential to transform the way this nation does law enforcement, achieves community safety, and heals longstanding rifts between police and minority communities. It is, in short, about nothing less than ensuring domestic tranquility.

96. *See* Tracey L. Meares & Andrew Papachristos, *Policing Gun Crime Without Guns* (Working Paper, 2009), *available at* http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1326932.

97. *See id.*

THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY & PRACTICE OF NONVIOLENCE

Choose peace.

HISTORY

The Institute was founded by members of St. Michael's Church team ministry in 2001 as a long-term solution to violence. Originally a training organization, the Institute hired its first Executive Director, Teny Gross, in 2001 and he introduced the Streetworkers program in 2003.

Since then, a constellation of programs has grown to better serve the community's most vulnerable youth and families whose lives have been affected by violence. Today the organization has a $1.3 million budget, a board of 31 members and a staff of 37.

MISSION

Our mission is to teach, by word and example, the principles and practices of nonviolence, and to foster a community that addresses potentially violent situations with nonviolent solutions. We work to build Dr. King's ideal of the nonviolent Beloved Community.

THE NEED

Providence is one of the poorest cities for children in the nation, and poverty level correlates to rates of violence. There are estimated to be over 1,400 gang members in the city.

A 2009 survey of youth in the Institute's summer jobs program revealed that nearly 50% of the respondents had lost a family member to murder; 75% had lost a friend to violence; 90% had a friend who was stabbed or shot; nearly 90% said they regularly witness violence in their schools.

PROGRAMS

Nonviolence Training directly teaches the principles and practices of nonviolence to students, police officers, inmates, and community members. Annually trains new trainers to work in schools and other settings.

Streetworkers provide advocacy and mentoring, and act as a positive presence in the streets and in the lives of gang-involved or at-risk youth. They build relationships, gather information and mediate conflicts to prevent violence. They respond to stabbings, shootings and homicides.

Youth Programs provide positive opportunities for youth in the form of employment, life skills training, leadership development, and safe-space and awareness-raising events.

Victim Support Services reaches out to provide services to families and friends of homicide victims, as well as living victims of stabbings and shootings.

Adult Reentry ISPN is committed to the positive reentry of individuals ages 18-25 with the goal of preventing recidivism and reducing the number of individuals victimized by violent crime.

265 Oxford Street, Providence, RI 02905 *phone* 401.785.2320 *fax* 401.270.5490
info@nonviolenceinstitute.org www.nonviolenceinstitute.org

The Providence Journal

The cost of a bullet: Former gang member survives shooting, lives with challenges of a new reality

Monday, October 14, 2013 11:15 PM

THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL / BOB THAYER
Ray Duggan, 31, a former member of the Young Bloods gang in Providence, was left paralyzed from the waist down nine years ago, after a rival gang shot at him. He lives on his own in a bare bones apartment in the Marieville section of North Providence which is barely wheelchair accessible, but insists on taking care of things himself. Duggan says he is barred from federally subsidized housing because of convictions for robbery, larceny and conspiracy charges.

BY W. ZACHARY MALINOWSKI
Journal Staff Writer
bmalinow@providencejournal.com

Day 2 in a three-part series from the Journal's veteran crime reporters

PROVIDENCE, R.I. — Ray Duggan, a former gang member with a violent past, never considered being stuck in the middle. He was ready to die or bounce back from a shooting with bullet wounds that would only enhance his reputation on the street.

Duggan didn't die and he didn't bounce back. Instead, he was gunned down in a barrage of bullets and ended up paralyzed from the waist down. He has spent the past nine years confined to a wheelchair and that's how he will spend the rest of his life.

The first 15 months of his recovery cost taxpayers at least $1.5 million in Medicaid costs for four weeks in Rhode Island Hospital, including more than 20 days in the intensive care unit; St. Joseph's Hospital, five months; and the Zambarano Unit of Eleanor Slater Hospital in Burrillville, six months. Since then, Duggan's ongoing medical problems have cost up to $1 million for a total of about $2.5 million over the past nine years.

He still must regularly check into local hospitals to treat bedsores, a common plight of people who spend most of their time in wheelchairs. The bed sores and hospital stays alone cost taxpayers at least $40,000 a year.

Shortly after midnight, on Oct. 9, 2004, Duggan's life as he knew it came to a halt. Several police cruisers raced to the corner of Regent Avenue and Harold Street in the city's Valley neighborhood for a report of shots fired. They found Duggan, 22, face down on the street outside 152 Regent Ave. Blood was flowing from multiple gunshot wounds.

Duggan, a member of the Young Bloods gang, lived with his mother on nearby Bergen Street, while his father was in prison on a robbery charge. The Young Bloods had an ongoing feud with Laos Pride, a Laotian gang that was well-established in Smith Hill.

Duggan remembered talking to a friend on the street when two Asian men strolled by. They stopped about 10 yards from him, turned and opened fire with handguns. He was shot five times, including twice with hollow-tipped bullets that exploded in his chest, sending shrapnel through his body and severing his spinal cord.
The chest wounds made breathing nearly impossible. He uttered what he thought would be his final words, “Mom, I love you.”

But Duggan did make it, although he was just a shadow of the tough gangbanger who had terrorized the city’s streets. He spent about three weeks in the intensive care unit at Rhode Island Hospital and was released on Nov. 9, 2004, exactly a month after he was rushed to the emergency room.

His recovery at Rhode Island Hospital cost at least $250,000 as stays in the intensive care unit can reach $10,000 a day.

Upon his release, Duggan was transferred to St. Joseph’s Hospital on Broad Street. He remained there for five months.

Duggan spent three months at home on Bergen Street. Then, he was shipped to Eleanor Slater Hospital and underwent extensive rehabilitation with other patients suffering from spinal cord and head injuries.
Ellen Sperry, a registered nurse and case manager at Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island, worked closely with Duggan for three years beginning in 2005. She estimated that his medical bills during his first year after the shooting were about $1.5 million.

Cost of a fatal shooting
(2010 figures):

Total cost: $5,094,980
Loss of quality of life: $3,093,750
Work loss: $1,552,381
Medical care: $28,741
Mental health: $10,883
Emergency transport: $544
Police: $2,119
Criminal justice: $395,221
Insurance claims processing: $2,361
Employer cost: $8,980

Source: Children's Safety Network

Duggan was angry, suffered from depression and loathed his new life in a wheelchair. His days of working for his brother-in-law’s carpet-cleaning company were over.

“I don’t want to be 50 years old and sitting in a home by myself and doing nothing,” Duggan thought during his first year as a paraplegic.

At Zambarano, Duggan befriended Tony Grant, a teenager from Providence who was paralyzed from the neck down in a serious car crash. Duggan quickly realized that he didn’t have it that bad. At least, he could use his arms and hands to eat, write and do other things.

He said Grant was a joy to be around.

“He was happy,” he said. “He gave me a whole ’nother attitude on life.”

Duggan refused to abandon the gang life. He lived with one of his sisters in Pawtucket and gang members would drop in and give him a lift to his troubled stomping grounds in the West End of Providence. He kept a loaded handgun tucked under the cushion of his wheelchair.

He and his sister ran out of money and were evicted from their apartment. Duggan spent about a month as a homeless paraplegic bouncing among friends’ apartments.

He also had other problems. He spent just two months at Hope High School before dropping out as a freshman. That same year, he got a girl pregnant and had a son.

One day in 2006, Teny Gross, executive director of the Institute for the Study & Practice of Nonviolence in South Providence, responded to a shooting at a Dominican festival in the city. Duggan was with the Young Bloods who were part of the problem. He slipped him a business card and urged him to call about working for the Institute.

Duggan didn't bother calling. A few weeks later, he changed his mind. He agreed to speak to a group of young people about being a gang member and realized that he might sway some of them from the life he had chosen.

The new job as a streetworker made him feel productive and useful. He knew that plenty of people, including members of the Providence police force, were critical of Gross for hiring a convicted felon with strong gang ties. Duggan wanted to prove them wrong.

"I knew I could stay out of trouble," he said. "I didn't want to disappoint [Gross and others at the institute for nonviolence].

Today, nine years after embarking on a new life in a wheelchair, Duggan is 31 and his medical problems persist. He answers phones at the front desk of the institute and speaks to groups of teenagers. He works 30 hours a week and earns $1,680 a month. He also collects $718 each month in Social Security Disability payments. That's $2,398 a month, or an annual income of $28,776.

Gross said Duggan has been a wonderful employee, but he often has to miss work to deal with his medical ailments. "He's got all these complications," he said. "He's a team member and people love him."

Duggan lives on his own in a bare bones apartment in the Marieville section of North Providence; it's barely wheelchair accessible, but he insists on taking care of things himself. He says he is barred from federally subsidized housing because of convictions for robbery, larceny and conspiracy charges.

And, he's got plenty of expenses. He insists on living on his own, and he rents a bare bones apartment for $550 a month in the Marieville section of North Providence. The one-bedroom flat has a large-screen television, two sofas, kitchen and bathroom. It needs plenty of work and is barely wheelchair accessible. He is resistant to having health-care or social workers drop by to help him out.

The apartment could use a new floor and a thorough cleaning, but he insists on taking care of things himself.
Duggan said he is barred from federally subsidized housing because of convictions for robbery, larceny and conspiracy charges. He is grateful that he has had his 1996 Honda Accord rigged for $1,000 with hand-held devices that allow him to drive. The car leaks oil and has 180,000 miles, but it makes him feel like a normal person.

"If I can drive," he said, "it makes me happy."

He also has to pay $136 a month in child support to the mother of his son, now a teenager. About four years ago, Duggan switched from Medicaid to Medicare and pays $128 each month for coverage. He also pays more than $150 a month for bandages, gauze and other medical supplies.

Medicare, financed by the federal government, is a social insurance program that provides health coverage to the elderly and young people with disabilities.

THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL / BOB THAYER
Duggan's 1996 Honda Accord that he had rigged with hand-held devices that allow him to drive leaks oil and has 180,000 miles, but it makes him feel like a normal person. "If I can drive," he said, "it makes me happy."

Duggan also has a couple from Vermont who act as benefactors. He has never met or spoken to them, but they help pay for essential items such as a new wheelchair, a new mattress, sheets and towels.

The couple connected with Duggan through Sperry, the case manager at Neighborhood Health Plan. She had previously lived in Vermont and knew people who would be willing to help.

Early last month, Duggan was admitted to Rhode Island Hospital with a perforated bladder and a chronic infection in his hip. The short hospital stay, x-rays and magnetic resonance imaging costs about $10,000. Duggan must also return for treatment for wheelchair sores and infections about four times a year.

On Sept. 11, Duggan was admitted to Roger Williams Medical Center. He was having problems urinating and the fluids were draining into the hole in his infected hip. He spent seven days in the hospital before he was to be transferred for three weeks to a nursing home in North Providence. Those plans fell apart when his medical coverage wouldn't pay for the nursing home for more than 20 days. He was tired of bouncing from hospital to hospital and other health-care facilities. Instead, he chose to recuperate at home and have nurses help him.

Duggan said a doctor wrote prescriptions for antibiotics to combat the infection. He went to a local Rite Aid pharmacy and learned that his medical plan — Medicare A and B — didn't cover the cost of the medicine. One prescription was for three pills at $15 per day for five weeks or $525, and the other cost $64. He didn't have the money and passed on the medicine.

"I just got to hope the infection doesn't come back," he said.

On Sept. 30, Sperry, the registered nurse, spoke to pharmacy officials and got them to reduce the price of the medications to a total of $46. She paid for the medicine out of her own pocket.

Sperry said Duggan suffers from osteomyelitis and needs the use of a Wound V.A.C. Therapy device that applies pressure and helps drain the infection in his bone marrow. She said it would cost him $450 a month for a co-pay and she is exploring ways to pay for the machine that would provide him with treatment.

Duggan remains surprisingly upbeat. In recent years, he has learned the identity of one of the Asian gang members who shot him, leaving him paralyzed for the rest of his life. He continues to live by the rules of the street and refuses to disclose the name. It's the price he chose to pay for living the life of a gangbanger.

"It's done with, over," he said. "I've moved on."

PROVIDENCE- April 7, 2013

The Providence Journal

Ex-inmate works to repair his life, community

Jose Rodriguez,

whose past was marred by drugs and violence, now tries to help keep the peace

By ALISHA A. PINA JOURNAL STAFF WRITER

Jose Rodriguez with his daughter Marilyn Resto, 13. He says that a warning from Marilyn helped turn his life around.
THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL/ANDREW DICKERMAN

PROVIDENCE — The school bus zipped past 12-year-old Jose Rodriguez. The driver couldn't risk picking him up with dealers and prostitutes lurking and a fight brewing nearby.

At that moment, the boy felt like just another throwaway kid from the 'hood.

Within days, he was selling $5 bags of marijuana in front of his mother's Manton Heights apartment in Olneyville. That was in 1995, and it wasn't long before Jose Rodriguez became "Squeaky" — the crack-cocaine dealer cops often questioned when shots were fired in the neighborhood.

Thirteen years later, a warning from his daughter — tired of visiting daddy in jail — and a subsequent invitation from peace advocate Teny O. Gross became catalysts for abandoning his life of crime.

Rodriguez, now 29, is a college student, intern for the Rhode Island public defenders office and street worker for the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence.

"Having the opportunity to work in the community that I helped destroy," Rodriguez says, "this is the way I get right with karma."

Jose Rodriguez was introduced to violence at an early age. His mother, Evelyn Colon, left New York in the 1980s with her four kids to flee an abusive relationship and get a fresh start. But her youngest son says that in Rhode Island, Colon still "ended up being a magnet for men who like to beat up on women."

“I believe I wasn’t more than 11 years old when I saw a man get beat to death, just looking out my window,” Rodriguez says about growing up at 61 Salmon St. “All we [neighborhood kids] saw were prostitution, drug dealing and people doing bad stuff. It was basically an open drug market.”

The bad men got the girls, drove the nice cars and donned the latest Nikes and clothes.

“I felt they didn’t care about me, so I started looking around at what I thought was success in my community,” Rodriguez said.

Three months after making his first $50 selling marijuana in September 1995, he was a “hood chemist” cooking cocaine into crack-cocaine for dealers, making $1 for every gram he converted into rocks. At 14, Rodriguez says he was making as much as $3,000 to $4,000 a week. He bought his first car then — a BMW convertible.

His mother was never home, he says, because she worked all the time in the factories making jewelry. He says she knew he was “doing something” but didn’t initially intervene because he helped out financially.

Still, she told him every day that she prayed he would return home safely. A tattoo on his left arm reads, “Pray for me Evelyn.”

The birth of his first daughter, Marilyn, in 2000, when Rodriguez was 16, only increased his dealing, including recruiting younger kids to sell his drugs. Stints in the juvenile detention center and prison didn’t deter him. Rodriguez protected his illegal operation and family with guns and threats.

He was helping his mother with the bills and paying for an apartment for his girlfriend, Vanessa Resto, then 15, and their infant daughter.

During Rodriguez’s four-month lockup in 2003 for repeatedly driving without a license, his mother moved to Puerto Rico without him — telling him to get straight.

Resto, the mother of Marilyn and Josmary, Rodriguez’s second daughter who was born in 2002, also left him that year.

Rodriguez ramped up the drug-dealing — saying his business peaked in 2005 when he made up to $20,000 a week. He kept legitimate jobs as a cover-up to show he had income.

“If he was netting that kind of money, that was a good operation,” police Maj. Thomas Verdi said. “Every patrolman in the Manton area knew about him. [Squeaky] was always associated with drugs and guns. He’s lucky he didn’t kill anyone.”

Rodriguez did try to take a life in January 2007, when he was 23. Angry with Erik Jacinto, the father of his sister’s baby, he fired multiple shots with his .38-caliber semiautomatic pistol into Jacinto’s North Providence apartment building.

Several people were home but no one was hit. Superior Court Judge Robert D. Krause gave Rodriguez 10 years, 5 to serve, after Rodriguez pleaded guilty in July 2007 to felony assault and carrying a pistol without a license.

“If this incident didn’t happen, I probably would have died in the streets,” he says now. In jail, Rodriguez says, he thought about how to improve his drug-dealing empire.

“I really didn’t care enough or couldn’t comprehend what I did,” he says.

About 19 months into his sentence, Rodriguez says Marilyn, then 8, came for a visit and warned him: “If you come back to jail, I’m not going to love you anymore.”

Rodriguez realized he needed to get out of prison to be with his family, though he did not immediately resolve to give up selling drugs. He signed up for GED classes, a course on resolving conflicts nonviolently, a parenting program and any other activity to reduce his sentence. He was released on parole Jan. 27, 2010.

“When he came out, he was still doing that silly stuff,” says his fiancée, Taisha Jimenez, whom he began dating when he was paroled. “I told him, ‘If you get locked up, don’t expect me to stay.’ ”

Jimenez, Rodriguez and her son now live in an apartment in the Chad Brown housing project. The couple, sitting with Marilyn, and her mother, Resto, in the kitchen, talk about their mission of keeping him straight.

Jimenez and Resto share a friendship, saying the families are intertwined.

Marilyn, now 13, struggles to explain how ashamed she was when her father was in prison. “Everyone would ask, ‘Who is your dad?’ I didn’t know what to say.”

She refuses to eat hot dogs, because that’s what she ate at the ACI every weekend.

A few months after being released, Rodriguez learned that the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence was looking for someone to replace David J. Cartagena, a former gang member and criminal who became a legendary street worker. Cartagena was assigned primarily to the Olneyville neighborhood, where he grew up. He died in a car accident in May 2009.

Rodriguez, who has a son with Cartagena's niece, attended the first memorial of Cartagena's death. He says the Institute's executive director, Teny Gross, seemed to speak right to him at the service.

"And you from the Man-ton projects," Gross recalls saying, "hold your head high. You need to be proud of where you came from. David was a gift, and you should follow in his footsteps."

Rodriguez signed up for an internship at the Institute. He was paired with Juan Carter during his 90-day probationary period. Afterward, he was hired to a full-time job at the Institute, paying $21,000 a year.

The first time he responded to the hospital after a shooting "shook him up." He says he realized that his criminal actions had sent people to the hospital.

"Juan [Carter] said being freaked out was a good sign — that I actually care," Rodriguez says now. "I knew then this is where I belong."

Rodriguez also joined College Unbound, a New England program run at Roger Williams University where students earn college credit — in the classroom and in outside work — by meeting individual goals. Rodriguez is seeking a bachelor's degree in community development but is interested in becoming a lawyer.

Late last year, a coworker at the Institute got him an interview for an unpaid internship at the state Public Defenders Office, which recently submitted testimony supporting proposed legislation to remove the question, "Have you ever been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor?" from job applications.

When he applied for the internship, Rodriguez didn't check the box.

"It was on the application, but I didn't mark it because if I answer yes, is that automatically going to disqualify me?" he says.

The interviewer didn't ask about his past, and Rodriguez was hired. When he later went to confess, he found out they knew about his criminal record from a background check.

Two days a week, the former inmate and father of four — three biological children and a stepson — now interviews people who need legal representation. He served jail time with some of them.

Statistics are not favorable for Rodriguez staying out of trouble, particularly because drugs, violence and crime are common in the Chad Brown project.

A state Department of Corrections study says 42 percent of Rhode Island's released prisoners return within two years. Rodriguez has been out for 3 years, 2 months and 11 days.

Police Major Verdi, who sits on the state parole board, doesn't remember voting to release Rodriguez in 2010. But he's glad to hear that the parolee is doing well.

"I hope he continues to be on the straight and narrow," Verdi says. "We want them to be successful. We don't want them to be a statistic."

The closest women in Rodriguez's life are determined to keep him out of jail.

"He changed so much that I don't see that happening," says Resto, who was Rodriguez's girlfriend for much of the time he was a dealer. Though she has custody of their two daughters, she says it's important for him to be in their lives.

"He's already missed out on too much," she says.

Jimenez, his fiancée, adds, "He still needs to learn the difference between needs versus wants. A car is a need. The latest clothes and sneakers are a want. He's growing with his children."

Rodriguez's salary as a street worker is far from the $20,000 a week he says he made at the peak of his drug dealing. He drives a 2004 Maxima; his Infiniti recently was repossessed.

Marilyn is his biggest watchdog; he says she questions "everything I do."

"It's a day-to-day struggle, but as long as I am surrounded by them, temptation isn't an issue," Rodriguez says of Marilyn, Jimenez and Resto. His mother still lives in Puerto Rico, but he speaks with her regularly.

Jimenez says it helps that Rodriguez is working with youth to encourage them to avoid his mistakes. That constant exposure, she says, keeps him in line.

“When we first started and were working through Man-ton, the street outreach came natural for him,” says Carter, Rodriguez’s supervisor at the Institute. “People gravitate toward him. They respected him, for lack of a better term, because he was a criminal. And now they respect him as a street worker.”

Gross says only two street workers have been rearrested, one within 90 days of being on the job.

“It’s much smarter to recycle them than to waste them,” he says. “Jose is one of the best that we’ve got now. He cares.”

Rodriguez says it’s hardest to see the young men that he recruited to his criminal world — starting them on the wrong path.

He chokes up about a boy, currently in the Training School, whom Rodriguez thinks he failed. “But he gets out soon and we’re going to help. I am going to do whatever I can to set him on the right path.”

Given the opportunity, Rodriguez says, change is possible. apina@providencejournal.com

(401) 277-7465

Twitter:@AlishaPina



THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL/ANDREW DICKERMAN

Jose Rodriguez walks the streets of Providence while working for the Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence. Rodriguez, who served time at the Adult Correctional Institutions for felony assault, now tries to prevent violence by young people. He’s also a college student and has an internship with the Public Defenders Office. Walking with him is Lisa Pina, another Institute street worker.

Rodriguez and Pina stop to talk with Richard Prince. “Having the opportunity to work in the community that I helped destroy,” Rodriguez says, “this is the way I get right with karma.”

Teny O. Gross

Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence

Every Life Should Be Purposeful



Lighting a candle in the darkness. Photograph: ISPN

In 1989, Teny Gross, a former Israeli army sergeant, was attending Tufts University when racial tensions erupted in Boston. A man called Charles Stuart staged his wife's murder and initially convinced police that the killer was a young, black male. Stereotyping opened old wounds, and urban youth reacted angrily. Gross hooked up with Reverend Eugene Rivers and others who walked the trouble spots and calmed the waters. A coalition of police, hospitals, schools, clergy, and street workers came together, working to identify the few hard core offenders and turn them from violence. The murder rate went from 152 in 1990 to 31 in 1997, earning the collaboration the name "The Boston Miracle." Then in 2001, Gross became the first employee of Providence's Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence, where today he oversees five programs and a staff of 33. The institute teaches the Martin Luther King Jr. method of nonviolence, while continuously refining the street-worker model and replicating it around the world.

What led you to violence prevention?

I had the right baggage. My work with Israelis and Palestinians. My Christian-Jewish family from Serbia and Croatia. A grandmother lost to the Holocaust. As a high school student, I was stunned that such a highly civilized country as Germany could become so violent so quickly. All my subsequent studies confirmed for me that civilization is fragile, whether I studied the Greeks, the Romans, Machiavelli's short-lived Florentine Republic, the Enlightenment, the American and English revolutions. In 2000, when I was attending Harvard Divinity School, I asked some Harvard students, "Does it ever occur to you that you might not always live in freedom?" They said, "Never." September 11 shook that certainty.

Antiviolence work for me is about the health of a democracy. America incarcerates one-quarter of the world's jail population. Out of 2,225 kids on life without parole worldwide, all are American. We have a civil war rate of homicide. If you consider pure numbers of violent acts, American inner cities are failed states. That's why I got involved.

How did the Charles Stuart case affect you?

I was upset. I wanted to drive with cops and see how people got treated. But I said to myself, Life is too short to play Gotcha. So I looked for someone doing something positive. With Reverend Rivers, I walked the inner city, keeping eyes open, listening, learning, and being accessible to kids.

The Boston Miracle was simply hard work and the realignment of resources. Law firm Hale & Dorr got involved, the Federal Reserve, the City of Boston, the police gang unit, probation officers, youth workers, clergy. Out of the 60,000 kids who initially were treated as a potential problem, we found that 1,200 were gang members and only 300 hard core. Suddenly, the problem became manageable. We said to the hard core, "You can reenlist in school, get help finding a job, but if you say no and violence breaks out, you'll get arrested and sanctioned severely." We developed a cadre of practitioners who shared information about everything that was going on so we could deal with violence before it erupted.

In Providence, we now respond to hospitals 24/7 for every shooting and stabbing. The street workers' relationship with

the police is way more sophisticated. We've trained people in Brockton, Fall River, New Bedford, New Haven, Richmond, and California. Belfast. Five Central and South American countries, including Guatemala and Brazil. We supported the relaunch of SafeStreet Boston with our hospital approach.

Describe the hospital approach.

Hospital security staff, social workers, police, community people call us immediately after a shooting or stabbing. It's fine with me to get called by them all. It's my Hobbesian side: systems fail. I don't rely on only one system.

The street workers know who is who. Suppose gang rivals are at the hospital. We deal with them and let the medical staff focus on treatment. The community presence we provide changes the atmosphere. We aren't predisposed to see the victim as being at fault. We see through the victim's eyes and translate what's going on for other workers.

If victims are in any shape to talk, we talk: (a) to show kindness, (b) because we have to be opportunistic. The traumatic moment is a moment of clarity for a person. For example: You've been selling drugs, you don't think anything's going to happen. Suddenly, you're in the hospital, it hurts, you're crying. It's a key moment for the victim. We show up immediately and provide a friendly face from the community. Little gestures can change lives. I've worked with gangs for 19 years, so I'm not naive. But it's amazing what you can get with kindness, with being interested in a person. Young people don't mind criticism, as long as it comes from a place of love.

How do you teach nonviolence?

We offer practical tools for handling life's inevitable conflicts. The program is based on Martin Luther King Jr.'s work. You have to teach nonviolence repeatedly to counter the constant barrage of violent messaging from our culture. Failed environments provide daily dosages of violent learning.

So we use dosages, too, starting in third grade. We counter the violent messages on TV homicide shows and on radio shows that insult elected officials in dismissive, violent language. In our small, obstinate way, we talk about seeing things through an opponent's eyes. People who have empathy, don't kill. The gang members I know always have a Shakespearian debate going on in their heads about their actions. Adults with positive messages can strengthen one side of that "To Be or Not To Be."

The National Network for Safe Communities, on which I serve, is really the Boston Miracle on steroids. It's determined to offer enough positive messages to kids to meet ambitious goals. I'm pushing for halving the national homicide rate by 2019.

Do you ever feel that you'll always swim upstream?

Yes. But it's the most worthy challenge I know. Consider first that the urban failed state creates injustice. It is unjust that so many mothers lose children to violence in a wealthy country. Second, it costs too much: just 240 of the 16,000 annual homicides rack up $2 billion annually in costs for police, hospitals, burials, investigations, trials, jail. Not to mention the loss of tax revenue and income. We're making change. My worst enemy is the view that things won't change.

How do you convince people that change can happen?

I start with the frog analogy. If you boil the frog gradually, it won't jump out and save itself. America gradually got used to violence. A dramatic goal like cutting homicides in half can help us jump out of the pot.

Additionally, I tell people to look at the heroes doing the impossible: Geoffrey Canada of Harlem Children's Zone; Pittsburgh's Bill Strickland, who wrote *Make the Impossible Possible*; Dr. Paul Farmer in Haiti; Wendy Kopp from Teach For America. They may be exceptional, but that's not the point. They're innovators. They're just pointing out that we can get great results from kids we've given up on. Our Institute doesn't give up. We just graduated four street workers from Rhode Island College's case management program. People who'd been to jail and never thought they'd see college. Change can happen.

Describe your five programs.

First, the nonviolence training program teaches the philosophy of absorbing hostility and thinking through how to act. We teach it to eight-year-olds, teenagers, juveniles in jail, the police academy, anyone.

Second, street workers—both former gang members and victims. They mediate conflicts large and small in schools and wherever the kids are. They're in the hospital, in the court, helping with job placements. They work to reattach kids to their families and to society.

We want to see life become purposeful for these kids. We want to get the spark back into their eyes.

Third is the Beloved Community Summer Jobs Program. When I arrived, there were only 300 summer jobs in Providence. I said, "That's a joke. A city this size should have 3,000." Small as we were, the Institute hired nine. We now work with 40 businesses and nonprofits to hire 100 kids. They're kept busy all summer. They get paid through grants from our partner companies, where the kids work four days a week. On Fridays, we bring them in and teach nonviolence, job readiness, life skills. Mayor David Cicilline is committed to youth, and now there are nearly 1,000 summer jobs in Providence.

Fourth is the victim center, where clinical social workers and case managers support families that have experienced homicide or shootings.

Finally, in February 2009, we started the Juvenile Reentry Program for young offenders. We teach nonviolence in the jail, build relationships, and work with kids when they come out.

We get as many people as possible involved—doctors, Brown University students, Bryant College, Providence College, Johnson & Wales, Community College of Rhode Island, Butler Hospital, Bank of Rhode Island, DCI Design Company. We want to teach the world how to develop our valuable yet neglected human capital.

At the end of the day, the goal is to help youth become productive members of society?

Yes, but it's not just about providing skills for Dunkin' Donuts or keeping kids from selling drugs. No. We believe that all people want to have a purpose, and we want to see life become purposeful for these kids. We want to get the spark back into their eyes.

THE PROVIDENCE PHOENIX

Local heroes 2013

People helping people

By **PHILIP EIL** | April 24, 2013

In this 16th annual edition of the *Providence Phoenix*'s Best issue, we highlight people and organizations who are doing exceptionally good work — local heroes who often labor behind the scenes to change their communities for the better. Whatever neighborhoods we live in, we are all in their debt.

DEDICATED Moniz in the victims support room. [Photo by Richard McCaffrey]

TARA MONIZ:A LIFELINE AFTER DEATH

"As a joke which nobody thinks is funny, I say I have the job that's a conversation killer," Tara Moniz says. "Nobody wants to talk about homicide."

In a state where victims of child abuse, sexual assault, domestic violence, and other social disasters can find specially trained counselors, Moniz — Director of Victims Services at Providence's Institute for the Study and Practice of Nonviolence — is the only advocate devoted specifically to murder, she says.

When Rhode Islanders read about a murder-suicide in Warwick; when they hear about a strangling or a stabbing in Woonsocket or Pawtucket or Providence, Moniz is likely reporting for duty at the hospital or the family's home. Murders don't just happen to the victim, she says. They happen "to their mother, to their father, to their children, brothers, sisters, and the community."

A murder also leaves logistical questions that, thankfully, few people will ever have to answer. Will the medical examiner pass the body along to a funeral home or does the family need to pick it up? Who will make sudden funeral arrangements? Will anyone clean the bloodstained rug where the crime took place? It's Moniz's job to help answer these questions.

"I'm perfectly comfortable walking into a house where a mother is laying on the floor crying and knowing that I can go to her . . . get on the floor with her and hug her and then sort of be able to say, 'We need to do this now,' " she says.

We'll let other newspapers focus on the fact that Moniz lives in a town called Hope Valley (which, we must admit, is pretty poetic for a woman of her unflappable charm). We at the *Phoenix* will instead boast that we helped connect Moniz with her current job. While working as a case manager at South Shore Mental Health Center in Charlestown in 2003, she spotted the *Phoenix*'s "The Peacemakers" feature profiling the fledgling nonviolence institute's peace-promoting work on Providence's grittiest streets. Moniz ripped the article out of the paper, went home to her mother, and said that this was where she wanted to work. A few years later, when funding for her counseling position dried up and she answered a listing for a homicide victims advocate, she got her chance.

Nowadays, four years later, Moniz has a stack of testimonials describing her skills. Her work is "critical to the emotional balance of victims and surviving family members who struggle to cope after a tragic loss," a note from the state attorney general's office reads. "I am [grateful] that God appointed you to help so many," adds a handwritten note from a bereaved family.
What impresses us most, though, is that, like a tango dancer or jazz musician, Moniz is a master of improvisation. Murder and its effects are unpredictable by nature, so Moniz is constantly straying from the services printed in the nonviolence institute's

"Victims Support Services" brochure. One day she might chauffeur a bereaved mother to the cemetery for a visit to her child's headstone; another, she may browse the Internet for jewelry designed to carry a loved one's ashes. Once when a family couldn't bear to look at autopsy photos during a murder trial in Providence, Moniz stayed in the courtroom to bear witness on their behalf. None of these "clients," as the nonviolence institute calls them, are charged a cent.
In fact, on every third Wednesday of the month, they — and anyone else struggling with the violent loss of a loved one — are invited to a meeting room at the ISPN's South Providence headquarters for one of Moniz's victims support sessions. Votive candles and a half-empty box of tissues sit on the table ("I could buy stock in Kleenex," Moniz jokes). Framed photographs line the walls with names and birth/death dates underneath them.
She isn't so much a discussion leader as a listener during these sessions, Moniz says. Some attendees have been told by friends to "get over it" or "move on." But, as Moniz says, "Why would you 'get over' someone? . . . You don't want to 'get over' people. They're important to you.
"We're not going to tell you, 'Oh, I've already heard that,' " she continues.
Sitting in that victims support room, she points to a photograph sitting on a nearby bookshelf of a brightly smiling woman. That woman's mother told Moniz again and again about the frozen lasagna they shared for their last meal together.
"She needed to tell me that a hundred times and that's OK," Moniz says. "Every time I look at her now I think. 'OK, she had lasagna with her mom. Her last meal was lasagna with her mom.' "

The Providence Journal

Accomplice in 1992 Pawtucket Murder Now Preaches Nonviolence to Prisoners and Troubled Youths

Monday, July 1, 2013
BY W. ZACHARY MALINOWSKI
Journal Staff Writer
bmalinow@providencejournal.com

PAWTUCKET — Fernando B. Silva locked eyes with Salomao "Sal" Monteiro Jr., one of two carjackers on Hancock Street.

Monteiro, 19, and his buddy, 18, had just left a neighborhood house party, and they had no way to get back to their homes in the Mount Hope section of Providence. They were looking for a car to steal.

They spotted Silva behind the wheel of a 1985 Chevrolet with the engine running. They decided to force him to give up the car so they could get home.

Monteiro's friend, Eugene DePina, who was armed with a stolen .32-caliber handgun, fired one shot through the car window. Monteiro swung open the car door and grabbed Silva by the collar of his navy-colored coat. Silva, a rugged man, tried to fight off the two robbers.

"Give up the car, man," Monteiro said just inches from Silva's face. "It's not worth it."

Moments later, a thunderous boom exploded near Monteiro's ear. DePina had fired a single shot into the right side of Silva's head.

"I remember him looking at me," Monteiro recalled. "His eyes rolled and I put him down very gently on the ground."

Monteiro and DePina didn't know whether Silva was dead or alive, and they weren't about to stick around to find out. They took off running in different directions on Hancock Street near the corner of Weeden Street.

As Monteiro disappeared into the night, the last thing he heard was Silva's wife wailing from the third floor of a triple-decker out to the dark, empty street below: "Fernando! Fernando! Fernando!"

Silva, 25, was dead. The Pawtucket police raced to the scene and immediately launched an investigation.

Monteiro and DePina didn't realize that Silva's 1-year old daughter, Ashley, was asleep in a car seat behind her father.

The murder took place more than 21 years ago, but the slaying has striking similarities to the incidents that have occurred during the recent explosion of gun violence among young men in the Providence metropolitan area.

Monteiro and DePina had been smoking marijuana and drinking at the party. Their lives, as well as those of the Silva family, forever changed when a handgun entered the picture.

Less than 24 hours after the shooting, Monteiro and DePina were identified by several of the partygoers. The men were arrested and provided detectives with confessions at the Pawtucket police station. During the interrogation, DePina directed the police to his cousin's house in Central Falls, where he had dropped off the gun.

The Pawtucket and Central Falls police went to Francisco DePina's apartment at 678 Pine St., in Central Falls. The loaded gun with an obliterated serial number was found under a rug in a closet. Investigators also found Eugene DePina's denim jacket with two lollipops in a pocket and Monteiro's pay stub from Rawcliffe Corp., a jewelry manufacturer in Providence.

Back at the police station, Monteiro remembered the detectives whooping it up and high-fiving each other when they returned with the murder weapon that DePina had bought six months earlier for $100.

DePina was the first to go. On Nov. 10, 1993, he pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and received a life sentence. Four weeks later, on Dec. 8, 1993, Monteiro pleaded no contest to a charge of second-degree murder and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Today, DePina remains a prisoner in medium security at the Adult Correctional Institutions, while Monteiro, who was paroled on March 17, 2004, has turned his life around. He has worked at the Institute for the Study & Practice of Nonviolence in Providence for eight years and has risen to the position of assistant training director.

Monteiro, 41, a passionate and emotional man, spends his days preaching nonviolence to prisoners at the ACI, and at colleges, schools and just about anywhere he's invited to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Each week, Monteiro and Abraham Henderson, discharge planner at the Nonviolence Institute, teach a class to a group of young men in the ACI's maximum-security unit; the men are all 25 or younger and are serving time for murder, shootings and other acts of violence.

Henderson and Monteiro had a rapt audience recently as they exhorted the men to better themselves and find other ways besides shooting bullets to resolve "beefs" or conflicts. They handed out photographs of black people defying racism through nonviolent means during the civil rights movement in the 1950s and '60s.

Monteiro told the men that it takes tremendous commitment to calmly take on hatred and injustice. He told the men to spend their time wisely in prison and take advantage of educational opportunities.

"There is not shame in being a criminal," he said. "There's shame in remaining a criminal."

Even though Monteiro was convicted for his role in the fatal shooting of Silva, he has a hard time understanding the obsession that today's young men have with guns. Back when he was a teenager, Monteiro said, he knew several guys with guns and they were considered "crazy."

"Nowadays, if you don't have a gun, or several guns, you are the crazy one," he said.

Monteiro, who dropped out of Hope High School, had no intention of becoming a hard-core criminal when he began serving his time in the ACI's maximum-security unit. He spent the first couple of years learning how to survive behind the prison walls, but he didn't want to waste his time like many other prisoners. He earned his GED, took classes in writing and enrolled in courses at the Community College of Rhode Island and New England Tech. He also was a LifeLiner, a prison counselor for suicidal inmates.

In early summer 1995, Monteiro was in the prison yard when a convict punched him in the head and broke his jaw. He had his jaw wired at Rhode Island Hospital and spent eight weeks consuming food through a straw at the prison's high-security unit. He knew that he would have to confront his attacker when he was returned to maximum security.

Upon his return, there was a buzz in the cafeteria and cell block about the pending showdown. Monteiro remembered standing in the prison yard alone when his attacker and two other tough convicts approached him.

"Want to finish this?" the attacker said. "Let's finish this right now."

Monteiro looked him in the eye and said, "You got it. You won."

The convict couldn't believe it. He and his two friends turned and walked away. No one ever bothered Monteiro again. He began to realize that nonviolence can be a powerful tool to end conflict. He also signed up for an eight-week course at the prison with three Quaker women who talked about conflict resolution through peaceful means. Two of the instructors were "Sensitive Sally" and "Positive Pat."

Back in 1993, at a sentencing, Silva's wife, Zenaida, had submitted a statement to the court about how her husband's murder had destroyed her life.

"I fear that my daughter may someday grow up with anger towards everyone for the death of her father," she wrote. "This scares me every day. I don't want her to ever have to set eyes on the people who killed her father."

Monteiro has spent a lot of time thinking about Silva's murder and what happened to his widow and baby daughter. The guilt remains today, and he often thinks about Ashley Silva, now in her early 20s. He would like to meet her, but a counselor has told him that can only happen if she decided to reach out to him.

"I wonder what she is today," he said. "Did she turn out OK? If I met her and her life is not good … that's a tough thing to swallow."

Monteiro lives with his girlfriend, Carla, and their daughter, Jazelle, 7, near Pawtuxet Village in Warwick. He's very protective of his little girl, and refers to her as "my world." Sometimes, when he's parked alone in the car with his daughter, he thinks about what happened to Fernando Silva on that winter night in Pawtucket. He wonders if the same thing might happen to him.

"I don't deserve to have a beautiful child like her, when I robbed somebody else of that."

New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
Gun Involved Violent Elimination Initiative – G.I.V.E
Field Contact Information

Bronx
Regional Director Gayle Walthall Gayle.Walthall@doccs.ny.gov **(718) 402-3961**
Includes Bronx County

Manhattan – Staten Island
Regional Director William Hogan William.Hogan@doccs.ny.gov **(212) 736-9880**
Includes Manhattan and Richmond Counties

Brooklyn
Regional Director Mary Smith Mary.Smith@doccs.ny.gov **(718) 254-2007**
Includes Kings County

Queens – Long Island
Regional Director Michael Burdi Michael.Burdi@doccs.ny.gov **(718) 558-5227**
Includes: Queens, Nassau and Suffolk Counties

Hudson Valley
Regional Director Ana Enright Ana.Enright@doccs.ny.gov **(914) 654-8691**
Includes: Albany, Schenectady, Greene, Schoharie, Westchester, Rockland, Orange Putnam, Dutchess, Sullivan, Ulster Counties

Central New York
Regional Director Marco Ricci Marco.Ricci@doccs.ny.gov **(518) 459-7469**
Includes: Columbia, Fulton, Montgomery, Rensselaer, Saratoga, Warren, Washington, Onondaga, Cayuga, Cortland, Oswego, Seneca, Onondaga, Jefferson, St. Lawrence, Oneida, Otsego, Herkimer, Hamilton, Chenango, Lewis, Clinton, Essex, Franklin Counties

Western New York
Regional Director Grant Scriven Grant.Scriven@doccs.ny.gov **(716) 847-3938**
Includes: Broome, Delaware, Tioga, Erie, Chemung, Schuyler, Steuben, Tompkins, Yates, Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Monroe, Genesee, Livingston, Ontario, Wayne, Wyoming, Niagara, Orleans Counties

GIVE RFA Data Tables and Attachments

Adam Dean
New York State Crime Reporting Program

DCJS Provided Data Tables

- **Attachment 5** - Shooting Related Violence – GIVE Eligible Jurisdictions.
- **Attachment 7** - 2013 Violent Crime Counts and Rates Per 10,000 Population – GIVE Eligible Jurisdictions.
- **Attachment 5A** - Jurisdiction Specific Data

Where the Data Comes From

- **Crime** – Submitted monthly to the DCJS Crime Reporting Program (UCR/IBR data)
  - Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR)
- **Shooting Data** – Submitted per contractual reporting requirements.
  - Incidents Involving Injury
- **Arrests** – Finger-printable arrest records transmitted to DCJS by Law enforcement.
- **Criminal History** – Person based records stored at DCJS.

Attachment 5: Shooting Related Violence

- Three year (2011-2013) total reported:
  - Violent Crimes Involving a Firearm
  - Shooting Incidents Involving Injury
  - Individuals Killed by Firearm(Shooting Homicides).
- Incident details available at the local level.
- Starting point on potential incidents that could be analyzed.

ATTACHMENT 5

Shooting Related Violence

GIVE Eligible Jurisdictions

Ranked by Violent Crime Involving a Firearm

January 2011 - December 2013

Jurisdiction	Violent Crimes Involving a Firearm	Shooting Incidents Involving Injury	Homicides	Individuals Killed by Gun Violence
Buffalo City PD	3,049	617	131	105
Rochester City PD	2,036	517	107	70
Suffolk County PD	1,326	187	82	39
Syracuse City PD	827	238	46	30
Nassau County PD	781	114	31	19
Mount Vernon City PD	421	68	18	13
Albany City PD	418	104	16	10
Niagara Falls City PD	367	67	10	6
Newburgh City PD	354	100	14	8
Hempstead City PD	348	97	27	17
Yonkers City PD	332	41	17	10

Attachment 7: Crime Counts and Rates

- 2013 crime counts and relative rates:
  - Violent Crime (Murder, Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault)
  - Violent Crimes Involving a Firearm
  - Shooting Incidents Involving Injury
  - Homicides
  - Individuals Killed by Gun Violence

ATTACHMENT 7

2013 Violent Crime Counts and Rates Per 10,000 Population
By GIVE Eligible Jurisdiction Ranked by Violent Crime Volume

		Violent Crime		Violent Crime by Firearm		Shooting Incidents Involving Injury		Homicides		Individuals Killed by Gun Violence	
Jurisdiction	2012 Population	Count	Rate	Count	Rate	Count	Rate	Count	Rate	Count	Rate
Buffalo City PD	262,434	3,249	123.8	951	36.2	171	6.5	47	1.8	35	1.3
Rochester City PD	211,993	2,094	98.8	752	35.5	192	9.1	40	1.9	28	1.3
Suffolk County PD	1,345,578	1,599	11.9	385	2.9	57	0.4	27	0.2	12	0.1
Nassau County PD	1,057,158	1,394	13.2	285	2.7	34	0.3	12	0.1	9	0.1
Syracuse City PD	145,934	1,192	81.7	262	18.0	74	5.1	21	1.4	14	1.0
Yonkers City PD	198,464	1,036	52.2	93	4.7	12	0.6	6	0.3	3	0.2
Albany City PD	98,187	787	80.2	130	13.2	33	3.4	7	0.7	5	0.5
Schenectady City PD	66,631	600	90.0	104	15.6	15	2.3	7	1.1	1	0.2
Niagara Falls City PD	50,356	584	116.0	124	24.6	20	4.0	3	0.6	3	0.6
Mount Vernon City PD	68,146	554	81.3	130	19.1	12	1.8	2	0.3	2	0.3
Newburgh City PD	29,183	435	149.1	109	37.4	36	12.3	5	1.7	4	1.4
Hempstead City PD	54,380	433	79.6	134	24.6	37	6.8	10	1.8	7	1.3
Troy City PD	50,391	371	73.6	81	16.1	7	1.4	1	0.2	0	0.0
Utica City PD	62,445	353	56.5	79	12.7	21	3.4	6	1.0	4	0.6
Binghamton City PD	47,250	286	60.5	35	7.4	2	0.4	3	0.6	1	0.2
Poughkeepsie City PD	32,967	284	86.1	83	25.2	32	9.7	7	2.1	5	1.5
Jamestown City PD	31,187	168	53.9	21	6.7	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Spring Valley Vg PD	31,872	132	41.4	5	1.6	0	0.0	2	0.6	0	0.0
Middletown City PD	28,395	114	40.1	13	4.6	0	0.0	1	0.4	0	0.0
Kingston City PD	24,016	74	30.8	5	2.1	2	0.8	1	0.4	0	0.0

*** Rates are based on 2012 populations.**

Attachment 5A : Jurisdiction Specific Data

- Data related to Firearm Activity, Shooting Incidents Involving Injury, and Homicides.
- Summary analysis prepared by DCJS using reported crime, arrests, and criminal history records.
- Analysis provided as a starting point.
- Must be followed by detailed analysis conducted with local data.

2012 Population: 98,187

Firearm-Related Violence 2011 - 2013

	Annual				% Change	
	2011	2012	2013	5 Yr. Avg (2008-2012)	13 vs. 12	2013 vs. 5 Yr. Avg
Shooting Incidents Involving Injury	44	27	33	36	22.2%	-7.8%
Shooting Homicides	2	3	5	4		
Firearm Related Robbery	91	62	67	86	8.1%	-22.1%
Firearm Related Aggravated Assault	78	52	57	68	9.6%	-15.7%

Shooting Incidents Involving Injury



Individuals Killed by Gun Violence



Homicides (2011 - 2013)

Total			Domestic			Non-Domestic		
Total	Firearm	% Firearm	Total	Firearm	% Firearm	Total	Firearm	% Firearm
16	10	62.5%	2	1	50.0%	14	9	64.3%

Person Arrested or Arraigned with Firearm Charges (2011 - 2013)

	Prior Conviction History			Age at Arrest						Median Age at First Arrest
Count	Felony	Misd Only	None	Under 18	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-34	35+	
274	43.1%	12.8%	44.2%	13.1%	30.3%	19.0%	11.3%	10.2%	16.1%	17.3

Supervision Status Among Persons Arrested or Arraigned for Firearm Charges (2011 - 2013)

		On Probation		On Parole	
Count	Unsupervised	Count	%	Count	%
274	220	27	9.9%	27	9.9%

Firearm Homicide Victims - Non-Domestic (2011 - 2013)

	Age of Victim					
Count	Under 18	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-34	35+
9	0.0%	11.1%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	22.2%

Key Facts

- In the past 3 years, the 20 GIVE eligible jurisdictions accounted for:
  - 86% of the non-domestic shooting homicides outside of NYC
  - 63% of all persons charged with a firearm offense outside of NYC.
- Majority of persons charged with a firearm offense:
  - Are under 25,
  - Have no prior convictions or adjudications,
  - Had their first arrest as a teenager, and
  - Are most likely not under current supervision.
- Majority of non-domestic shooting homicide victims are young black males.

Interpreting the Data Sheet

Jurisdiction Specific Data

Firearm-Related Violence 2011 - 2013

	Annual				% Change	
	2011	2012	2013	5 Yr. Avg (2008-2012)	13 vs. 12	2013 vs. 5 Yr. Avg
Shooting Incidents Involving Injury	44	27	33	36	22.2%	-7.8%
Shooting Homicides	2	3	5	4		
Firearm Related Robbery	91	62	67	86	8.1%	-22.1%
Firearm Related Aggravated Assault	78	52	57	68	9.6%	-15.7%

Shooting Incidents Involving Injury



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2013	1	1	1	2	1	3	2	5	8	3	1	5
2012	0	0	2	1	7	3	3	3	3	3	1	1
5 Year Avg (2008-2012)	1	3	2	3	5	5	3	3	3	2	2	3

Individuals Killed by Gun Violence



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2013	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
2012	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
5 Year Avg (2008-2012)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0

Jurisdiction Specific Data

Homicides (2011 - 2013)

Total			Domestic			Non-Domestic		
Total	Firearm	% Firearm	Total	Firearm	% Firearm	Total	Firearm	% Firearm
107	70	65.4%	16	1	6.3%	91	69	75.8%

- 65% of all homicides are shootings
- 76% of non-domestics are shootings

Jurisdiction Specific Analysis

Person Arrested or Arraigned with Firearm Charges (2011 - 2013)

	Prior Conviction History			Age at Arrest						Median Age at First Arrest
Count	Felony	Misd Only	None	Under 18	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-34	35+	
1,823	22.8%	16.1%	61.1%	14.9%	35.7%	19.4%	10.3%	8.3%	11.4%	17.6



- Median age at their first arrest 17.6

Jurisdiction Specific Analysis

Person Arrested or Arraigned with Firearm Charges (2011 - 2013)

	Prior Conviction History			Age at Arrest						Median Age at First Arrest
Count	Felony	Misd Only	None	Under 18	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-34	35+	
1,823	22.8%	16.1%	61.1%	14.9%	35.7%	19.4%	10.3%	8.3%	11.4%	17.6

- 61% have no prior conviction.
- Only 23% have a prior felony conviction/adjudication.

Jurisdiction Specific Analysis

Supervision Status Among Persons Arrested or Arraigned for Firearm Charges (2011 - 2013)

		On Probation		On Parole	
Count	Unsupervised	Count	%	Count	%
571	467	64	11.2%	40	7.0%

- 18% are under supervision
  - 11% on Probation
  - 7% on Parole
- 82% are not under supervision

Jurisdiction Specific Analysis

Firearm Homicide Victims - Non-Domestic (2011 - 2013)

	Age of Victim					
Count	Under 18	18-21	22-25	26-29	30-34	35+
102	4.9%	20.6%	21.6%	21.6%	15.7%	15.7%



Utilizing Data Table and Attachments (Recap)

- DCJS analysis of local data summarizes what jurisdictions already know in a standard format
- Data should be used to help applicants plan their local assessment of firearms activity, shootings and homicides:
  - Provides general trends
  - Characteristics of those charged
  - Supervision status of those charged.

GIVE and Crime Analysis

Tony Perez
DCJS

An Award or Two

- 2009 "Best of New York" award for Best IT Collaboration Among Organizations, presented by the Center for Digital Government.
- 2010 "Emergency Management Digital Distinction Award" for Best Process Improvement, presented by Emergency Management Magazine.
- 2010 "Special Achievement in GIS Award" for Crime Mapping presented by ESRI.
- 2010 "First Place for Intelligence Products" and "Third Place for Statistical Reports" awarded to the Onondaga Crime Analysis Center, presented by the International Association of Crime Analysts and the Center for Problem Oriented Policing.
- 2011 "First Place for Intelligence Bulletin" awarded to the Monroe Crime Analysis Center; "Second Place in Statistical Analysis," "Second Place for Tactical Analysis," and "Third Place for Intelligence Bulletin" awarded to the Albany Crime Analysis Center by the International Association of Crime Analysts.
- 2012 "1st Place" GIS/SIG Annual Spacial Digital Mapping Conference map contest awarded to Wendell Associates for the Erie Crime Analysis Center web map.
- 2012 "Second Place for Statistical Reports" category awarded to the Onondaga Crime Analysis Center OCAC by the International Association of Crime Analysts.
- 2013 – 5 out of 12 Awards at the International Association Crime Analyst Annual Conference


New York Crime Analysis Centers
Timely and Effective Products
Crime Analysis Center
Probationer Arrests To Probation
Parolee Arrests To Parole
Known Offenders Arrests to PD and DA
Digital Signage
Daily Gang Arrests to Gang Group
Camera Map
Active Known Offender Bulletin
Recently Released Parolees
Active Crime Series
Parolee arrests, pawns, cases, FIR contacts
Probationer arrests, pawns, cases, FIR contacts
Known Offender with Warrants
Daily Meeting With PD
Gang Group For County
IMPACT
Gun Violence Implementation Team
Burglary Meeting With County
Community Policing Internal Advisory Panel
Active Pawner List
30 Day Burglary Bulletin
Shots Fired Calls for Service
Investigative Synopsis To PD
Stolen Property Report
Gang Profiles
Gun Profiles
Robbery Profiles
Bulletins Email ListServ To every LE agency in County
Intranet to PCs and Cars


NYS Crime Analysis Center Data Resources
Data-Sharing Network – Federated Search Engine of Local PD RMS Systems
Onondaga Crime Analysis Center
Erie Crime Analysis Center
Broome County CAC
NYS SOR
NYS DOCCS
NYS Probation
Pistol Permit App
New York State Police
SHARING DATA:
83 PD Agencies
PENDING CONNECTION:
6 PD Agencies
NETWORKED LPR DATA:
64% of NYS Part I Crime
Albany, Erie, Monroe, Nassau Onondaga, and Suffolk Counties represent more than 60% of the reported Part I Crime in NYS outside of NYC. The DIG Network provides search capacities for each of these jurisdiction's RMS systems. At minimum, each agency provides all Incidents, Persons and Address data. Many agencies provide significant additional RMS, LPR and other crime data that furthers the capacity to identify shared offenders and to identify related offenses occurring in multiple jurisdictions.
Connections to the 6 Agencies Highlighted in Gray are Currently Under Construction
Updated April 2013

Crime Analyst Website

- Designed as a way to increase communication between analysts across New York State
  - Information Sharing Tool
  - Networking
  - Data Sharing
  - Analyst Spotlight Link
  - Upcoming Training Link

NY State Crime Analysis Training

- Upcoming Training
  - i2 Analyst's Notebook
  - Microsoft Excel Training
  - Microsoft Access Training
  - Courtroom Testimony for Crime Analysts
- Future Plans
  - HIDTA PIMS (Facial Recognition Training)
  - Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Training

Crime Analyst Level 1 Certification

- Free exam given to: NYS analysts, students and analysts from other states
- Next Exam - May 17, 2014
  - Albany County
  - Erie County
  - Monroe County
  - Nassau County
  - Onondaga County
- There are plans to update the exam based on developments in Crime Analysis
- A discussion to create a Level 2 Certification has begun

Contact Information:

Carolyn Cassidy

NYS Crime Analysis Training Director

•Email: cpcgcj@rit.edu

•Cell: 321-591-4285

Probation/FIO Initiative Presentation

mcac

Basic Probation Demographics

- As of 2/11/14: 6066 adult probationers
  - 4474 males, 1579 females, 5 unknown
  - White: 3,353, African American: 2,513, Asian: 50, American Indian: 20, Other: 59, Unknown: 59
  - Age Breakdown:
    - 18-25: 1617
    - 26-35: 1841
    - 36-45: 1075

Objectives

- Target high risk offenders
- Target offenders on for IMPACT/GIVE crimes
- An example of probation related crimes:
  - 2013 homicide number for City of Rochester: 42
    - Of those victims:
      - 6 active probationers, 1 pending PSI, 19 had prior contacts with probation and 16 had no probation contacts
    - Of those Arrested (32 arrestees in 24 cases):
      - 5 active probationers, 22 had prior contacts with probation and 5 had no probation contacts

Probation Analyst's Daily Responsibilities

- Preparing the nightly violence summary
- Identify high risk probationers
  - FIF's
  - Social Media
  - CI Information/TIPS
- Preparing search details and briefing sheets
  - Prioritizing targets
- Monitoring Facebook
- Fielding PO requests
- Act as a liaison between police department and probation department

Probation FIO Daily Responsibilities

- Help analyst identify problem probationers
- Execute probation search conditions
- Obtain search orders, when probationer does not have search conditions
- Testify before court on cases in which items were seized/ charges were filed as a result of search conditions or orders
- Maintain probation evidence room
- Act as a liaison between police department and probation department

Results

Years	Searches	Handguns	Long guns	Replica guns and BB guns	Cocaine	Marijuana	Heroin	Molly	Cash
2013	192	4	45	15	103.9g	1288g	20g	22g	6,320
2012	222	30	43	18	138.2g	635g	2.8g		6,220
2011	126	14	26	10	55.2g	1447g	.06g		3,059
2010	135	9	30	12	37.2g	2676g	2.84g		12,693
2009	111	17	18	8	160g	3776g	13.1g		5,114
2008	47	12	21	7	5.6g	210g			250

Violent Offender Identification

Offender based weighted criteria



Offender of Shots Fired since 2009
History prior to shots fired incident





Albany PD Response to Identified Subjects

- Weekly Review by APD and Stakeholders
  - Discussed During APD Weekly Operations Meeting
  - APD Command; Parole, Probation, ACDA, US Federal Probation
  - Follow up on previously discussed subjects
- For newly identified subjects, potential action plans discussed.
  - Address outstanding Warrants/Wants
  - Determine if any Court or Supervision issues currently pending.
  - Identify if a potential for current ongoing criminal activity.



Shooting Suspect/Victim Packets

- A packet is created for every shooting suspects/victim
- Packets Include:
  - Pedigree information
  - Incident synopsis
  - Known addresses, phone numbers
  - Every incident with subject on a police report
  - Known associates
  - Every police report
- Streamlined process- using Crystal Reports
  - Enter name/DOB into database to query all information at once
- Disseminated through ECAC website

Shooting Victim Packets

Shooting Victim

[redacted]



Gang Member: LRPG
Alias: Shaq

Prepared By: ECAC
716-851-4452

Phone Numbers	As of
716-882-9866	8/14/2013
716-444-0538	8/9/2013
716-603-6447	8/9/2013
716-563-0304	5/19/2013

Attached:
Summary of police reports
Summary of known associates
RICI arrest history
All police reports involving victim

Last Known Address	As of
[redacted]	8/14/2013
[redacted]	8/9/2013
[redacted]	5/19/2013
[redacted]	1/31/2012
[redacted]	5/6/2011



On Wednesday, 8/14/13, 15:50 hours [redacted] reported that while exiting the store at 137 Maple, a black male wearing all dark clothing ran toward him carrying a silver / chrome revolver. The suspect fired several rounds, striking Coleman on the right arm / elbow. Suspect then fled toward Locust. A vehicle which appeared to be a clean black 2001 Grand AM was seen fleeing the scene. Coleman was treated at BGH.

Law Enforcement Sensitive- For Investigative Purposes Only

Police Reports Involving Subject

Agency	Incident #	Date	Address	Role	Arrest?	Occurrence Type	Notes
BUF	133230687	11/19/13	[redacted]	Complainant	N	Shots Fired	Shot 6 times
BUF	132890958	10/16/13	[redacted]	Offender	Y	Narcotics	23 bags of marijuana confiscated
BUF	121150650	4/24/12	[redacted]	Suspect	N	Larceny/Theft	
BUF	111710455	6/20/11	[redacted]	Offender	Y	Dis. Con.	Resisted arrest
CHE	09940756	11/2/09	[redacted]	Offender	Y	Petit Larceny	
BUF	083140808	11/10/08	[redacted]	Offender	Y	Obstruction	
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Subject	N	Dis. Con.	
AMH	06613939	4/17/06	[redacted]	Offender	N	Trespass	

[redacted]wn Associates of Subject

Agency	Complaint	Date Occur	[redacted]	Last Name	DOB	Person Type	Source
BUF	121150650	4/24/12	[redacted]	Mcdowell	6/9/69	Complainant	Police Report
BUF	111710455	6/20/11	[redacted]	Bennett	12/26/62	Complainant	Police Report
AMH	06613939	4/17/06	[redacted]	Gutillo	12/11/76	Victim	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Anderson	10/10/89	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Cook	4/17/90	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Cook	4/17/90	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Cook	4/3/62	Parent	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Hairston	5/2/90	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Honeycutt	11/25/92	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Martin	5/24/89	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Palmer	12/13/89	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Smith	3/26/91	Subject	Police Report
AMH	08818818	5/4/08	[redacted]	Walker	4/21/89	Subject	Police Report
AMH	06613939	4/17/06	[redacted]	Hairston	5/2/90	Offender	Police Report
AMH	06613939	4/17/06	[redacted]	Palmer	12/13/89	Offender	Police Report
CHE	09940756	11/2/09	[redacted]	Kim		Complainant	Police Report
CHE	09940756	11/2/09	[redacted]	Watson	6/11/89	Offender	Police Report
			[redacted]	Palmer		Kin	JMS Jail Vistor



AMHERST POLICE
POLICE REPORT
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 2ND

Complaint 06-609170
Report Date & Time 3/11/06 21:05

INCIDENT — Status: Exceptionally Cleared

Address of Occurence	Occ. Date & Time	District	Day of Week	Type of Premise
141 WINDERMERE BD	3/11/06 21:05	04	Saturday	

Officers: 234 - LEISING, 424 - BROWN, 040 - EDWARDS, 415 - MANN
Rep. Off.: 424 - BROWN
Supervisor: 515 - MCGONAGLE

REPORTING PERSON - 1

Last Name	First Name	MI	Ext	Birth Date	Race	Sex	Age	Juvenile	Arrested
[redacted]									

Address / City / State / Zip / Home Phone / Work Phone: [redacted]

Height / Weight / Hair / Eyes / Build / Complexion / Glasses / Scars/Marks/Tattoos:

SUBJECT - 1

Last Name	First Name	MI	Ext	Birth Date	Race	Sex	Age	Juvenile	Arrested
JUVENILE	JUVENILE				W	F	14	Y	N

Address / City / State / Zip / Home Phone / Work Phone:

Height / Weight / Hair / Eyes / Build / Complexion / Glasses / Scars/Marks/Tattoos:

SUBJECT - 2

Last Name	First Name	MI	Ext	Birth Date	Race	Sex	Age	Juvenile	Arrested
JUVENILE	JUVENILE				W	F	15	Y	N

Address / City / State / Zip / Home Phone / Work Phone:

Height / Weight / Hair / Eyes / Build / Complexion / Glasses / Scars/Marks/Tattoos:

SUBJECT - 3

Last Name	First Name	MI	Ext	Birth Date	Race	Sex	Age	Juvenile	Arrested
[redacted]									

Address / City / State / Zip / Home Phone / Work Phone: [redacted]

Height / Weight / Hair / Eyes / Build / Complexion / Glasses / Scars/Marks/Tattoos:

SUBJECT - 4

Last Name	First Name	MI	Ext	Birth Date	Race	Sex	Age	Juvenile	Arrested
JUVENILE	JUVENILE				W	F	14	Y	N

Address / City / State / Zip / Home Phone / Work Phone:

Height / Weight / Hair / Eyes / Build / Complexion / Glasses / Scars/Marks/Tattoos:

SUBJECT - 5

Last Name	First Name	MI	Ext	Birth Date	Race	Sex	Age	Juvenile	Arrested



Crystal Reports

Agency	Complaint	Date Occurr	[redacted]	Person Type	Arrest	Sealed	Occurrence Type
BUF	140410840	02/10/2014	[redacted]	Victim	N	N	Robbery
THM	11000590	01/10/2011	[redacted]	Subject	Y	N	Grand Larceny 4Th (Mv)
BUF	102960668	10/23/2010	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	V & T Offenses
CHE	09940439	10/31/2009	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Agg Unlicensed Oper 2Nd
BUF	083400748	12/05/2008	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Narcotics
BUF	083250896	11/20/2008	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Narcotics
BUF	080330847	02/02/2008	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Narcotics
BUF	071350163	05/15/2007	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Burglary
AMH	06611442	03/29/2006	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Arrest On Warrant
BUF	060810201	03/22/2006	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Child Neglect
AMH	05541337	10/03/2005	[redacted]	Subject	N	N	Arrest On Warrant
BUF	052720525	09/29/2005	[redacted]	Offender	N	N	Larceny/Theft
AMH	05510003	03/14/2005	[redacted]	Offender	N	N	Arrest On Warrant
BUF	050700431	03/11/2005	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Resist Arrest
AMH	04427785	07/01/2004	[redacted]	Offender	N	N	Arrest On Warrant
BUF	041810580	06/29/2004	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Narcotics
BUF	040480966	02/17/2004	[redacted]	Offender	Y	N	Narcotics

Agency	Complaint	Date Occurr	[redacted]	Last Name	DOB	Person Type	Arrested
CHE	99922184	07/09/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Subject	N
CHE	99916070	05/20/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Offender	Y
CHE	99909138	03/19/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	11/20/1979	Offender	Y
CHE	99909138	03/19/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]		Victim	N
CHE	99909138	03/19/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	07/19/1969	Witness	N
CHE	99909138	03/19/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Offender	Y
CHE	99909138	03/19/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	10/23/1957	Witness	N
CHE	99909138	03/19/1999	[redacted]	[redacted]	03/03/1983	Offender	Y
BUF	062031026	07/22/2006	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Offender	Y
BUF	041370768	05/16/2004	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Offender	Y
WSE	03315245	12/09/2003	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Suspect	N
WSE	03315245	12/09/2003	[redacted]	[redacted]		Victim	N
BUF	032440928	09/01/2003	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Offender	Y
BUF	0304728	05/16/2004	[redacted]	[redacted]	12/28/1980	Offender	N

Associates and involved police reports are queried in Crystal Reports

Disseminated on ECAC Website



Contact Information

Jamie Giammaresi - Director
Erie Crime Analysis Center
74 Franklin St
Buffalo NY, 14202
(716) 851-4452
ECAC@bpdny.org

Syracuse Truce

A Focused Deterrence Initiative

Onondaga
Crime
Analysis
Center

Sarah Pierce
Crime Analyst, NYS Level 1
Onondaga Crime Analysis Center
NYGIA Advanced Gang Specialist

511 S State St, Syracuse, NY 13202
spierce@syracusepolice.org
(315) 442-5645x5068 Desk
(315) 731-7435 Cell
(315) 442-5646 Fax

Focused Deterrence

- Deterrence:
  - Certainty, Severity, & Celerity
- Focused Deterrence:
  - Additional sanctions for specific type of offense
  - Focus on high-risk offenders
  - Strategic direct threat

Syracuse Gang/Group Violence

- Approximately 20-25 violent gangs and groups: approximately 2,000 members and associates
- OCAC /SPD Intel gather & maintain information
  - Police Reports
  - Social Media
  - Debriefings
  - Intel-Gathering Sessions
  - CRUD
  - GRIP
  - Truce Database

OCAC / Intel & Gang Intelligence

- Locations of Gun- Violence

  Density of Shots Fired, Shootings w/ Injury, and Homicide (by gun)



Multiple Use Firearms



OCAC / Intel & Gang Intelligence

- Locations of Gang-Related Offenses and Gun- Violence

SHOT /SHOI/HOMI 1 year



Gang-Related Offenses/Territory



Gang-Related Gun-Violence

- Approximately 50% of gun violence is gang-related

**2013 gang-related # will likely increase as further intelligence is gathered*

2013 YTD	Total	Gang Related	Percent
Homicide by Gun	14	5	
Shooting w/ Injury	64	40	
Shots Fired	225	61	
	303	106	35%

2012	Total	Gang Related	Percent
Homicide by Gun	11	7	
Shooting w/ Injury	84	55	
Shots Fired	236	102	
	331	164	50%

2011	Total	Gang Related	Percent
Homicide by Gun	4	4	
Shooting w/ Injury	90	57	
Shots Fired	270	114	
	364	175	48%

2010	Total	Gang Related	Percent
Homicide by Gun	13	11	
Shooting w/ Injury	81	52	
Shots Fired	255	100	
	349	163	47%

2009	Total	Gang Related	Percent
Homicide by Gun	11	8	
Shooting w/ Injury	72	51	
Shots Fired	173	75	
	256	134	52%

Partnerships

- Law Enforcement
  - OCAC
  - All SPD Divisions
  - NYSP
  - OCSO
  - FBI
  - DEA
  - ATF
  - USM
  - Social Services Investigator
  - Onondaga County DA's Office
  - US Attorney's Office
  - Onondaga County Probation
  - Federal Probation
  - DOCCS
- Services
  - Salvation Army (coordinates with over 20 services agencies)
  - Gifford Foundation
- Community

Moving Forward with Truce

- Evaluation
  - Annual Reports
    - SPD "Truce Team" created, ideas shared
  - Continue with meetings
    - Monthly updates & Overall violence stats presented
- Continue with enforcement actions on triggering events
- Additional notifications
  - Direct Contacts / Street Outreach
  - Call-Ins
    - Highlight enforcement actions
- OJJDP funding for the "Cure Violence Initiative"
  - Complements Truce. Offers to reduce violence further through and by additional means and measures

Impact of Truce on OCAC

- Highlights data-driven approach to policing
  - Large-scale intelligence packets
- Increased communication, visibility, and partnership
  - Cohesion & information sharing among SPD units and OCAC
    - Direct communication and partnership in major investigations
  - Outside law enforcement agency networking
  - Increased knowledge of gangs
  - Increased knowledge of services and community involvement
  - Increased skills in data management

Not just "Truce" but all prolific offenders

Feedback

Sarah Pierce
Crime Analyst, NYS Level 1
Onondaga Crime Analysis Center
NYGIA Advanced Gang Specialist
511 S State St, Syracuse, NY 13202
spierce@syracusepolice.org
(315) 442-5645x5068 Desk
(315) 442-5646 Fax

Director Ronald Rockwood
511 S State St, Syracuse, NY 13202
Ronald.Rockwood@dcjs.ny.gov
(315) 442-5225 Desk
(315) 442-5646 Fax


Questions?
Tony Perez
Deputy Commissioner Office of Public Safety
518 485 7610

GMS

- Http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/gms.htm

- Update your contact information: primary, signatory and fiscal
- Pages 10 to 12 – How to build the budget and restrictions
- Page 16 – How you will be rated
- Justification is limited to 3 pages

Final Check Points

- Do not exceed your tier ranking for your budget.
- Does each budget line reflect a need in your strategy and is justified accordingly?
- Is there travel funds for training and technical assistance events?
- Verify all budget items are allowable.
- Have you completed M/WBE FORMS?

CONTACT INFORMATION

RFP and Q & A

http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/newrfp.htm

General GMS Information:

- funding@dcjs.ny.gov
  or (518) 457-9787

M/WBE Information and help

- Joann Tierney-Daniels, DCJS Criminal Justice Rep 2
  (518)457-0002

http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/mwbe/index.htm